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SOCRATES And what of the monarch's art? In ruling over
all that comes under its rule, what does it
produce? Perhaps you are not quite ready with
the answer.
CRITO I am not indeed, Socrates.
SOCRATES Nor were we, Crito; yet so much you know,
that if this is really the one we are seeking, it
must be beneficial.
CRITO Certainly.
SOCRATES Then surely it must purvey something good?
CRITO Necessarily, Socrates.
SOCRATES And you know we agreed with each other,
Clenias and I, that nothing can be good but
some sort of knowledge.
CRITO Yes, so you told me.
SOCRATES And it was found that all affects in general that
you may ascribe to statesmanship — and a great
many of them there must be, presumably, if the
citizens are to be made wealthy and free and
immune from fraction — all these things were
neither bad nor good, while this art must make
us wise and impart knowledge, if it really was to
be the one which benefited us and made us
happy.
CRITO True: so at all events you agreed then, by your
account of the discussion.
Plato, Eu/Aydemju (292 A-C). In: «a/o in 7te/ve Verfumw II, translated by W.R.M. Lamb,
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For a long time, at least since the Second World War, governments
have tried to control education in order to turn it into an instrument of
economic policy." Education is seen as an important investment, both
on the individual and social level, with long-term consequences for up
to 40 years, the length of a working career. As a result of this aim an
extensive literature appeared on 'educational planning' or 'manpower
forecasting'.* Typically, these studies attempt, on the one hand, to
forecast or calculate future needs or requirements for educated labour,
and on the other hand, to forecast future supplies of the same type of
educated labour. The need for educated labour is derived from the
demands for labour at the market, or from a policy target, for example
a certain level of economic growth. The comparison of supply and
needs gives an indication of the surpluses or shortages for certain types
of educated labour. These indications about the future labour market can
be used for policies which aim at improving the match between supply
and demand for labour, or at achieving the policy target.
Mostly, however, this literature only deals with the question how to
forecast the future labour market situation, while little attention is paid
to the question how to use these forecasts. In an OECD report,
Soumelis (1983, pp. 34-35) states 'that educational planning efforts in
the analysis of the education-labour relationship will be particulary
directed towards [...] increasing and managing the information flow
from the labour market to the potential students to facilitate their
educational decisions, leaving to the labour market the allocative
function to balance up demand and supply'.' In the same report
Tinbergen and Psacharopoulos (1983, p. 309) add that 'precisely
because education processes take considerable time, it is possible to
warn both potential suppliers and potential demanders of some type of
labour ahead of time of possible discrepancies giving them time to take
measures in favour of equalising supply and demand. Information of
this type already exists; secondary school leavers are provided with
information about the demand for alternative third level jobs open to
them. This will have an impact especially on those whose endowment
with intellect or other capabilities makes them hesitant about exactly
what job to aim at.'
Also in Dutch policy the idea that students have to be guided towards
jobs according to the labour market situation plays an important role.
1 See f.g. Blaug (1967).
2 Hinchliffe (1987), Hughes (1991), and Van Eijs (1993) give overviews of this literature.
3 Soumelis also mentions curriculum changes as an important area for educational planning.The Socio-Economic Council (SER, 1986, pp. 10-11) states that 'by
involving labour market information in the planning it can be achieved
that the correcting developments which now occur with a delay by
means of the educational choices of students in relation to employment
forecasts, will occur at an earlier stage and will therefore occur with
more effect'.* The Temporary Advisory Board Education-Labour
Market agrees with this and adds that 'in her opinion it is important to
involve also labour market developments and perspectives in educational
and occupational guidance'.' These thoughts about the need for
manpower forecasts imply that students themselves are not capable of
adequately anticipating the future labour market situation at the moment
they have to make their educational choices, and therefore they may
benefit from the judgements of experts. This gap between the foresight
of students and professional forecasters makes it possible to improve the
functioning of the labour market without direct intervention in the
economic process, as for example in entry barriers and tuition policies.
As a result of this policy view in the Netherlands, the Research Centre
for Education and the Labour Market (ROA) started to provide data and
forecasts about the labour market for an automated system for study and
occupational choice.' The largest and best developed information
service of this type is provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
of the United States Department of Labor. After the second world war
BLS started to collect detailed information about the labour market.
Initially, this information was used to inform veterans about their
possibilities on the labour market. Later, this policy was extended to
anyone who wanted to embark on a study. The information was only
descriptive. From 1962, however, BLS started to make forecasts. These
forecasts are published in among others the biannual Occuparicvw/
0H//o0)fc //andfrooit.' This book includes job descriptions and expected
prospects of many occupations, and is designed to help people make
educational and vocational decisions.'
4 'Dear het betrekken van arheidsmarktgegevens bij de planning kan bereikt worden dat de
corrigerenile ontwikkelingen die zich nu vertraagd voordoen door middel van de
schoolkeuze van leerlingen in relatie met werkgelegenheidsprognoses, in een eerder
stadium en dus met meer resultaat kunnen optreden.'
5 Tijdelijke Adviescommissie Onderwijs-Arbeidsmaikt (1990, p. 24). 'Naar haar oordeei is
het van belang in de studie- en beroepskeuzevoorlichting ook irbeidsmarktontwikkelingen
en perspectieven te betrekken.'
6 See r j. De Grip, Heijke, and Dekker (1989).
7 See r*. BLS (1984).
8 In many other countries also labour market forecasts at detailed level are nude, but mostly
these are only used for policy making, and not to assist students' educational choice. £.£.
in the United Kingdom the Institute for Employment Research (1ER) publishes the /fcvifw
</ fnr £ro/i(vny and Erryi/oyrwnr (Wilson rr a/., 1991) and in Germany the Institut fur/n/rrx/urrion 3
The eminent metaphor to describe the ignorance of students with respect
to changes in the labour market situation is the cobweb-model. In this
model, it is assumed that students base their enrolment decisions on
current wages instead of anticipating the labour-market situation at the
moment they enter the market. Suppose there is a surplus of students
entering the market for a particular type of educated labour. As a
consequence, wages will fall, resulting in decreasing enrolment, because
new students base their decisions on current wages, which are low. This
leads to a shortage on the market at the moment these students finish
their schooling and consequently wages will rise again. This mechanism
shows that the behaviour of inexperienced students may lead to
matching problems and that the best way to overcome these problems is
to inform students adequately about their real prospects.
Not only from practical policy but also from theoretical economic
studies, the relevance of providing labour market information to assist
students in their educational choices has been noted. Based on a study
of Hayek's view of the economic order as a system of communication
Pikkemaat (1969, thesis 5) states that 'the most important condition for
preserving employment as labour productivity increases is a lasting
correct match between the composition of demand and the composition
of supply on all markets. For that, information is required which is
increasingly detailed and centralised, also with regard to the individual
preferences of families. This last issue will result in government getting
involved in market research, in a more integrated way than is currently
being carried out by industrial enterprises and the like." Furthermore,
one of Freeman's (1971, p. 229) eight policy implications for education
and manpower policy is that 'the existence of lengthy disequilibriums
under incomplete adjustments directs attention to the value of manpower
forecasts in the labour market. Since career decisions result from a
rational consideration of alternatives, students are likely to react
favourably to a comprehensive, high quality set of forecasts.' Freeman's
suggestion is that the informational problems students are faced with,
will be reduced by means of a set of high quality forecasts. Such
forecasts counteract the disequilibria on the labour market and are
Arbeidsmarkt- und Berufsforschung GAB) makes forecasts concerning the labour market
GAB, 1990).
"De voornaamste voorwaarde voor het behoud van de werkgelegenheid bij toenemende
arbeidsproductiviteit is een blijvend juiste afstemming op elkaar van de samenstelling van
de vraag en de samenstelling van het aanbod op alle markten. Daartoe is steeds meer
gedetailleerde en gecentraliseerde informatie nodig, ook betreffende de individuele
preferences van de gezinshuishoudingen. Dit laatste zal er toe leiden, dat de overheid zicb
met marktonderzoek gaat bemoeien, en wel op een meer integrate wijze dan nu geschiedt
door industriele ondernemingen en dergelijke.'favourable to students.
The aim of this study is to investigate this intuitive relation between the
provision of public labour market forecasts, educational choice, and
functioning of the labour market, especially the effects on the stability
of the market and welfare effects of such a policy. There is some
literature concerning topics which are closely connected. Freeman
(1971, 1989), Zarkin (1983, 1985), Siow (1984) and Connelly (1989)
investigate students' expectation formation with respect to labour market
conditions. Freebairn (1976), Freebairn and Withers (1979) and
Antonovitz and Roe (1986) try to measure the value of information.
Finally, Smyth (1973) and Turnovsky (1978) are devoted to the
stabilisation effects of public forecasts.
The theory developed in these publications is, however, to some extent
naive where the problem of public forecasts is concerned. On the one
hand, by assuming that students take the current labour market situation
into account, instead of anticipate the future situation, students are too
easily regarded as naive. The cobweb behaviour is simply assumed and
not explained. The only alternative put forward in the literature is the
assumption of rational expectations in which the need for public
forecasts is denied. On the other hand, just as students' expectation
formations, public forecasts will never be perfect, and will always be
subject to a large amount of uncertainty. The studies mentioned above
ignore this problem by simply assuming that the public forecasts are
perfect, or at least by assuming that students will treat those forecasts as
totally reliable. In view of the great difficulties manpower forecasting is
confronted with in practice, these assumptions trivialise the question too
much.
This facet of errors in forecasting is particulary important for the field
of labour market expectations of students. Rosen (1987, p. 179)
compares investments in human capital with other investments in for
example buildings or production capacity and concludes that 'there is an
important difference between the two. Business investment activities in
the private sector are placed in hands of a relatively small cadre of
highly trained and highly skilled professionals. These people continually
obtain market feedback on the wisdom of their judgements and
repeatedly revise and revalue their decisions as new information comes
available. Education decisions, on the other hand, are squarely in the
hands of young people and their parents. They are usually made at early
stages of life, before the acquisition of significant practical experience,
and do not continually occur.' An attempt to give a theoretical basis for
the effects of the provision of public labour market forecasts, at leasthas to grasp the sense of this type of uncertainty, which hampers the
educational choice of students.
The significance of this study is that it attempts to reconsider economic
theory on expectations and information, departing from the practical
experience of labour market forecasting. The problems connected with
the labour market forecast activities of the Research Centre for
Education and the Labour Market have greatly influenced the contents
of this study.'" It appears that the existing theory is not always
adequate to describe these practical experiences and intuitive notions
about expectations, prediction errors and information. Therefore, these
theories will be reinterpreted and new theoretical concepts will be added
in order to create a framework to deal with the questions about the
effects of the providing public forecasts.
At the practical level the concepts developed in this study may
contribute to a foundation of certain common practices in manpower
forecasting and the provision of labour market information, while
furthermore it may provide a framework for the development of new
methods for producing and providing public information.
These new concepts may not only be useful at a practical, but also at a
theoretical level. The field of educational choice is only a marginal area
for economic theory, but, as mentioned before, it provides an example
to economic theory in general, which is far more extreme in certain
aspects than the usual examples. This is most clearly the case for the
role of uncertainty in educational choice. Therefore, the results of this
study may sharpen the thoughts about information and expectations in
mainstream economic fields, such as monetary policy and savings
behaviour. Decision makers at, for example, a financial market will be
much more experienced than students, making less obvious errors than
students do. Furthermore, these professionals will in general behave
much more in agreement with each other and with economic theory.
Errors in their expectations will therefore appear as being unavoidable.
For many students the choice of education is very difficult. The decision
may have far-reaching consequences, and it is often not possible for
students to cope adequately with the complexity of the labour market.
This aspect of uncertainty, which is typical for educational choice, and
which, as a consequence, enables more specialised forecasters, to
contribute towards improving students' expectations, is the main subject
of this study.
10 See r.g. Heijke (1986) and Heijke and De Grip (1991) for the labour market forecast
activities of the Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA).7.7 Pfon o/ f/ie
The usual approach to model expectations in an uncertain situation is to
start with a model of the economic relationships. The economic reality
is thought to be at hand. Within the framework of such model people's
expectations are described, and therefore in such model these
expectations are by assumption correct, i.e. consistent with the model,
or are formulated ad /ioc, i.e. the expectations are not related to the
economic variable that has to be predicted. From this point of view
there necessarily is a fixed relation between the expectation and
observable economic data. Such a fixed expectation formation scheme
contradicts, however, the everyday experience that forecasting requires
power of thought (not simply calculations) and that always at least some
doubt is felt about the correctness of the forecast. Although due to the
sophisticated mathematical modelling it may be difficult to recognise,
the current approach to expectations is always based on some postulated
a priori knowledge of the agents about the economic system, or views
people's behaviour as an effect of the circumstances. In both cases the
essence of forecasting is lost. A forecast is an attempt to say what is to
happen in the future. The first approach makes this attempt to a
triviality, in which the forecast is enclosed in the available data, while
in the second approach expectations are disconnected from the future.
In contrast with this usual approach, this study takes the possibility of
people to make forecasts as a starting point, without reference to the
'real model' which generates the economic data. Although forecasts of a
certain variable are always directed towards the realisation of this
variable, the quality of this forecast may differ between people,
indicating differences in individual capabilities to forecast.
! This study consists of three main parts. In the first part,
some basic concepts, mismatch and equilibrium (chapter 2), and a basic
labour market model (chapter 3) are introduced. Since a direct reference
to the 'real model' or 'data generating proces' disappears, it makes no
sense to compare expectations to this real model, but it requires as a
benchmark the realisations. Therefore, the meaning of a correct
expectation changes from 'consistent with the model' to 'corresponding
to the actual realisation', i.e. correct expectations are expectations that
are fulfilled. Equilibrium is defined, in a Hayekian way, as a situation
in which all expectations are correct in this sense and therefore in
equilibrium not one student regrets his educational choice at the time he
participates in the labour market. Deviations from equilibrium are called
mismatch. The policy to provide public labour market information aims
at reducing these mismatches. The equilibrium serves as the bench-markor target for this policy. Furthermore, in chapter 4 some empirical
evidence on the magnitude of the mismatch problem due to educational
choices is given. In chapter 5 the possibilities to incorporate the
provision of public labour market information in the different theoretical
views on economic policy are discussed. It is shown that the usual way
to make economic models, departing from the 'true model' eliminates
the possibility to fruitfully investigate this information policy. Although
also in the neo-liberal view on economic policy this information
instrument in not found, it seems to fit well into this, less formalised,
thought.
The second part, /n/ormarion, focuses on expectation formation. Based
on an investigation into the history of expectation formation in economic
thought, in chapter 6, it is shown that due to the formalisation of
economic theory, especially due to Haavelmo's conception of the
economy as a stochastic process, the representation of economic reality
as something which is available was developed, which inevitably led to
the development of rational expectations.
In chapter 7 the stochastic characteristics of a forecast as such are
described. It is shown that a forecast error fits into the common
conception of uncertainty as due to uncertainty regarding states of the
world, but that forecast errors can also be interpreted as being caused
by the difficulties of students to predict future events in a context in
which the true model is not at hand. Due to errors students make in
forecasting there is a trade off between the shortcomings of naive,
abstract expectations, and their errors in specific expectations, based on
real economic insights. The recognition of errors in forecasts
undermines the theoretical supriority of rational expectations.
In chapter 8 an empirical study of the Dutch junior secondary technical
education shows that the rational expectation hypothesis indeed does not
dominate the much less sophisticated cobweb theory. Furthermore, it
indicates the extent of the mismatch problem on this market.
In chapter 9 both rational expectations and cobweb theory are
interpreted in the framework of the errors in forecasts model of chapter
7. The optimal way of forming expectations depends on the variability
and the predictability of the economic variable which has to be
forcasted. If a variable has a low variability and is difficult for students
to predict, the optimal prediction comes close to a naive, abstract
expectation. In such a case the rational expectation hypothesis will be
easily rejected. In contrast to the students' situation, in professional
markets a variable with a high variability forecasted by capable experts8
will not differ very much systematically from the rational expectations
hypothesis. The usual tests will not easily reject the rational expectations
hypothesis in this case. Based on the model it is investigated to what
extent policy can manipulate expectations and, which is the main aim of
this study, what are the possibilities for policy to improve prediction
and thereby the match between education and the labour market.
Theil (1958) observed that people tend to underestimate changes.
Rational expectations theory is not able to explain this phenomenon. In
chapter 10 it is shown that the errors in forecasts model developed in
chapter 7 and 9 is able to explain the underestimation of changes and
based on this difference it is possible to distinguish econometrically the
model developed in this study from the rational expectations model.
The occurence of prediction errors causes disequilibrium situations.
Such disequilibria make it more difficult to predict future labour market
situations. In chapter 11 the interdependency between the errors in
forecasts and disequilibria is investigated. This interdependency explains
the cycles which typify the cobweb model.
In chapter 12 the theoretical concepts of this study are used to analyse
the market for primary school teachers. This is a typical example of a
market in the Netherlands with many mismatch problems. The
investigations show that these mismatches are largely caused by
unexpected policy changes.
In the third part, W?//are, the welfare consequences of the errors in
forecasts model of chapter 9 are taken into account. In chapter 14, the
basic model is studied. Naive, ignorant behaviour of students places
some of the welfare costs of prediction errors on employers, compared
to more active anticipatory behaviour. An improvement of students'
predictions, therefore, can be confronted with two opposite effects. The
prediction improves, and therefore the costs of prediction errors
decrease, but at the same time students become more active, due to a
change in the trade off between abstract and specific expectations, which
causes a shift of the costs from employers to students. Furthermore, in
chapter IS attention is paid to dispersed predictions. One of the effects
of the presence of dispersed predictions may be that the provision of
public information destabilises the market under certain circumstances.
However, as long as students correctly estimate the reliability of the
public prediction welfare improves. The positive effects of public
information induce besides improvements of the market at aggregate
level, individual gains due to improved allocation. It is therefore not
sufficient to base evaluations of the effects of forecasts solely onaggregate effects. In this part too, these cases are illustrated by some
empirical examples.
Finally, in chapter 16 conclusions and implications regarding economic
theory and the practice of manpower forecasting and the provision of
labour market information are presented.
7.2 Cwivt/i/io/u
Throughout this study some (notational) conventions are adopted. For
the sake of clearness the most important conventions are listed below:
w is the general indication for the wage. There are two relevant
moments of time: (1) the moment at which the student enters the
labour market and is confronted with the labour market situation,
and (0) the moment, in advance of this, at which he has to make
his educational choice, which decision he will base on a prediction
of the labour market situation at moment (1).
w~* is the current wage at the moment of choice (0).
W°*P is an expectation of the wage at the moment the student will enter
the market (1), made at the moment of choice (0), available to the
student.
w**' is an expectation similar to w***\ which is actually used by the
student.
w*° the wage at the moment the student enters the market (1).
w** the equilibrium wage at the moment he enters the market (1).
Aw = w^'-w**
Aw = w *•-*'••
Throughout this study all students are assumed to evaluate the quality of
an expectation with an MS£ loss function. Qualifications like 'the best
prediction' or 'the optimal prediction' therefore also refer to the AfS£
loss function, with MS£(Aw) = £(Ai?}.-
All expectations, variances, and covariances are unconditional, if not
explicitly indicated with the conditioning sign | .
F() denotes a probability density function
denotes an estimate
denotes a new value of a variable after the provision of public
information10 Ouster 7
• denotes 'almost sure', /.e. a s A means ProWa = fc} = 1.MISMATCH
- '•?,•2 MISMATCH AND EQUILIBRIUM
The fundamental idea behind the provision of public labour market
forecasts is that this enables students to better anticipate future
developments on the labour market and therefore to make more
appropriate educational choices. The aim to improve educational choices
implies a point of reference at which all students make 'optimal'
choices, i.e. the choice they actually made is equal to the choice that is
« posr optimal, given their possibilities. On a market with a well
functioning price mechanism this individual optimality also implies
collective optimality. Such an optimality of the market is, however, not
assumed. The structure of the demand side of the market is taken as
given. Optimality in this framework therefore only refers to a situation
in which students made the decisions which could not have been
improved by them, while the functioning of the market as a whole is not
taken into account.
Educational decisions typically have a strong impact which lasts for a
very long period of time, in which many unexpected things can take
place. Therefore, it is not unlikely that students make decisions which
they regret once they experience the consequences. Such a situation of
regret is called a mismatch: a choice which would not have been made
given the realisations. In this respect it is important to note that
mismatch is limited in two ways. Mismatch only occurs in a situation in
which ex posr an alternative appears to exist. Firstly, this alternative
must be preferred to the choice actually made. Secondly, this alternative
must have been feasible. This second condition depends on the scope of
the analysis. In a lot of literature the education of workers is taken as
given, which implies that in such a framework education can not
generate any mismatch. In this study education is of course not taken as
given, but the functioning of the demand side of the labour market is.
Another example of such a restriction, which is imposed in this study,
is a complication regarding employment opportunities. In this study
employment opportunities are described as the probability to get a job.
The question of regret therefore refers to regret given the probability to
get a job and not given the individual realisation of this, i.e. being
employed or unemployed. The assumption is made that educational
decisions merely determine employment probabilities. The realisation of
such a probability is therefore not treated as a consequence of the
educational decision.
In the literature about labour economics the word mismatch is mostly
used in a narrow meaning, only referring to frictional or structural16
unemployment.' 'The identification of the presence of the
frictional/structural unemployment rate should be based on the
coexistence, at the aggregate level, of both unemployment and
vacancies, even when aggregate labour demand equals labour supply'
(Padoa Schioppa, 1991b, p. 17). Although frequently used, this concept
is not very useful for two reasons.
Firstly, the restriction of mismatch to unemployment is rather arbitrary
and misleading, since it does not include people who, forced by the
labour market situation, accepted a job which they do not like or for
which the wages are too low.* The central question concerning this
problem is whether they would have made other decisions with respect
to their schooling and careers if they had known in advance the labour
market situation they are faced with now. People may be willing to
accept the risk of unemployment if this is compensated for by other
advantages.
Furthermore, the fact that mismatch sometimes leads to (involuntary)
unemployment instead of other types of market adjustment is hard to
explain by economic theory. Most theories of unemployment do indeed
explain the existence of unemployment as a trade off between
unemployment and possible gains, such as union power, better search
possibilities, or decreased income risk. Therefore, the reduction of the
mismatch concept to unemployment is strange and in the welfare
judgements at least these possible gains, which are an essential part of
the theory itself, should also be taken into account.
Secondly, the unemployment/vacancy concept of mismatch implicitly
uses a benchmark, which is in fact meaningless. The statement that the
coincidental occurrence of a certain number of vacancies for e.g.
computer specialists and the unemployment of an identical number of
taxi-drivers implies a mismatch, suggests that these taxi-drivers had
been able and would have wanted to become computer specialists if they
had known the circumstances in advance. Not accepting this critique is
like claiming a mismatch in resources in a country with a shortage of
oil and an abundance of water.
The term 'mismatch' implies that (i) the current situation is not optimal,
i.e. an improvement would have been possible at the moment of choice,
and (ii) this non-optimality is due to the match, in this case the match
1 See r*. Uyard. Nickell, and Jackman (1991) and Padoa Schioppa (1991a).
2 Klaassen and Heijke (1977. p. 118) therefore conclude 'that discrepancies or tensions on
the labour market exist to a far higher degree than is indicated by unemployment or open
demand figures'.17
between student and education and afterwards between student and
occupation.
In this study, mismatch is interpreted as a divergence between a
decision actually taken, based on uncertain expectations of relevant
economic variables, and a decision that would have been taken if the
actor had known these variables with certainty. This leads to a definition
of mismatch which is referred to by Padoa Schioppa (1991b, p. 2) as
'short-run shocks'. The term short-run is, however, misleading. It
suggests that, firstly, the information which was not known at the
moment the decision was made, will be known soon after, and
secondly, that problems disappear as soon as this information is
revealed. This view is inadequate since the only thing that will become
known to the actors after a while is that a wrong decision has been
made, given the current developments. These developments themselves
are, however, partly generated by these wrong decisions. Other
decisions would have caused other developments. Therefore, the
situation of regret itself does not reveal an alternative in which no regret
would occur.
Furthermore, the thought that mismatch problems will disappear as soon
as the relevant information is revealed, disregards the fact that former
decisions might not be reversible and that changes are not once-only,
but will continually occur, or at least might continually occur. These
two components of uncertainty and continual changes play a crucial role
in the cobweb theory, which is discussed in chapter 11. The more
revisable a decision, the less the mismatch problem will occur. In the
most extreme case, in which the decision is completely revisable, in fact
no decision has been made.
Suppose, for example that the demand for electricians increases, which
has not been anticipated. As a consequence the wages for electricians
rise. A student who decided some years ago to study to be a pipefitter
instead of an electrician, might, faced with these developments, regret
his decision. Given the present wages he would have preferred to be an
electrician. This regret does, however, not imply that he decides to
revise his educational choice and take up a course for electricians. The
costs of such a revision may be too high. Furthermore, the regret does
not imply that if everybody would have made a decision based on the
current situation, no mismatch would have been introduced. The present
wages might be too high, leading to a surplus of electricians. The
change in enrolment decisions may, furthermore, also affect the supply
of other occupations. The observation of a mismatch does, therefore,
not indicate which situation would have been optimal.18
The definition of mismatch as a situation in which (wrong) decisions are
made, due to the fact that some relevant information was not known
with certainty at the moment the choice was made, suggests as a
benchmark the imaginary situation in which all decisions are the same
as those which would have been made, based on correct information
known with certainty. This benchmark is called equilibrium, according
to Hayek (1937, pp. 39-41), who explains his definition as: 'We may
merely mean that these plans are mutually compatible and that there is
consequently a conceivable set of external events which will allow all
people to carry out their plans and not cause any disappointments. [...]
It appears that the concept of equilibrium merely means that the
foresight of the different members of the society is in a special sense
correct. It must be correct in the sense that every person's plan is based
on the expectation of just those actions of other people which those
other people intend to perform, and that all these plans are based on the
expectation of the same set of external facts, so that under certain
conditions nobody will have any reason to change his plans. Correct
foresight is then not, as it has sometimes been understood, a
precondition which must exist in order that equilibrium may be arrived
at. It is rather the defining characteristic of a state of equilibrium.'
The choice of a full information equilibrium as a benchmark excludes
from the analyses certain 'non-optimalities' which are referred to in the
literature as 'structural' or 'disequilibrium'. There are three reasons
why a certain situation may be viewed as a mismatch without reference
to information problems, as above. Firstly, the 'mechanics' of the
economic system may lead to situations which are non-optimal (e.g.
exogenous fixed prices). In this view economic relations are treated as
independent from human behaviour. In the economic model additional
restrictions are added to the choices of people, which are neither
technical restrictions, nor restrictions which are chosen by them. It is
Lucas, who most clearly opposes this type of reasoning. In his
conversation with Klamer (1984, p. 45) he states: 'I just don't get the
sense that their theory is being driven by an attempt to get at, or model,
some specific kind of human behaviour. They're trying to explain other
economists' words, but they're not thinking about human decision-
making. That's why the key actors are always some external force in
their models, like a price that just won't change. WTry won't it change?'
Mainly in this respect Lucas's thought stems from Austrian sources.
Hayek (1937, p. 50, note 2) already makes a distinction between 'the
social science' and 'the behaviourist approach'.
Secondly, situations may occur in which the optimal situation can not be19
reached, due to inadequate contracts, f.g. in the principal-agent problem
(Hellwig, 1989), and in models of dynamic inconsistency of government
behaviour (Blanchard and Fisher, 1989). These models focus on the
difficulties of coordination. Since contracts do not play a role in the
study of the effects of providing information, this problem of non-
binding contracts does not seem to be crucial.
A third reason for not accepting the exclusively information-based
definition of mismatch and equilibrium, is the situation in which the
information-based equilibrium is regarded as undesirable. This point is
fundamental in studies concerning poverty and income distribution, but
also in studies about labour market performance these types of
arguments often play an implicit role. Bentolila and Dolado (1991, pp.
183-184) argue that the 'willingness to look for work in other regions
than their own', is 'a source of mismatch from the labour supply side
[...] and there is a role for policy in speeding up the process'. This
third objection against the equilibrium-benchmark of this study is in
general very relevant, and perhaps not sufficiently accepted by
economists. The provision of public information as a policy instrument
has, however, in its very nature an aim which can not go beyond the
equalisation of actual behaviour and behaviour desired by individuals.
The information purpose of this instrument justifies the use of the
equilibrium-benchmark.
The study of the provision of public labour market information requires
the possibility that students do not make the best possible forecast, and
that others, the professional forecasters, are able to improve these
forecasts. In the case of educational choice it seems reasonable to
assume that students can make errors in their predictions. These errors
can result in a situation in which there is an alternative decision which
is preferred to the decision actually made, and which is also feasible. In
this framework it is assumed that every forecast is theoretically feasible.
Mostly, however, in economic models the assumption is made that an
ex ame optimal prediction exists, /.«. it is impossible to make a
prediction which is better than this optimal prediction. This usual
assumption restricts the feasibility set. The introduction of forecast
possibilities as a restriction in the choice, is consequently mostly
accompanied by the assumption that agents do indeed use this optimal
prediction. In this view, discrepancies between forecasts and realisation
do not lead to mismatch, because a better alternative forecast was not
feasible at the moment of choice. Therefore, situations which are non-
equilibrium in the framework sketched above, become equilibrium from
this point of view. The crucial difference in point of view is the20
existence of an optimal forecast. This issue is discussed in chapter 7.3 THE BASIC LABOUR MARKET MODEL
In this chapter a model is presented which serves as a basis for the rest
of this study. Furthermore, the concepts introduced in the previous
chapter will be illustrated by this model.
The model presented here is a single market model. The market is
cleared by wages and there is a one-to-one relation between education
and work. The consequences of both assumptions will be discussed
further on in this study.
3.7 TteMarfce/
The model presented in this section describes a segment of the labour
market. For the sake of simplicity the following two assumptions are
made.
Firstly, every worker on the market earns the same wage in a certain
period r. This wage is called the realised wage, w'™. Thus, the wage
does not depend on the workers characteristics. The only relevant factor
is the presence of the worker in this labour market segment.
Secondly, it is assumed that only the wages in the first period are
relevant for the decision made by students. This assumption can be
interpreted in different ways. The whole working period might be seen
as one period. In that case it is likely that the working period for
different generations overlap. Unless different cohorts are no substitutes
the wages in this case are determined by the decisions of future
generations. Siow (1984) shows that in the case of identical workers,
perfect substitution between generations and rational expectations, only
the first year's wages are relevant for workers' choices. New entrants
make decisions, such that the utility of entering the market equals the
utility of not entering the market, and this equality will hold for all
workers. The assumptions to obtain this result are, however, very
strong. The second interpretation of the first period assumption is that
future wages are completely determined by the first year's wages. It
might, for example, be the case that the wage development is
completely determined institutionally once the starting salary is given,
perhaps converging to a salary independent of the labour market
situation. In such a case the pay-off of a correct match is concentrated
in the beginning of the career. The choice between these interpretations
becomes relevant only in empirical studies. The theoretical results apply
to both interpretations.
In general, the market characteristics of the occupation in one specific
segment of the labour market are subject to change. The wages and the22
probability to get a job, but also the contents of the job, and the
working conditions, may change. In this basic model the assumption is
made, however, that all market characteristics except for the wages are
constant. Thus, the wages are the only flexible factor on the demand
side, and therefore the variation in the wages has to equalise, given the
other characteristics of the job, supply and demand. Otherwise rationing
should take place and a change in the ratio of supply and demand would
lead to changes in the probability to get a job.
The following three equations describe the market:
(3.1) S, = So
(3.2) D = Cfl + PpW"" in which PQ < 0
(3.3) S, = D
The supply on the market (S,) is completely determined by the
enrolment decision (S^). Once somebody has chosen for a certain
education, his supply at the related segment at the labour market is
fixed. Revision is assumed not to be possible. The enrolment decision
itself is the subject of the next section of this chapter.
Demand (D, equation (3.2)) is a linear function of the realised wage.
(3.3) is the market clearing condition. Substituting (3.1) and (3.2) in
this market clearing condition provides an expression for this realised
wage:
(3.4) w™ = —-—
J.2
Since labour supply is assumed to be totally inflexible given the type of
education, the enrolment decision is the crucial decision on the supply
side. This decision will depend on a person's characteristics
(preferences and capacities) and on the predicted situation on the
market. Since the assumption is made that wages are the only varying
characteristic of the market the optimal decision of a student /' depends,
given his own preferences and capacities, only on the wage. This is the
wage at the moment the student will enter the labour market (w""), and
not the current wage (denoted by w"**). Therefore, this wage is not
known to the students, and they have to base their decision on their
prediction of the future wage (w/"'). The enrolment decision depends
on a comparison of the predicted wage with an exogenous reservation
wage (w, ):7V &uic £4*ow Varta WodW 23
J = 0 if V
(3.5)
, = 0 if
. = 1 if
in which 5. denotes the individual enrolment decision which is 1 if
student / enters and is 0 if he does not enter a certain education. In this
chapter the predicted wage is treated as exogenous. Therefore, the
model is still static. In later chapters the relation between the predicted
wage and the labour market situation will be modelled explicitly,
introducing dynamics into the model.
Based on the individual decisions it is possible to define the total
enrolment as:
(3.6) So = $ ,
This total enrolment depends on the distribution of the individual
reservation wages and the distribution of individual predictions of the
wage. The distribution of individual reservation wages does not depend
on the wage and is therefore a constant. Furthermore, the distribution of
the predicted wages is assumed to be independent on the distribution of
the reservation wages. The supply function can therefore be defined as
the enrolment in the notional case every student predicts wage w:
(3.7) 5»
This supply function is assumed to be linear:' ...
(3.8) 5o(w) = C, + P,w
This specific form for the supply function is in fact an implicit definition
of the distribution of the reservation wages.
In general, the predicted wage will not be equal for every student. In
the literature it is mostly (implicitly) assumed that this prediction is
unique. In this study this convention is sometimes — in cases where the
dispersion of predictions is not relevant — adopted. In such case the
general prediction is denoted as w*" for every student I. If the
1 The linearity of the supply and demand curve serves two ends. Firstly, it makes it easier
to derive analytical results. Secondly, non-linearities introduce some relationships which
are not directly relevant for the purposes of this study. These effects of non-linearities are
discussed in chapter 14.24 Owprer i
dispersion is explicitly taken into account it is, however, also useful to
distinguish a general prediction. This general prediction is denoted by G
and implicitly defined as:
(3.9) G: S«, = $,,(0
i.e. G is the predicted wage which if every student made this prediction,
would result in the same supply as actually results from the dispersed
predictions. Due to the linearity of the supply and demand curve this
general prediction is equal to the average individual prediction.
Based on this general prediction, the individual prediction can be split
up into two components.
(3.10) wf* = G + /,
In which /, is the individual component, i.e. the difference between the
individual prediction and the general prediction.
A combination of the market model (3.1)-(3.3) and the enrolment
model provides the complete description of the basic model. This model
is illustrated in figure 3.1. In this figure the supply and demand
functions are depicted. The supply does not depend on the realised
wage, but on the predicted wages. The predicted wages are distributed
over the wage-space, i.e. the vertical axis. By definition the general
prediction G determines the actual enrolment or supply. Once students
have made their educational decision their choice is irreversible, and
their supply at this segment of the labour market is completely inelastic.
This inelastic supply curve after the enrolment decision is depicted by
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FIGURE 3.1: THE BASIC MODEL OF A SEGMENT OF
THE LABOUR MARKET.
J.J £^ui7/6nu/n and
Based on this partial labour market model it is possible to illustrate the
concepts equilibrium and regret, introduced in the previous chapter.
In general, the predicted wages do not equal the realised wage. A
student regrets his decision if he would have taken another decision if
he had known the realised wage with certainty before the decision had
to be made, i.e. if v
(3.11) j,<O * >,(O
Equilibrium is defined as a situation in which no student regrets his
decision:*
(3.12) =s.(w'") Vi
In that case total supply equals 5Q(W"^ = Cj + PjVv'". Substituting this
into the market model (3.1)-(3.3) gives the equilibrium wage:
2 As stated in chapter 2, mostly equilibrium is defined as a situation in which no student
wants to change his position, given his past decisions. In such a definition regret hat no
role. In the present model such an equilibrium equals the realisation.26
(3.13) "~ *
If the equilibrium condition (3.12) does not hold, the realised wage will





This equation shows that an underestimation by the general prediction of
the equilibrium wage leads to an excess realised wage and v. v. if
students' expectations are too high, too many enter the market, which
leads to wages below the equilibrium level.
FIGURE 3.2: THE SIX POSSIBLE SITUATIONS REGARDING
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The relation between the realised wage and predictions only depends on
the general prediction. It may be the case that the general prediction
equals the realised wage, and therefore also equals the equilibrium
wage, but this situation does not imply an equilibrium, since some
students whose predictions were too high may have entered mistakenly,
while others whose predictions were too low did not enter, but also
regret their decision. If the realised wage equals the equilibrium wage in
such a situation, on aggregate level the supply appears to be optimal,
but on individual level welfare losses occur due to wrong decisions.
Figure 3.2 gives the possible combinations of the reservation wage
(H»J™*) and the predicted wage (w>/**). The figure shows, given the
equilibrium wage and the realised wage, the six possible positions a
student can find himself in. In the case depicted in the figure
w«" ^ ^«« j^g reverse situation may, however, also occur. On the
diagonal line students are indifferent about their choice: w,'" = K','"*.
FIGURE 3.3: A SITUATION OF EQUILIBRIUM.
Above this line students decide to enter the market, since their
predictions exceed their reservation wages. Below the line they decide
not to enter. The prediction may be wrong, however. Students with a
reservation wage below the realised wage, optimally, should have
entered the market. Therefore, group (1), above the diagonal, entered28 Cfeiprw 5
correctly, while group (2) did not enter by mistake.For students with
reservation wages above the realised wage the opposite is the case.
They, optimally, should not have entered the market. Therefore,
students above the diagonal (group (2) and (3)) mistakenly entered,
while those below the line (group (5) and (6)) correctly did not enter.
If, however, every student would have behaved optimally, the realised
wage would have been equal to the equilibrium wage. Therefore,
students in group (2) entered by mistake, but their decision would have
been correct in case of an equilibrium situation. Group (5) did not enter
correctly, but their behaviour would not have been optimal in the
equilibrium situation.When every student makes the right decision the
realised wage will equal the equilibrium wage. Figure 3.3 shows the
combinations of reservation wages and predictions the equilibrium
situation allows for. Predictions need not to be correct, but should lie in
the shaded segments.
•»;>4 EVIDENCE ON MISMATCH
The previous two chapters gave a conceptual description of mismatch.
Mismatch is defined as a situation in which, based on predictions,
decisions are made which would not have been made if, instead of these
predictions, the realisation had been know with certainty. Recognising
this theoretical concept does, however, not imply that it is significant
for the relation between education and the labour market. Of course it
will be true that students make wrong decisions, but the significance of
the mismatch problem depends on the number of students making wrong
decisions and on the effects these wrong decisions have. In this chapter
some empirical evidence is presented to indicate the magnitude of the
mismatch due to educational decisions in the Netherlands.
There is no straightforward measure for labour market mismatch. Every
way to measure mismatch presupposes a theoretical framework, and
throws light on different aspects of the mismatch problem. For that
reason several indicators will be presented in this chapter which all
indicate only one aspect of mismatch in educational choices, but which
together provide some evidence on the extent of the mismatch problem
in, mainly, the Dutch situation.
These indicators have been subdivided into four categories. In the first
category (section 4.1) students' choices are observed rather directly.
The mismatch concept implies that it is a difficult process for students to
make their choice, and that after the choice has been made some
students will discover that they did not make the right choice: they
regret their choice.
A shortcoming of the direct evidence on regret is that it is not clear
whether these difficulties in choice and this regret are due to
uncertainties in labour market conditions. It might be the case that
students are indifferent regarding labour market conditions. In the
second category (section 4.2) some results of other studies are presented
which measure the responsiveness of students in their educational choice
to the labour market situation of a certain education.
Another important aspect of the concept mismatch is that the choice
which is made is a relevant choice to some extent, i.«. by choosing for
one education rather than for another some future possibilities are
opened, while others are closed. In the third category (section 4.3)
evidence is given on the compartmentalisation of the labour market.
This indicates whether the educational choice is a real choice with
consequences for the labour market possibilities of the students.
Finally, in the fourth category (section 4.4) it is examined whether30
anticipation of labour market conditions is a relevant activity. It is
shown that the fluctuations on the labour market are of such a
magnitude that it makes anticipation worthwhile.
As stated in the introduction of this chapter, the mismatch concept
implies that students make mistakes, i.e. they make choices which they
regret later, since they acquire information or insight which was not
available at the moment the choice had to be made. The significance of
the mismatch concept implies that students indeed experience a lack of
information at the moment of choice, and that a considerable number of
them will regret the decision afterwards. In this section some evidence
from survey data is presented on both aspects.
In Weerdenburg (1985, 1987) the results are presented of a survey
among students at the senior general secondary education and the pre-
university education concerning their educational choice and the role of
educational guidance and information in this decision.
TABLE 4.1: THE IMPORTANCE OF SEVERAL ASPECTS WITH REGARD TO





























Table 4.1 provides the results of the question what aspects students
regard as important with respect to their educational choice. Although
the contents of the study is the most important aspect, the labour market
aspects of the choice are also regarded as important by 83% of the
students. Only 1% answered that labour market aspects are unimportant
to them.
For the relevance of the mismatch concept it is not only relevant that
I Weenienburg (19&5). p. 61.fvufrnrr on MumiUcTi 31
students regard labour market aspects as important, but also that they
indicate that the amount of information they already acquired does not
satisfy their needs. This is indicated in figure 4.2. In this survey 43% of
the students indicated that they did not have enough information with
respect to labour market aspects. This percentage is much lower than
the 83% who said that labour market aspects were important to them.
This is, however, completely in accordance with the labour market
model in chapter 3. Since the reservation wages of the individual
students are not all the same, some of them are in a situation in which a
more accurate prediction of the future labour market situation is not
relevant to them, since their choice does not depend on this situation.
For that reason. Freeman (1971, pp. 223-226) distinguishes between
marginal and non-marginal students. For marginal students the
reservation wages are near the predicted realised wages, and therefore
information on the exact value of the realised wages is important to
them.






















Educational guidance and information can be split up into general and
detailed sources. General information for example consists of meetings
with a student counsellor or an occupational test. Detailed information is
information about the contents of a study, the entry requirements and
labour market prospects. Table 4.3 shows that this detailed information
is used more often and appreciated much more than general
information. This indicates that the problem students have in choosing is
not mainly caused by questions about their own preferences and
abilities, but much more by lack of information concerning detailed
consequences of the educational choice.
2 Weerdenburg (1985), p. 62.32











The results in these tables indicate that the future labour market is
indeed relevant for students' choices. Furthermore, the figures indicate
that students experience a lack of information, mainly on a detailed
level, which hampers their educational choice.
A second piece of evidence on mismatch in this section concerns regret.
Since students experience a lack of information at the moment they
make their choices some of them will make the 'wrong' choice. This
wrong choice is the mismatch, introduced in chapter 2. The most direct
way to measure mismatch is to count the number of students who regret
their choice afterwards. Table 4.4 provides the results of ten Dutch
surveys with respect to this question. In these surveys students are
asked whether they choose the same study again.
As far as the surveys allow, a distinction is made between regret with
respect to the study, and regret with respect to the specialisation subject
of the study. In total, the percentage of students who regret their
choice, specialisation or study, varies from 20% to 57%. 11% to 53%
regret their study. The percentages in the table are very high, indicating
a large group of people who made the wrong choice, given the
knowledge they have afterwards. These high numbers of mismatch are,
however, not only due to labour market uncertainty, but might also be
caused by uncertainty about the contents of the study, or about
individual preferences.
3 Weerdenburg (1987). p. I3S.on 33
TABLE 4.4: THE FRACTION OF STUDENTS
THEIR STUDY AFTERWARDS, ACCORDING TO










































































4.2 77ie /to/e q/" r/ie* La&our in C/iof ce
In the previous section it was shown that a large number of students
regret their educational choice afterwards, indicating a rather large
amount of mismatch. As noted earlier, this mismatch is not necessarily
due to uncertainty with respect to labour market conditions. Table 4.1
showed, however, that 83% of the students regard labour market
aspects as important. This section gives further evidence on the relation
between labour market conditions and educational choice. It contains the
results of some studies on students' responsiveness to changing labour
Translation of types of education according to Ministerie van Onderwijs en
Wetenschappen (1989). Sources: I, 2 and 3 from Pater (1987), p. 34; 4 from Stijnen and
Wieling (1988), p. 43; 5 from MTS-Roermond (1986), p. 4; 6 from Haanstra, Koppen
and Oostwoud Wijdenes (1987), p 119; 7 from Wilbrink (1989), pp. 25, 27; 8 from NILI-
MPW (1989), p. 67; 9 from Maurice (1991), p. 19; 10 from Kramer and Schreurs (1988),
p. 27; 11 from Oostwoud Wijdenes (1990), p. 69; 12 from SMO (1988).
The question in this survey is not completely comparable to others because the regret i»
explicitly related to the career.34
market conditions. The relation between choice and labour market
condition is measured by the elasticity. If a study itself did not provide
elasticities, it has been calculated for the most recent year in the study.
All results in this section concern higher education, simply because
these are the only studies of this kind.
TABLE 4.5: ESTIMATES OF THE




Willes and Rosen (1979)
Pissarides (1979)'
Dolpin(1981)*
Lcfflcr and Lindsay (1981)
Manila (1982)
Freeman and Hansen (1982)*
Fiorilo and Dauffenbach (1982)
Kodde (1985)
Huijsman « a/ (1986)
Paulsen and Pogue (1988)
Stapleton (1989)


































1.23 to 1.25 -
1.13 to 1.80 '
1.30
Tables 4.S and 4.6 provide measurements of the elasticity of supply in
response to wages. A similar survey is provided by Freeman (1986,
1987). Some studies distinguish several measurements of the elasticity.
In that case the tables provide the range of their estimations. In
accordance with Freeman's results these tables show that the elasticity
varies roughly between 0.5 and 2.0.
6 Source: Freeman (1986).£vuir/ior on Mumo/cft 35
TABLE 4.6 ESTIMATES OF THE ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR H1OKER



































Table 4.6 also provides results for the elasticity of demand in response
to wages. This elasticity varies much more, from -10.0 to -0.015.
These estimates are probably relatively poor. It is remarkable that the
estimates below —1.0 are obtained from a regression relating wages to
demand, while the estimates above — 1.0 are obtained from a regression
relating demand to wages. This might indicate a large bias due to errors
in variables.
Most studies relate educational choice to wages. Only a few studies take
unemployment into account, while the relation with other possible
labour market variables, such as job level and working conditions are
not investigated in literature. Table 4.7 provides the results of two
studies which take into account the probability to get a job. The
variation between these two studies is rather large.
TABLE 4.7: ESTIMATES OF THE ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR HIGHER
EDUCATION IN RESPONSE TO THE PROBABILITY TO GET A JOB.








Although the elasticities in the studies presented in this section vary,
which may also be caused by variations in sample, they all indicate that
both wages and the probability to get a job influence the choice of
students significantly. It may be concluded therefore that labour market
conditions indeed play a role in the choice and that uncertainty with36 Ow/Wer 4
respect to these variables causes mismatch.
In this section the question is investigated whether the educational
choice is a crucial decision in the sense that by making the choice for
one direction, other possibilities are excluded. This is an important
question because if the educational choice has no real consequences for
the occupational possibilities, this choice is not relevant to mismatch on
the labour market.
In this section two indicators are provided which measure the
compartmentalisation of the labour market. Firstly, the extent to which
(academic) students with different educational background, end up in
different occupations is presented. Secondly, a measure of
compartmentalisation based on the duration of vacancies is presented.
Students with different educational backgrounds will in general get
different occupations, but the relation between education and occupation
is of course not a purely one-to-one relation. Based on data on the
occupation of people with a certain (university) background it is
possible to measure the similarity in the occupations. In this study data
are used from the Dutch census and the Dutch Labour Market Censuses
(AKT), about the distribution of twelve types of university studies over
different occupations. If /^ = i4^Mj '* ^ fraction students in
occupation & of education j, than this similarity can be measured by the
cosine-measure:'
E
(4.1) Sim(iJ) = *
JE/.E4
The similarity equals 1 if / = // and the similarity equals 0 if /^ = 0 if
/^ * 0 and v. v.
Borghans (1992a) measures these similarities, corrected for observed
similarities between occupations. This measure provides a matrix with
similarities between studies. Table 4.8 provides for 7 years the average
similarity for the 144 cases, weighted with the distribution of people
over the studies.
7 See Lorr (1983).fvu/rnce
TABLE 4.8: AVERAGE SIMILARITY



















The results indicate that indeed the market for university trained
students is segmentated although the separation is not complete and the
similarity has increased in recent years. The similarities are averages.
For particular studies the similarity with other types of education may
differ from this. Medicine, pharmacology, languages, and theology have
very low similarities with other studies, while management science,
economics, and law have high average similarities. The segmentation
indicated by these calculations tends to be too low. The academic
studies are clustered in twelve groups, and also the occupations are
clustered. It may be the case that students with different studies fulfil
completely different jobs, which are nevertheless clustered in one class
of occupations. The results of these calculations depend very much on
the specific clustering used.
Another way to measure the compartmentalisation of the labour market
is by use of data on the duration of vacancies. The moment in which a
vacancy arises does not generally coincide with the moment a student
becomes available to the labour market. Therefore, if every vacancy
gets filled by a new entrant at the labour market an employer has to
wait on average
(4.2) *; = •£•
for the next entrant, in which 7^ is the average duration of a vacancy
and Fj is the flow of people starting to search for a job. The
8 See Borghans (1992a), p. 17. Data from the Dutch censused 1947, I960, and 1971 and
the Dutch Labour Force Censuses 1979, 1981, 1983, and I98S.38
compartmentalisation of the market makes, however, that not every
student satisfies the employers' needs. The more compartments on the
market (Af), the longer the employer has to wait on average for an
appropriate candidate.
(4.3) r. - £
This formula allows to estimate Af. In case of unemployment, or a stock
of people already searching for a job, there also is a probability that one
of the unemployed is available directly for the vacancy. By assuming
the same compartmentalisation A/ for the stock of searchers (5), the
probability of not finding a candidate directly among the searchers is
cxp(-—5). Therefore, the average duration of a vacancy becomes:
(4.4) 7 = ^
FIGURE 4.1: 5 YEARS MOVING AVERAGE ESTIMATION OF
NUMBER OF COMPARTMENTS M ON THE DUTCH LABOUR
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In recent economic literature (<-.$. Blanchard and Diamond (1989)
Jackman, Layard, and Pissarides (1989) and Van Ours (1991)) the
relation between job-searchers and vacancies is usually modelled as a
9 The estimation in year » is based on the interval |r-2. f+2). Data about T f and
ire from Van Ours (1991). with a correction for not registered vacancies. "Evu/wtor on A/umorcA 39
matching production function. The main difference with (4.4) is, apart
from the functional form, the role of the flows in the model. In a search
model a large flow of matchings is seen as a high productivity of the
matching function, while in (4.4) a high flow of new searchers indicates
large possibilities for employers to find an appropriate employee within
a short time-period.
Figure 4.1 shows the results of the estimation of this equation for a
moving time-period of 5 years. An estimation over the whole period
results in Af = 210 (srf = 7.45). Through time the compartmentalisation
first decreases slightly, but later increases again. This increase is,
however, not significant. It should be noted that (4.4) explains all
variation in the vacancy duration as a result of the
compartmentalisation. Therefore Af may also contain other influences,
so Af should be interpreted as a representative number of compartments.
In job search models (Blanchard and Diamond (1989), Jackman,
Layard, and Pissarides (1989) and Borghans (1992b)) only an increase
in the matching inefficiency is found in this period. From a job search
model point of view this increase indicates a decreased search intensity
at the market. The results of the analysis in this section may on the
other hand be interpreted as increased selectivity with employers. The
large amount of unemployed and other job searchers reduces the
average duration of vacancies which makes it profitable for employers
to be more selective.
4.4 F/uc/uariwis o/i /Ae Lo&our Afarfcef
In the previous sections evidence has been presented on the difficulty of
educational choice, the large numbers of students who regret their
choice, the influence of labour market conditions on the choice and the
cruciality of the educational choice. In this final section on evidence for
mismatch, figures are presented which indicate the extent of fluctuations
of labour market variables. Large fluctuations make it necessary for
students to anticipate the future labour market at the moment they enter
the market. Basing the choice on the current instead of the future
situation creates, due to the large fluctuations, a large mismatch.
In this section two examples are given. The first, about the market for
teachers, indicates fluctuations in the demand for teachers, and in the
second, about lower technical education, fluctuations in relative wages
and the probability to get a job are indicated.
In table 4.9 results are presented about the market for primary school
teachers. The demand for new teachers is split up into three40
components.'" The first component is the replacement demand, while
the second and the third refer to expansion demand. Replacement
demand is demand for new teachers due to the departure of others, who
create a vacancy. Expansion demand is demand due to new places. The
extension demand is again split up into a demographic component and a
policy component. The demographic component is constructed by
imposing the student/teacher ratio from year / upon the change in the
number of children at primary school between year r and year f+1.
This figure indicates the demand for teachers that would be created due
to a growth in the number of children, under the assumption that the
average class size does not change. The remaining part of the extension
demand is called the policy component, because it is caused by
(intended or unintended) changes in the student/teacher ratio. Table 4.9
gives the variability of these components, which is, e.g. for the
replacement demand, defined as:
in which fop/, represents the replacement demand, and D, the total
demand at /.
TABLE 4.9: VARIABILITY OF THE THREE COMPONENTS OF THE DEMAND








The table shows that while the variability of the demographic
component decreased, the variability of the replacement demand and the
policy component increased over time. Assuming independency of the
three components results in a total variability of 0.116, which is
comparable to a yearly shift of 34% in the demand.
Table 4.10 provides similar figures for the variability of wages and the
probability to get a job for technicians. Two sectors, building industry
and metal industry are distinguished, which are compared with the food
and catering industry.
10 See also chapter 12.fvufcvirr on Afumarch 41
Measured over the whole period the variability of these wages and
probabilities to get a job are much lower than the variability of the
demand for teachers, although ?.£. the variability of the wages in the
building industry is comparable to a 3% shift in the wages yearly. The
main cause for this is most likely the fact that these wages and
probabilities to get a job refer to the whole stock of workers and not
only to starting employees.
TABLE 4.10: VARIABILITY OF WAGES AND THE PROBABILITY TO
GET A JOB FOR THE DUTCH BUILDING INDUSTRY AND THE METAL
INDUSTRY COMPARED TO FOOD AND CATERING INDUSTRY, FOR THE
PERIOD 1951-1985."
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The variability of these labour market variables remained far from
constant during the years. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show the development of
the variabilities, based on an 11 year moving average. They clearly
show that, while the variability of the wages decreased slightly, the
variability of the probability to get a job increased dramatically from the
11 See also chapter 8.42
end of the seventies. Both empirical examples show that the labour
market conditions do not remain constant. Together with the evidence in
earlier sections of this chapter, which show that students face problems
in correctly anticipating the future labour market, the extent of these
changes indicates a possible large mismatch due to these wrong
anticipations.
FIGURE 4.3: VARIABILITY OF THE PROBABILITY TO GET A JOB
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The aim of this chapter has been to show the significance of the concept
'mismatch' for the Dutch labour market. It is, however, not possible to
find one single figure that can prove this relevance. Therefore, in this
chapter different kinds of empirical evidence have been given which
together indicate the importance of an improved match between
education and the labour market.
In section 4.1 it is shown that students would like to get additional
(labour market) information and that afterwards many students regret
their choice. Section 4.2 gives an overview of the elasticities of supply.
These indicate that at least a group of marginal students is affected in
their educational choice by changing labour market prospects. In section
4.3 some evidence has been given regarding the compartmentalisalion of
the Dutch labour market. It is shown that the educational choice
influences the labour market possibilities of students. Finally, in section
4.4 it is shown that changes on the labour market are large enough toon MunuurA 43
make some anticipation necessarily. It does not suffice to base the
educational choice on the current labour market situation.5 THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION AS AN
ECONOMIC POLICY INSTRUMENT
As stated in the introduction, the provision of labour market forecasts to
students is an economic policy instrument which may improve the
allocation of educated workers and may stabilise wages. Although both
improved allocation and stabilisation are generally accepted aims of
economic policy, most textbooks on public economics do not mention
the provision of information as an instrument.
This chapter gives a short sketch of the theory of economic policy, as
an orientation for the provision of information as an economic policy
instrument. Although the views on economic policy described in this
chapter mainly stem from macro-economic theory, the basic thoughts in
these theories seem to be influential in all economic research.
J. 7 7Tnterge/J '5 fconomic PO/JCV
The most influential view on economic policy has been described by
Tinbergen (1952, 1956). Based on his early experiences with
econometrics he develops a theory for government influence on the
economic process.
Tinbergen distinguishes three types of economic policy, quantitative
policy, qualitative policy and reform. Quantitative policy 'consists
mainly in the adaption of the economy to the continuous changes in data
that threaten to upset its equilibrium' (1956, p. 48). Qualitative policy
refers to 'problems in which the structure of the economy is changed'
(1956, p. 149). Reforms are defined 'as changes in the more
fundamental features of social organization: those affecting spiritual
aspects of society and essential relations between individuals' (1956, p.
186).
The provision of labour market information clearly belongs to the
category of quantitative policy. Tinbergen (1952, p. 4) presents a
scheme for such economic policy:
*(i) the fixation of a collective preference indicator;
(ii) the deduction, from this indicator, of the targets of economic policy
generally;
(iii) the choice of "adequate" instruments, qualitative and quantitative;
(iv) the determination of the quantitative values of the instrument
variables, as far as such instruments are chosen and
(v) the formulation of the connections between (a) the relation between
targets and quantitative variables on the one hand and (6) the structure
of the economy studied on the other hand.'46 Oiqpr«• 5
It is, however, not easy to put the provision of labour market
information in this framework. Tinbergen regards, according to Lucas
(1976, p. 21), the structure of the economy as a difference equation
(5.1) y,., =Xy^ep
in which y, is a vector of state variables, JC, a vector of exogenous
forcing variables, and e, a vector of independent, identically distributed
random shocks. The art of economic policy according to Tinbergen is to
find an adequate description of /, and, based on this to calculate the
appropriate values of x, to obtain the preferred value of y,,,.
Tinbergen's theory of economic policy is based on two fundamental
points. Firstly, he assumes that it is possible for the policy maker to
know /. Although Tinbergen pays much attention to the problems of
finding the exact form of the model of the structure of the economy, he
believes, according to e.£. Haavelmo (1944), that after sufficient
investigations / will be approximately known, making the economic
policy possible.
Secondly, Tinbergen assumes the system of the economy to be closed
and fixed. The model will, of course, contain equations about the
people's behaviour, but Tinbergen believes this behaviour is sufficiently
predictable and can therefore also be described in a mathematical
equation. Expectations may for example play a role in the model, but
these expectations are, according to Tinbergen, functions of data in the
model and can therefore also be described by mathematical equations.
For studying the effects of the provision of labour market information
on the functioning of the economic system this view on economic policy
is not very useful. Firstly, the assumption that the policy maker knows
the model / trivialises the problem of the possibility of mistakes in
public forecasts. Secondly, the mechanistic form of the economic
system does not make clear what the use of additional information
would be in the system. Since people's reactions are given, there are no
opportunities for influencing these reactions. In connection to this,
Tinbergen's model devolves all responsibilities to the government.
While the government has the task to adjust its behaviour to the
economic targets, other people are assumed simply to react in a
mechanistic way to the circumstances. A main point of providing
information to students is, however, that on the one hand students need
assistance and expert information to make their choice, but on the other
hand students are eventually responsible for their own educational
choice. *y 47
5.2 Lucas's
The econometric program of Tinbergen and Haavelmo led to great
optimism regarding the possibilities of economic policy. The results
were, to some extent, disappointing. It appeared to be very difficult to
find appropriate descriptions for the model/. In 1976 Lucas published a
critique on the econometric program in which he stated that it was not
the problem of finding the appropriate form for / which caused the
disappointing results. In his view there is a more fundamental problem,
which is the assumed mechanistic behaviour.
According to economic theory people will optimally react to their
circumstances, and therefore a reaction function which is optimal under
one type of government behaviour may not be optimal once this
government behaviour has changed. Therefore people may change their
reaction function if the government adopts a new policy. Lucas
therefore states that the right formulation of the economic policy theory
is based on policy rules and not on incidental values of the exogenous
forcing variables. In his alternative specification:
(52) y,., =/e(y,,x,(6),e,)
the policy rule 6 determines the values of the forcing variables (x,(6)),
but might also influences the structure of the model /g, since reaction
functions will adjust to the new policy.
Lucas explicitly takes into account people's autonomous behaviour in
his model of 'democratic decision making' (Lucas ,1976, p. 42). In his
model the description of the economic system /j remains, however,
known by the policy maker. Furthermore, his interpretation of the
optimising behaviour of the people is based on rational expectations,
which assume that the 'true model' also is known to the people. Based
on his democratic principle he not only assumes that people act in
accordance with their aims, but also that everybody has the same
(perfect) capabilities to do this.
It will be clear that also Lucas's variant of the theory of economic
policy is not useful for the study of the concept provision of labour
market information. On the one hand his economic system is (in
principle) knowable to the government, thereby excluding main errors
in public forecasts, while on the other hand everybody is assumed to
have this perfect insight, making the provision of information from
experts to laymen redundant.48 Oiap/er 5
5.3 77i£ Ateo-L/6era/ V/ew on
One of the fundamental properties of Tinbergen's model of economic
policy is that the model of the economic system is (in principle)
knowable by the policy maker. Lucas added to this model the property
that not only the government, but also the economic agents know this
true model. This extension is very often seen as too strong and
unrealistic, but the question is whether this assumption, departing from
the Tinbergen's model, can be avoided. According to Lucas (1976, p.
25) 'we have to attribute to individuals some view of the behaviour of
the future values of variables of concern to them'. If this attributed view
of the individual agents is inconsistent with the true model of the
economic system, the agents are assumed in the model to behave in a
way which is a prior/ not optimal for them. The assumption that
everybody is equally capable to analyse the market is for Lucas (1976,
p. 42) essential for 'democratic decision making'. For the study of the
effects of providing labour market information the assumption that
everybody perfectly analyses the economic situation will, however, not
be fruitful. It excludes the possibility of an incorrect public forecast and
it excludes in advance possible gains from information from experts to
laymen.
In the neo-liberal economic thought (e.#. the Austrian school and the
Freiburg school) two themes, closely connected to this problem, play an
important role. Firstly, for example Von Mises and Kirzner stress the
role of errors in the economy. Secondly, especially Hayek has discussed
the problems related to the fact that knowledge in the economy is not
known by one single person.
Kirzner (1978) remarks that 'economists have traditionally been
concerned with issues related to efficiency. Inefficient action occurs
when one places oneself in a position which one views as less desirable
than an equally available alternative state of affairs. Inefficiency can
therefore not be thought of except as the result of an error, a mistake,
an incorrect and wrong move' (pp. 57-58). But, he continues, 'at the
same time, however, as he directs his energies toward the obviation of
error, the contemporary economist is frequently to be found pursuing
his analysis on the assumption that men do not, and will not, ever fall
into error' (p. 58).
In the neo-liberal economic thought the possibility of errors is
fundamental. "The market is a process. The state of the market is
continually changing. The market process is characterized by profits and
losses as the judgements made by entrepreneurs turn out to be correct49
or incorrect' (Littlechild, 1990, p. 52). In this continually changing
economy it is unavoidable to make errors, but some people turn out to
be better in judging the market than others, and therefore these experts
become entrepreneurs. In this thought the capabilities in analysing the
economy might differ between persons and therefore Lucas's democratic
principle does not hold.
Hayek (1945, p. 519) raises the question 'what is the problem we wish
to solve when we try to construct a rational economic order? On certain
familiar assumptions the answer is simply enough, //"we possess all the
relevant information, i/ we can start out from a given system of
preferences and // we command complete knowledge of available
means, the problem which remains is purely one of logic'.' 'This,
however, is emphatically no/ the economic problem which society faces.
And the economic calculus which we have developed to solve this
logical problem, though an important step toward the solution of the
economic problem of society, does not yet provide an answer to it. The
reason for this is that the "data" from which the economic calculus
starts are never for the whole society "given" to a single mind which
could work out the implications, and can never be so given.'
From this point of view it seems possible to improve individual
decisions by transferring information from experts to laymen. Hayek,
however, rejects this. 'It may be admitted that, so far as scientific
knowledge is concerned, a body of suitable chosen experts may be in
the best position to command all the best knowledge available — though
this is of course merely shifting the difficulty to the problem of selecting
the experts' (Hayek, 1945, p. 521). This rejection is, however, most
likely not based on economic but on political motives, which are always
largely interwoven in neo-liberal thought. The argument that finding an
expert is equally difficult as analysing the problem is not very
convincing. Hayek's rejection of expert influence on individual
decisions is probably inspired by his fear for 'the dangers that the then
visible collectivist tendencies created for personal freedom' (Hayek,
1990, p. 439).
The Freiburg school has more confidence in the government. Also
based on the possibilities of errors in the economic process Ropke
stresses the role the government has in improving the economy. The
policy influence should, however, not eliminate the flexibility of the
economic system. 'Regarding the fluctuations in the conditions of the
economy and in the resulting economic activity, it is necessary to give
1 By "logic" Hayek means'mathematics'.50 Owpftr 5
priority to permanent o^/MJ/men/ and fta/anc/ng. This is, however, only
possible, if the economic system is as flexible as possible in all its parts'
(Ropke, 1949, pp. 272-273).* He compares the economic system to a
bicycle. It may be necessary for the government to steer, but if the
government fixes the handlebars, the bike will fall (Ropke, 1949, p.
273).
Although Ropke does not refer directly to public forecasts, this policy
instrument seems to fit perfectly in his thought. By providing
information the government influences the economic process. But since
information leaves the decisions to the individual agents, the flexibility
of the system is not affected.
According to Ropke (1949, p. 190) some specific problems occur in the
relation between education and the labour market, which need special
attention. 'A similar problematic exception in the price-making process
is to be found on the favour marfce/, where the law of prices may be
used in a similar way as on the goods markets. While the elasticity of
demand for labour differs for every part of the business cycle and will
decrease sharply during a depression, the elasticity of the supply is, at
least for the qualified occupations, really low, since human labour force
in case of a lack of economic capacity can not be "stored" for a long
time, and also because in the short term due to long terms of education
and the strong inflexibility can only be extended within a very limited
range. This low elasticity of supply may be increased by all kinds of
social political measures, for example by unemployment benefits, which
increase the "storability", by improvement of the employment services
«c. The longer the period of education, the longer the delay in
adjusting the supply to the market situation, and the more difficult it will
become. For this the academic labour market is a good example, where
in every single occupation surpluses and shortages alternate very easily,
and therefore the advice of a wise uncle for his nephew, to study the
subject which at the moment faces the largest surpluses, becomes
understandable, — an advise, which remains wise, as long as there are
not too many uncles and nephews of this kind."
'AngeslchU der Schwankungen in den Wirtschaftsbedingungen und der daraus sich
ergebenden Schwankungen der BesehSftigung ist die Notwendigkeit der stindigen
/4n/xmu/ije und /lujj/rJcAu/i; an die Spitze zu steilen. Das ist aber nur mOglicb, weon der
Wirtschaftsapparat in alien seinen Teilen mftglichst beweglich ist.'
'Einen solchen problematischen Sonderfall der Preisbildung stellt im allgemeinen auch der
^rtxifjmaritj dar. auf den die Preisgeseue in gleicher Weise angewandt werdeo kdnnen
wie auf die Warenmirkte. Wihrend die Elastizilit der Nachfrage nach Arbeitskriften in
den eiiuelnen Kunjunkturphasen verschieden ist und in der Depression aufterorderttlich tief
sinkt, ist die ElastizitSt des Angebocs. zum mindesten fur die qualiftzierten Berufe, rechtfo/iry fv/ruvw S1
5.4
This chapter started from the observation that most textbooks on public
economics do not mention the provision of information as an instrument
of economic policy. It is shown that this ignorance might be caused by
the current views on economic policy.
In Tinbergen's (1952, 1956) view — which is the most influential — the
economic system can be described by some quantitative relationships.
These relationships are assumed to be known by the government and
therefore it can control the system. People's expectations are a part of
the description of the system. Economic policy therefore may influence
expectations indirectly by changing the economic control variables, but
does not change the mechanisms themselves. In Tinbergen's model the
government takes all the responsibilities for the optimal control of the
economy. People's behaviour only serves as a relationship which has to
be taken into account.
Lucas (1976) showed that in order to make economically sense the
expectation formation schemes in Tinbergen's model must depend on
the economic system as such. While according to Tinbergen only the
government controls the economic relationships, Lucas's democratic
principle states that all agents will have optimising behaviour. Since
Lucas also departs from a knowable economic system, this does,
however, not lead to the need for public information. Because people
act optimally within this knowable economic system their expectations
are a priori optimal.
The neo-liberal view on economic policy does not depart from a
knowable economic system. Instead they describe the economy as
continually changing, in which it is unavoidable to make errors in
forecasts. Since some people are better in judging the market than
others, in this theory there may be possibilities to let experts provide
information to laymen. For the Austrian school, however, personal
gering, da die menschliche Arbeidskraft bei mangelnden VermOgensreserven nicht lange
"gelagert", aber auch auf kiirzere Fristen wegen der ISngeren Aushildungszeit und der
starken Unbeweglichkeit nur in geringen Grenzen vermehrt werden kann. Diese geringe
Elastizitit des Angebots kann durch allerlei sozialpolitische Maflnahmen erhdht werden, to
durch die Arbeidslosenunterstutzung, die die "Lagerungsfthigkeit" erhdht, durch
Verbesserung der Arbeitsvermittlung u.a. Je linger die Ausbildungsperiode ist, urn to
roehr verzSgert sich die Anpassung des Angebots an die Marktlage, urn to tchwieriger
wird sie zugleich. Darur ist der akademische Arbeitsmarkt ein gutes Beispiel, wo in den
einzelnen Berufen leicht Oberfullung und Unterbesetzung miteinander abwechseJn, to da0
der Rat eines weisen Onkels an seinen Neffen verstandlich wird, das im Augenblick am
meisten uberlaufene Fach zu studieren, — ein Rat, der Weise bleibt, so lange es nicht zu
vide solcher Onkel und Neffen gibt.'52
liberty is a very important political issue, which makes the provision of
public information unacceptable. For the Freiburg school these political
motives are less important. Therefore, although they do not refer
directly to public forecasts, this policy instrument seems to fit perfectly
in their thought.INFORMATION6 EXPECTATIONS IN THE HISTORY OF
ECONOMICS
Expectations play an important role in the study of the effects of
providing public labour market information. The concept of expectations
has, of course, been recognised important in economics for a long time,
at least since the beginning of this century. The meaning of this concept
is part of an economic theory and with the changes in the economic
thought, the meaning of the concept 'expectations' has also changed.
While the first part of this study was devoted to mismatch, in this
second part on information, an interpretation will be given of the fact
that students make prediction errors. This interpretation makes it
possible to derive how information can be used to improve students'
predictions and thus to decrease mismatch. In this chapter the history of
'expectations' in economic thought is discussed. This historical
framework aims to show how the concept of expectations depends on
the more general economic thought, which may clarify the crucial
relationship between the way of economic thought and the meaning of
this specific concept.
In 1930 Ricci, Tinbergen, and Schultz published studies containing the
first explicit models of a theory on expectations, which has since
become known as the 'cobweb theorem'. The name orginates from
Kaldor (1934). The cobweb theory has been the first explicit economic
theory about expectations formation. The well-known cobweb
mechanism is clearly explained by figure 6.1 which is an illustration of
Schultz (1930).
The figure shows a demand curve DD' and a supply curve SS'. Their
intersection is the equilibrium point, but suppose that initially supply has
been very low, and therefore the price was very high (a). The essential
cobweb assumption is that suppliers base their investment decision on
this price. They are not able to anticipate perfectly the price as a
function of their behaviour, but simply assume that the current price
will prevail in the future. This leads to a too large supply (6), and
therefore prices fall very sharply (c). These low prices cause the supply
to be very low and therefore prices will go up again. The mechanism
produces a cycle in prices and quantities, shown in part B and C of the
figure.60
in the supply curve to be distinguished from fluctuations in the demand
curve.
Moore (1929) invented an alternative approach to identify these
relations. His assumption is that changes in prices and quantities
through time are not caused by shifts in the supply and demand curve,
but are caused by deviations from the equilibrium. Since suppliers have
to make their supply decisions in advance they may make errors which
cause fluctuations in the supply. These fluctuations make it possible to
identify the demand curve, in which no errors occur. If in addition the
assumption is made that suppliers base their decision on the price at the
moment their decision has to be made, also the relation between prices
and supply can be identified.
Thus, Moore discovered that the cobweb model made it possible to
identify a model which had seemed to be unmeasurable. Ricci (1930, p.
653) describes Moore's method: 'With respect to the supply curve,
Moore uses a brilliant tool. Since the price in one year affects the
production in next year, he pulls down the column of prices one row,
and calculates the supply curve with the same data, which already
served to determine the demand curve."
The cobweb theory, therefore, provided a theory of expectations which
included the idea that people could make prediction errors and made it
possible to estimate the supply and demand curve. A fundamental issue
in the theory is the assumption that people expect the current price to
prevail in the next years.
In the static Walrasian model, equilibrium prices reflect the total
availability and utility of goods in a society, indicating their 'subjective'
value. It is therefore sufficient for people to be price taker, i.e. to
compare their own subjective utility with the prices. Kaldor (1934, p.
123) illustrates this view by defining 'perfect knowledge' as 'all the
relevant prices quoted in all markets are known to all individuals'
(italics added). In a dynamic context, however, this leads to the paradox
of the general equilibrium model. 'It so happens that the general
equilibrium comes about, on the one hand by consumers and companies,
maximising their utility, and profit respectively, while on the other hand
supply and demand for every good are equal. The latter condition
determines the prices. Prices are, however, for consumers and
'In bezug auf die Angebotskurve verwendet Moore ein brillantes Hilfmittel. Da der Preis
eines J ah res auf die Produktion des folgenden Jahres einwirkt, rGckt er die Kolonne der
Preise urn eine Zeile nach unten, und herechnel mit den gleichen Daten, die schon rur
Beslimmung der Nachfragekurve gedient haben. die Angebotskurve.'£xprrr<vio/u in rt^ Mr/Ofy o^£«wiomi« 61
companies constant parameters.""
The (classic) idea that the price of a good reflects its value, and that this
value can be thought of as a property of the good is still dominant in the
economic thought of the thirties. Of course, prices may deviate slightly
from the value but in the long run they tend to the equilibrium or
normal price. 'The normal price is that price at which the market price
would tend to settle over a period of time long enough to bring
quantities demanded (by purchasers) and quantities produced into an
equilibrium' (Ezekiel, 1938, p. 261).
Hicks (1935, p. 29) cites Pareto who defined 'the economic equilibrium
is the state which preserves eternal, if there is no change of the
conditions in which it is observed' 7 Equilibrium of prices was
equivalent to constant prices. Hicks remarks that in order to extend this
static equilibrium concept to a dynamic equilibrium concept the
condition must be added that people correctly forecast all changes that
will occur. Morgenstern (1935, p. 344) thinks that such perfect
forecasts will be impossible. People should take all future relationships
into account. "There is always an infinite chain of mutually suspected
reactions and responses to be taken into account. This chain can never
be broken off by an act of knowledge, but always by an arbitrary act,
by a decision.'* But on the other hand he concludes that 'besides the
assumption of perfect, unlimited foresight, [...] also the assumption that
there is no foresight at all has to be excluded' (p. 345).' 'It may
therefore be maintained, that a somehow positive degree of "knowing"
about future relations, /.e*. a with more or less probability provided
assumption about the future, indispensable for economic practice. This
is for example expressed in the fact that individuals refrain from a
purchase which is possible today, because experience showed them, that
these prices will not change until tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow,
e/c. Would it be impossible for them to make such assumptions, but
also to make any assumption, then every suspicion about tomorrow's
6 Lange (1935), p. 3S9. 'Das allgemeine wirtschaftliche Gleichgewicht kommt nlmlich
dadurch zustande, dafi einerseits die Konsumenten und die Unternehmer ihren Nutzen,
bzw. ihren Profit maximalisieren, w ah rend andererseits das Angebot und die Nachfrage
fur jedes Gut gleich sind. Durch die letztere Bedingung werden die Preise bestimmt Die
Preise sind aber fur die Konsumenten und fur die Unternehmer konstante Parameter.'
7 'L'equilibre economique est I'&at qui se maintiendrait indlfinement s'il n'y avait aucun
changement dans les conditions dans lesquelles on I'observe '
8 'Immer liegt eine unendliche Kette von wechselseitig vermuteten Reaktionen und
Gegenreaktionen vor. Diese Kette kann niemals durch einen Akt der ErkenntnU, sondern
immer nur durch einen Willkurakt, durch einen EntschluB abgebrochen werden.'
9 "Neben der Annahme der volligen, unbeschrankten Voraussicht scheidet aber auich |...| die
Annahme aus, es bestunde uberhaupt keine Voraussicht.'62 Oiopver 6
prices would be equally probable' (p. 345).'°
People are, according to this theory, not able to forecast perfectly what
is going to happen in the future, what would be necessary for dynamic
equilibrium, but they may use the past and present as an orientation.
People interpret these data. The cobweb theory assumes that people
interpret the current price in the same way as economists do. The
current price reveals the relation of supply and demand, which is likely
to persist.
The economists of the cobweb theory are very well aware of the
paradox which is generated by this assumed behaviour. Mostly they
stress that the cobweb assumption should not be taken too strictly. It is
not necessarily the case that people do not anticipate future
developments, but the opposite assumption that anticipations are perfect
is even more unrealistic. 'It is the supposition of this paper, rather, that
estimates of conditions for future dates are wrapped in a thicker and
thicker mist of uncertainty the more remote the date in question' (Hart,
1937a, p. 69). Furthermore, 'entrepreneurs' estimates for the future are
to be regarded as uncertain. [...], but the entrepreneur will not have
perfect confidence in his guess' (Hart, 1937b, p. 285). This means that
although people, e.g. in the cobweb theory, make errors in forecasting
the future, it is not thought that they do not realise that they make such
errors.
Tinbergen (1931, pp. 171-172) gives the clearest exposition of this
problem of dynamics. 'While in static schemes only quantities appear of
which the numerical values are assumed to be known to all subjects —
all quantities which will exists in future have the same value there as in
the past —, in dynamics the fundamental situation appears, that certain
future quantities are not known and therefore the subjects can only
calculate with expectations, which they have with respect to these
quantities.'" It is, however, not possible to state with certainty how
10 'Ei kann also fettgehalten werden, daB irgendein positiver Grad von "Wissen" um
zukQnftiges Verhallen, d. h. eine mil mehr oder minder Wahrscheinlichkeit ausgestattete
Annahme iiber die Zukunft fur das Wirtschaften unentbehrlich ist. Dies drOckt sich z. B.
auch darin aus. daft die Individuen heute durchfiihrbare KJufe unterlassen, weil ihnen die
Erfahrung gezeigt hat. daft sich die Preise bis morgen oder ubermorgen usw nicht
verindern. Warden sie derartigen Annahmen nicht machen kdnnen, sondern uberhaupt
keine haben, so wire jede Vermutung uber die morgigen Preise gleich wahrscheinlich.'
11 'Wihrend im statischen Schema immer nur Groften vorkommen, deren numerischer Wert
hei alien Subjekten als hekannt vorausgesetzt wird — alle Groften. die in der Zukunft
bestehen werden, haben da eben denselbtn Wert wie in der Vergangenheit —. kommt in
der Dynamik prizipiell der llmstand dazu, dafl bestimmte zukunftige Groften nicht bekannt
sind und die Subjekte deshalb nur mit der Erwartung, die bezOglich des Umfangs dieser
GrOBen haben rechnen kftnnen.'£y*cra/ioiu in rA? Htsrory <y fconomirt 63
people will form these expectations. 'These "expectations" show an
important distinction opposite to the "real" quantities. They may, also
in the case of full information, be different for individual subjects."*
Tinbergen assumes that people who have to form the expectations
understand economic relationships and use these in their expectation
formation. He assumes '[...], that the expectations are "reasonable",
/.£. agree with the economic relationships'." '* This reasonability
does according to Tinbergen not imply that expectations simply become
a given quantity: 'This last assumption does, however, not contradict
the fundamental property just posed'."
According to Tinbergen only in some very specific situations the
replacement of an expectation in the theory by a given quantity may be
possible. 'In certain cases — and these will temporarily be the most
successful in the analysis — the "expectations" might be replaced by
economic deduction, by certain constants or real quantities. In relation
to e.g. an expectation with respect to a quantity which is a "random
variable", the reasonable expectation will be the mathematical
expectation and therefore also a given constant."* Most economic
variables, however, can not be viewed upon as stochastic variables.
Tinbergen's examples, mostly about uncertainty with respect to the
weather conditions, are according to him only exceptions.
These specific examples bring Keuzenkamp (1989, p. 4) to the
conclusion that Tinbergen 'explicitly uses rational expectations, but it
disappeared under the dust of history'. Tinbergen's equalisation of the
reasonable expectation with the mathematical expectations, however,
only concerns random variables. Morgan (1987) shows that economists
before Haavelmo (1944) reject the probability approach to economics.
Tinbergen does not, as is typical for rational expectations, view all
economic variables as random variables.
In his papers about reasonable expectations, Tinbergen (1931, 1933)
12 'Die "Erwartungen" weisen gegenuber den "wirklichen" GroBen einen wichtigeo
Unterschied auf. Sie kflnnen namlich auch bei vollkommener Information, fOr einzelne
Subjekte verschieden sein.'
13 '|...], dafl die Erwartungen "vernunftig" sind, d. h. mit den wirtschaftlichen
Zusammenhangen ubereinstimmen.'
14 Tinbergen (1933) introduces the word 'reasonable' for 'vernunftig'.
15 'Die letzte Annan me widerspricht uberigens nicht der soeben angegebenen essenzielleo
eigenschaft der Erwartungen.'
16 'In bestimmten FSllen — und das werden vorlJufig wohl die meist erfolgreichen bei der
Analyse sein — kann man die "Erwartungen" durch wiruchafuteoretische Deduktion,
durch bestimmte Konstanten oder reelle GroBen ersetzen. handelt er sich z. B. um eine
Erwartung bezuglich einer GroBe, welche eine "zufSllige Variable" ist, so ist die
vernunftige Erwartung die mathematische und also eine bestimmte Konsunte.'64
unfolds the tension in economic modelling of expectations between, on
the one hand, the fact that people do have insight in the functioning of
the economy, but on the other hand, the fact that despite this insight
people make forecast errors. The economic reality is too complex and
ambiguous to make possible an unequivocal interpretation. Cobweb
theory incorporates the erroneous expectation behaviour of people, but
at the cost of the notion that people have insight in some very general
economic principles. In his subsequent work Tinbergen sticks to his
choice for naive expectation schemes, apparently because he considers
the erroneous character of expectations to be more relevant for practical
research than people's insight in economic relationships.
6.2 on 77ieory
From two different sources the cobweb theory was criticised. Firstly,
there are some theoretical problems with this theory, and secondly,
empirical research raised some doubts about the validity of the cobweb
theory.
The theoretical problem the cobweb theory is posed to is the fact that its
dynamic mechanism does not necessarily lead to convergence.
Tinbergen (1930) already showed that, depending on the parameters of
the model, price and quantity fluctuations may increase. Figure 6.2
gives his illustration of both a divergent (2a) and a convergent (2b)
process.
FIGURE 6.2: ILLUSTRATION OF DIVERGENT (2a) AND CONVERGENT (2b) COBWEB
PROCESS FROM TINBERGEN (1930, P. 671).
Alili. 2 Ahb. 2 A Abb. 2 b
Initially, this observation has been interpreted as a discovery concerning
the 'economic reality'. 'Since the classic economists it has been
undisputed that the exchange economy of which the equilibrium has
been distorted, will establish a new equilibrium, if no further changes inK Wwory of Economic! 65
the data take place [...]. But now, more recent authors, namely Ricci,
Schultz, Tinbergen, and Rosenstein-Rodan showed that these automatic
adjustments of the market price to the equilibrium price [...] is not at all
as obvious as they wished since the classics' (Lange, 1935, p. 358).'^
Kaldor (1934, p. 122) is the first to understand the problem of this
possibility. If a theory predicts infinite fluctuations, there is no problem
in reality, but there is simply something wrong with the theory. 'The
assumptions of static theory are, therefore, nothing else than the
conditions necessary to make equilibrium "determinate": the conditions
under which we can give a scientifically precise description of the actual
course of economic phenomena. Once these assumptions have been
specified and have gained general acceptance as the limits within which
deductive speculation must proceed, any new elements subsequently
discovered which play a r61e in shaping the course of events are likely
to be put down as "causes of indeterminateness" since the human mind
finds it easier to alter the conclusions arrived at within an accepted
framework, than to alter the framework itself. Whenever, therefore,
new causes of "indeterminateness" are said to be detected this is merely
another way of saying that a new set of determining forces has been
found: forces whose behaviour and manner had not hitherto been
reducible to uniformities and whose influence must therefore also be
assumed absent if the existing body of generalisation is to be regarded
as valid.'
The accepted assumptions, which lead to the indeterminateness of the
theory are:
'5. All independent variables remain constant through time.
6. All individuals expect the prices actually ruling to remain in force
permanently: no price-changes are anticipated' (p. 123).
Kaldor concludes that if the cobweb theory predicts divergent
fluctuations of prices, something must be wrong with the theory. He
gives a list of possible corrections, related to the velocity of adjustment.
His final possibility is that 'in any actual situation, the presence of some
foresight may always be expected. The existence of foresight, however
incomplete, will always change the situation in favour of stability so
17 'Seit den klassischen NationalGkonomen gait es als unumstritten, dafl die
Verkehrswirtschaft, deren Gleichgewicht gestOrt ist, sich wieder von selbst in ein neuei
Gleichgewicht einspielt, falls keine weitere Datenanderungen stattfinden [...]. Nun haben
aber neuere Autoren, namentlich Ricci, Schultz, Tinbergen und Rosenstein-Rodan,
gezeigt, daft diese aulomatische Anpassung des Marktpreises an den Gleichgewichtspreis
|...] keineswegs so selbstverstandlich ist, wie man es seit den KJassikern wahr haben
wollte.'66
long as the expectations of price-changes are in the right direction, [...]'
(p. 136).
Also Buchanan (1939, pp. 80-81) brings in these theoretical objections.
'The cobweb theorem has been offered as a formal statement of a
certain combination of conditions under which the displacement of
equilibrium does not set in motion a chain of events leading to a new
equilibrium of an enduring sort. If our analysis is valid, we have shown
that neither perpetual fluctuation at a given amplitude nor expanding
fluctuation is theoretically possible if the supply curve is a competitive
curve such as most writers apparently had in mind in their exposition of
the doctrine.' In many papers that followed this observation, attempts
were made to save the cobweb theory. Leontief (1934) for example
shows that in case of non-linear supply and demand curves, local
unstable processes may turn out to be globally stable.
The second source of critique against the cobweb theory comes from
empirical arguments. Coase and Fowler (1935, p. 159n) observed that
the length of the waves measured in the pig-cycle did not correspond to
the cobweb theory. 'To have shown that farmers react immediately to
changes in the profitability of pig-breeding is, however, a serious
objection to the attempt to explain the pig-cycle by an appeal to the
"cobweb-theorem." For if farmers react immediately, then on the
assumption of that theorem one would get a two-year not a four-year
cycle'. While a wave of four years was observed, the theory would
predict a two years length. Cohen and Barker (193S) tried to refute this
analysis by some additional hypotheses about the farmers behaviour
with respect to the number of gilts kept for replacement purposes and
the number of old sows culled off, but Coase and Fowler (1937, p. 55)
again show the inconsistency of the theory: 'In fact, however, such
explanation as they attempted in their Reply involved certain important
modifications of the theory previously held and was not based on any
analysis of the way farmers had behaved but was purely hypothetical'.
The introduction of the cobweb theory, and also the Keynesian theory
showed to economists the importance of expectations in economic
analysis. An alternative way to investigate expectations and to test the
theory is by direct measurement of expectations. To this end surveys
were started to ask entrepreneurs about their price and inflation
expectations. Examples of such studies are Klein (1954), Modigliani and
Sauerlender (1955), Haavelmo (1958), and Katona (1958). The
dispersed answers to the expectation question are aggregated to onem 67
single market expectation. The findings of these surveys did in general
not confirm the cobweb hypothesis that people expect the current price
to persist.
This rejection is, however, accompanied by a very remarkable
observation. Theil (1958, p. 126), who gives a very broad overview on
the forecast literature states that, 'the obvious conclusion is that the
entrepreneurs consistently underestimated the actual changes in their
variables'. Theil, therefore suggests to multiply predicted changes such
that the underestimation will disappear. He explains the phenomenon as
psychological. 'It should perhaps be noted beforehand that the
"economic" analysis which follows has, in a sense, a "psychological"
competitor. For, if a man predicts large but not very large changes, the
public will regard him as a man of imagination; but if he predicts
extremely large changes, his audience will replace imagination by
phantasy. Thus, there is some kind of social pressure in the direction of
the bias which we have observed' (p. 156).
Theil expresses this phenomenon as (using the notation of this study):
(6.1) w^-w"^ = e(w'"-vi>-<*) 0 < 6 < 1
From this it can be deduced that
(6.2) VARW"->v "^ = e*VA/?(w'"-*>"''}
i.e. the variance of the prediction, related to the current value w~* of
the wages is lower than the variance of the realised wages related to the
current wages. Compared to the present wages, the realised wages
fluctuate more than the predictions of people. This 'psychological' law
has been interpreted by many economists as a partial confirmation of the
cobweb theory. People do not use the present prices as predictions, but
also do not forecast the change completely. Their expectations are
somewhere in-between.
The theoretical and empirical observations concerning the cobweb
theory led to new theories concerning expectation formation. It was
noticed that people have expectations which are more adequate than the
cobweb theory assumed. One example of such a theory is extrapolative
expectations introduced by Metzler (1941, p. 119). 'The dynamic
models [...] introduce a somewhat artificial assumption about business
expectations. [...] entrepreneurs are assumed to base their expectations
of sales in a given period upon sales of the preceding period. It is68 Oiqp/rr 6
natural to object that expectations of future sales may depend not only
upon the past /eve/ of sales, but also upon the d/recrion o/ c/io/jge of
such sales'. Therefore, 'to discuss the role of expectations, I shall make
use of a coefficient of expectations (TJ) defined as the ratio between
periods r and /-I and the observed change of sales between periods
r-1 and/-2':
(6.3) w*" = w^^w *-w_"f)
The thought behind this expectation formation scheme is that people
may improve their expectation by taking into account also the past
change of a variable and not only its level. Cagan (1956) introduced
adaptive expectations in which the expectation depends on all past
observations. In general these expectation schemes can be formulated
as:
(6.4) w"* = yt.., *;', *;?, w-*)
It is also possible to extend the formula by elements other than past
wages. In general, the prediction is a function of all data known to the
forecaster. This general specification leaves open a great deal of
possible expectation formation schemes which leads to the question
which scheme should be selected. This problem could not be solved
empirically, because it appeared even impossible to identify the
parameters of simple forms of (6.4) in a simple one-market model.
In order to restrict the large amount of possible expectation formation
schemes some theoretical restrictions are proposed. Enthoven and
Arrow (1956), Arrow and Nerlove (1958), and Arrow and Hurwicz
(1958) restrict the possible expectation formations to those which lead to
a stable equilibrium. Kaldor's (1934) critique that a theory which
predicts indeterminateness of the equilibrium should be interpreted as a
defect theory is used to select between possible and impossible
expectation schemes.
The idea introduced by Muth (1960) to solve the selection problem is to
assume that people use the optimal" expectation scheme. Nerlove and
Wage (1964) proved that adaptive expectations are optimal in the usual
cobweb model. Implicitly in the proof of Nerlove and Wage is an
assumption about the stochastic process which determines the
development of the equilibrium wages (p. 208). In fact all selection
criteria for expectation formations schemes relate the optimal or
18 To make possible the use of 'optimality' (implicitly) a loss function has to be introduced.
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possible expectation schemes to the properties of the economic reality,
assumed in their model. Thus, expectations are optimal if they adjust as
good as possible to the nature of the economic stochastic, or data
generating process.
This seems to be a trivial statement, but it certainly is not. The
approach to view the economy as a stochastic process has for a long
time not been common practice among economists. The description of
the developments in an economy as a stochastic process has been
introduced by Haavelmo (1944), inspired by Slutzky (1937). Morgan
(1987) shows that the general opinion among economists before the
revolution of Haavelmo was that probability was not useful in
economics. Ezekiel (1928, p. 223) writes that 'the results obtained by
statistical determination of the relations are not fundamental "laws of
nature" in the same sense as is the law of gravity. They are measures of
the way that particular groups of men, in the aggregate, have reacted to
specific economic conditions during a specified period in the past. If the
study is elaborate enough, it may reveal the way in which the reaction
has been changing during the period considered, and the direction and
rate of change. But it does not tell how long the same reaction will
continue to prevail, what new causes may arise to change the responses,
or what the relations would be in the new situation. The theories of
mathematical probability do not apply.' Economic relations are largely
based upon individual preferences and decisions, and these individual
characteristics can not be described, according to Ezekiel, by a data
generating process. Some regularities may be found in the data, but this
provides no certainty about the persistence of the regularity. People may
change their mind and alter their preferences.
Robbins (1935, p. 107) also raises questions about the possibilities to
use probability concepts in economics. 'Ought we not to wish to be in a
position to give numerical values to the sales of valuation, to establish
quantitative laws of demand or supply? [...] No doubt such knowledge
would be useful. But a moment's reflection should make it plain that we
are here entering upon a field of investigation w/iere f/iere w no reason
to suppose /tow u/!(/or7ni//&? are fo te dwcovera/. The "causes" which
bring it about that the ultimate valuations prevailing at any moment are
what they are, are heterogenous in nature: there is no ground for
supposing that the resultant effects should exhibit significant uniformity
over time and space.'
Besides this problem of the non-uniformity of economic relations,
economists opposed to probability concepts because it is unclear what
may be the source of the probabilities. In empirical work it is of course70 Qwp/f r 6
necessary to allow for some randomness, but these probabilities in the
economic relations were ascribed to measurement errors (Frisch, 1934)
or incompleteness of the model (Working, 1925). The probabilities do
not arise at the theoretical but only at the practical empirical level. In
the theoretical economic relations there is little reason to assume
randomness. Economic decision rules are optimal according to the neo-
classical theory, so can not be subject to chance. The only exceptions in
which probability is accepted are examples like the weather condition in
Tinbergen (1931). For a farmer the amount of rain next year is a
stochastic variable.
Haavelmo (1944, p. iii) remarks that 'so far, the common procedure has
been, first to construct an economic theory involving exact functional
relationships, then to compare this theory with some actual
measurements, and, finally, "to judge" whether the correspondence is
"good" or "bad"'. He continues that 'it has been considered legitimate
to use some of the too/s developed in statistical theory wjfnoul accepting
the very /oMnaVm'on upon which statistical theory is built. For no too/
d^ve/fl/jed* /n /ne f/ieory q/" $/a/wttes /JOS any meaning — except,
perhaps, for descriptive purposes — w/f/ioMf be/ng re/erred to some
Haavelmo is of course right in his observation that statistic theory can
only be used for stochastic models, but then he states: 'The reluctance
among economists to accept probability models as a basis for economic
research has, it seems, been founded upon a very narrow concept of
probability and random variables. Probability schemes, it is held, apply
only to such phenomena as lottery drawings, or, at best, to those series
of observations where each observation may be considered as an
independent drawing from one and the same "population"'. He
continues with an explanation why it is not necessary to assume that
observations are independent. The reason some economists did not
accept probability theory is, however, not that they thought the
observations should be independent draws from one population, but that
they thought that this population does not exist. In their view it is not
possible to assume that future events are drawn from the same
population as past events.
Opponents of probability theory in economics are confronted with the
dilemma that it is only possible to make empirical inferences based on
some stochastic model, but their theory does not allow for stochastic
elements. Haavelmo (p. iv) states that 'in fact, if we consider actual
economic research — even that carried on by people who oppose the
use of probability schemes — we find that it rests, ultimately, upon£jprcTa/io<u in rtr Hurory of Economic* 71
some, perhaps very vague, notion of probability and random variables'.
Although they reject it, implicitly every empirical economic study needs
some stochastic notion. Therefore, mostly measurement errors are
introduced.
As a result of Haavelmo's ideas it became more and more common
practice not to ascribe all randomness to measurement errors, but to
assume the economic reality itself to be subject to probabilities. The
economic theory itself, however, did not change drastically. It is still
assumed that people make optimal decisions. Human behaviour,
therefore, can not be the source of the randomness, and therefore the
economic system is considered to be subject to exogenous random
shocks. The source of these shocks is not clear. The weather is still the
archetype, but the concept is replaced to all economic variables, also to
those for which it is difficult to think what the meaning is of exogenous
random shocks.
Accepting a model of the economy which is a stochastic process makes
it possible to fit expectations in these analyses. Based on the optimality
idea of expectations, Muth (1961) introduced the concept of rational
expectations. The observation of Nerlove and Wage (1964) that adaptive
expectations are optimally given a certain stochastic process of the real
world, led to the observation that the optimal expectation scheme is in
fact a function of the stochastic process of the real world. Given this
stochastic process the optimal expectation or rational expectation equals:
(6.5) w" = £W*"|/,J
in which 7,_^ denotes all data available at the moment the expectation
has to be formed. 'The hypothesis can be rephrased a little more
precisely as follows: that expectations of firms (or, more generally, the
subjective probability distribution of outcomes) tend to be distributed,
for the same information set, about the prediction of the theory (or the
"objective" probability distributions of outcomes)' (Muth, p. 316)." In
rational expectations all economic events are treated as realisations of
random variables with a simultaneous probability density function. This
density function is known to the economic agents and therefore the
realisation of one variable makes it possible to improve the forecast of
other (future) variables by making the marginal density function
19 This definition of the rational expectation is the most precise. The rational expectation
predicts a probability distribution, not a single outcome. In (6.5) the expectation it
'described' by the mean, what is sufficient only for certain loss functions («.g. an
loss function). See section 7.1.72
conditional on this realisation. Therefore, at the moment r-rf a part of
w'*" is predictable using the information set /,^, and a part is not
predictable. This unpredictable part is the prediction error.
A remarkable feature of rational expectations was that although it
assumes optimal behaviour of the agents, it seemed to be able to explain
TheiPs underestimation of changes. By construction,w" = E{"°|/J
is not correlated with the prediction error Aw. Therefore,
(6.6)
= VA/JW'-wi
Rational expectations thus also explain that the realisation of a variable
is more fluctuative than the prediction, which was noticed by Theil
(equation (6.2)). Although Muth (1961) suggested that rational
expectations did explain the underestimation phenomenon, this is not the
case since the formulation of the underestimation of changes in (6.1)
implies the prediction error:
(6.7)
Since w^ and W* are both known at r-d, they are an element of
/,_j, and thus it is possible to predict Aw based on information in /,_j,
which is impossible in rational expectations by definition. Bossons and
Modigliani (1966) pointed to this inconsistency, but their observation
did not play an important role in the discussion about rational
expectations.**
Tinbergen, as mentioned before, recognised the large tension in the
economic modelling between, on the one hand, the notion that people
use economic principles to anticipate the future developments, and on
the other hand, the notion that these developments are so complex that
nobody will ever make perfect anticipations. The formalisation of
economic theory, together with the enormous influence of econometrics
caused, however, the theory on expectations to evolve from cobweb
theory into rational expectations. The insight of cobweb theory that
people make errors in their forecasts, was modelled in a rather arf /we
way. This aspect was lost in the rigor of the further developments of the
theory, leaving the theory with a more consistent framework in which,
20 Although *.j. Lovdl (1986) recently rediscovered Theirs findings, based on direct
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however, all uncertainty is reduced to external shocks."
6.5 £xpec/aft'ons in ftfwcar/ona/ C/101'ce
Studies about students' expectations in educational choice are confronted
with the same dilemma between the consistency of rational expectations
and the usefulness of the cobweb model. The first study about
expectations formation of students with respect to their educational
choice was carried out by Freeman (1971). This study contains both the
results of a survey and a theoretical expectation scheme. Freeman uses
the cobweb model to model the expectation behaviour of students. He
does, however, not give any fundamental reasons why he prefers the
cobweb model, and even refers to Muth (1961) as a theoretical
preferable model. But, 'if expected salaries can, as a first
approximation, be taken as functions of current salaries only, the
traditional cobweb analysis is obtained' (Freeman, 1975a, p. 174).
The choice of the cobweb assumption is clarified in Freeman (1975b, p.
31). "The cobweb relation, obtained by substituting the salary equation
into the basic supply equation, highlights the endogenous fluctuations
that characterize the market.' By assuming the cobweb expectation
formation Freeman introduces errors in the expectations of students,
which according to him is a realistic and necessary property of the
model. For Freeman it is more important that students make mistakes,
than to know exactly which mistakes they make.
The cobweb specification in educational choice has been criticised with
similar arguments as described in the previous sections. Zarkin (1983,
pp. 94-95) compares a cobweb and a rational expectations model about
the educational choice of teachers. 'A myopic cobweb model fits the
data only marginally worse. This paper demonstrates that we may be
led to incorrectly accept a cobweb model of occupational choice if we
look solely at the fit of the model. Because of its autoregressive
specification, a cobweb model should fit most data well, regardless of
the true underlying structure. This same feature makes it difficult in
other contexts to distinguish a world in which agents are myopic from
one in which they pursue a forward-looking, rational expectations
mechanism.' Therefore, he concludes that the comparison of both
21 In game theory agents can play mixed strategies. In such a case one player generates the
randomness for the other players and v.v. The crucial property of such a model that for
every agent all relevant uncertainty is external to him remains, however. Fundamental
exceptions to this, in which uncertainty is really internal, are theories in which the players
play with a 'trembling hand' (See Selten, 1975).74
models must be based on theoretical grounds. 'In investigating the
dynamic properties of the two models, we find that a cobweb model
implies a long, oscillatory adjustment path in response to a future
anticipated baby boom.' These long oscillations are unprobable and
therefore the cobweb model must be rejected.
Siow (1984) also uses rational expectations. 'The benefits of the
integration include: [...] (iv) An alternative to the cobweb model for
forecasting the supply of new entrants into an occupation is developed'
(p. 632). Siow views the use of rational expectations as an evident
improvement of the model of Freeman. The systematic errors which
students make in the cobweb model are regarded as unrealistic and
therefore replaced by a model in which all prediction errors have
external causes. Freeman on the other hand accepts the disputable
assumption of the cobweb behaviour, but uses it to incorporate errors of
the students in his model.
It is highly remarkable that in the context of educational choice the
cobweb model, which has been abolished in more theoretical fields kept
its lure." It would be too easy to explain the popularity of the cobweb
model in this context as a lack of theoretical notion in practical
research. It rather seems to be the case that with the formalisation of
rational expectations, the theory lost some aspects about the way
students form expectations, which are important for studies about
educational choice. Implicit in the cobweb view is the notion that due to
the complexity of the labour market, students will make errors in their
predictions. Cobweb theory incorporates such errors while rational
expectations does not. Although cobweb theory is rather ad /we, for
them, the cobweb model simply provides a better metaphor to describe
their thoughts about the functioning of the match between education and
the labour market. The aim of this second part of the study, on
information, is to model prediction errors in a more general way, but in
such a way that the possibility of errors in the forecasts, due to the
difficulty for students to forecast, is preserved.
6.6 Conc/uj/oAir
The rise of empirical research in the thirties made it necessary for
economists to incorporate expectations in their model. Of course, it was
recognised that expectations may be incorrect. The cobweb theory
incorporated this possibility and was able to explain Hanau's pig cycle.
Empirical research and formalisation led to the fall of the cobweb
22 See r j. De Grip (1987), Roos (1989). and Bouman (1989) in the Netherlands.m rt* Hw/ory 0/Economics 75
theory, which got replaced by various alternative expectation formation
schemes. This ultimately led to the concept of rational expectations in
which the possibility that agents make errors in forecasting disappeared.
For a long time economists opposed against the introduction of
stochastic elements in the theory, which appeared to conflict with the
economic principle of optimising behaviour. Haavelmo introduced the
idea that the economic process is a stochastic process. In rational
expectations these stochastic elements are incorperated, but because of
this economic principle and the assumption of a given data generating
process these must necessarily be external random shocks.7 A STOCHASTIC MODEL OF PREDICTION
ERRORS
In the first part of this study some theoretical notions and empirical
evidence concerning the provision of public labour market information
were given. The two central issues were, firstly, that students base their
educational decisions on predictions which may not equal the
realisations, and secondly, that the extent of this difference between
realisation and prediction may be influenced by providing additional
labour market information. In the model of chapter 3 the prediction and
the equilibrium wages are treated as given constants.
For the study of the effects of providing information it is necessary to
extend the model of chapter 3. Firstly, there is a relation between the
prediction and the realisation which has to be modelled. The essence of
a prediction is that it is intended to equal the realisation, and therefore
the prediction can not be treated independently from this realisation.
Secondly, information generally influences the prediction. The
prediction can therefore not be exogenously, but at least depends on this
information.
In the previous chapter it was shown that the formalisation of
expectation theory and the attempts to make the theory consistent, led to
rational expectations, in which predictions are by definition the best
possible. Every prediction error is caused by external random shocks,
while it is not possible for students themselves to make errors in
forming an expectation. The theory therefore lost the characteristic that
making a forecast in the real world is a difficult process.
In this chapter an attempt is made to model expectation formation in a
way which both serves the theoretical request for consistency and the
realistic every day experience of the difficulty to make an adequate
forecast. The relation between prediction and realisation is modelled
stochasticly. In section 7.2 and 7.3 two different approaches to the
stochastic character of the prediction error are considered: the states of
the world view and the errors in forecasts view. In section 7.4 it is
shown that as soon as errors in forecasts are allowed for, there arises a
trade off between information and interpretation errors. Information
errors represent the type of uncertainty used in rational expectations.
Interpretation errors represent the difficulties students (and professional
forecasters) have in the act of forecasting.78
7.7 77i£ Prai/crion Error
A prediction is mostly defined in dictionaries as 'a statement about what
is (likely) to happen in the future'.' For economic analysis, the
interpretation of the word 'statement' is important. Since economics
deals with people's intentions it is important to stress that such a
statement aims at being right. A prediction is therefore 'an attempt to
say what is (likely) to happen in the future'. However, as will be shown
in later chapters, many economic theories neglect this attempt aspect.
Some theories simply assume that the attempt will always be successful,
while in other theories the expectation formation is modelled completely
independent of its aim, the realisation.
For the study of student behaviour it is important not to neglect possible
mistakes in predicting the future. It may be useful to assume that
professional forecasters in ?.#. financial markets, make perfect
predictions, but it is very unrealistic to assume that students have this
capability of perfect forecasting. The evidence in chapter 4 already
made clear that students do not forecast perfectly. On the other hand, it
is necessary to assume that students aim at correct forecasts. A forecast
that does not aim at its realisation is simply not a forecast.
In general, the prediction of some future economic variable, e.g. future
wages, will not equal its realisation. The difference between these two,
i.e. the prediction error, Aw = w^'-tv™" * may take different values.
The reason prediction errors are made is that the student does not know
beforehand what value Aw will have.
To model this uncertainty the prediction error Aw is interpreted as a
stochastic variable, with a marginal probability density function
F,(Aw\). Since this random variable models the uncertainty of an
individual student, the marginal density function may differ for every
student i. In this section, the prediction error of one particular student is
considered and therefore the index < is omitted. As noted above, the
prediction of the wage aims at its realisation. To operationalise this
concept a loss function is needed. A loss function assigns to every value
of Aw * 0 a positive loss associated with this error. If Aw = 0 the
loss should be 0. In this study we use the mean square error (MS£) as
the loss function for students.
1 See «.g. Fowler's Concise English Dictionary, 1989.
2 The bar in Aw indicates that the prediction w'"* is compared to the realisation w"".Aw
without a bar will be used for comparisons with the equilibrium wage. Thus
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(7.1) AfS£(Aw) = £<Aw*}
The use of the mean square error as a loss function makes it sufficient
to describe errors with their mean and variance.' The student who has
to make a prediction aims at minimising the loss. In the best case
Aw s 0. Since the random variable Aw models the uncertainty of the
student with respect to the prediction it can not be the case that a non-
identical transformation of the prediction /e(w'"*) exists, with
A/SE^w^-w'") lower than A/SE(Aw). 8 represents a variable
parameter of the transformation. If such a transformation existed the
student would be able to improve his prediction without any further
information or insight into the situation. This implies that the AfSE of
such a transformation should be minimal for y^w***) = w*"*. This
property makes it possible to put a restriction on the distribution of
Aw.
The AfSE of such a transformation equals:
(7.2)
- w "• + (/g(w "•) - w
+2Aw(/g(w>") -O
= AfS£(Aw) + 2E(Aw}(/e(w'"') - w"<) +
Minimising the A/SE with respect to 0 gives:
') - w ~) #("•)
(7.3) 2£{Ai32(^,(w)w)
de ae "' ae
which implies that
(7.4) /e(w>") = w""-E(Aw}
Therefore, to have /gtw'"') = w'" the assumption must be made that
3 Based on the model of chapter 3 the exact loss function for a student who decides to enter
the market is loss. • Mar(0,*•,""-*'••). This implies that if the student has a probability
distribution as expectation about the realised wages, it is optimal to base the supply
decision on the expected value of this distribution. For the comparison of two forecasti,
the higher moments of the distribution may matter. The use of the MS£ is an
approximation in which the assumption is made that students do not use moments other
than the second (the variance) and that the class of distributions is such that for two
distributions />, and /*j. Loss-//*,) < La»,<Pj) if o*(/\) < o*(Pj). For many reasonable
classes of distribution functions this second assumption holds exactly, while the first
assumption is met for the normal distribution. •% <80 Oiqp/f r 7
(7.5) £(Avd =0
This assumption (7.5), within the framework of the Mean Square Error
loss function, can be regarded as the definition of a prediction of
w"*".* /4 priori it is impossible to decide that it is more likely that a
prediction will be an underestimation or an overestimation. This does
not exclude, however, that somebody else may make a prediction of the
students' prediction error 4w'". Again, by definition of a prediction
ElAvv'" - Aw) = 0, but this does not imply that Aw'" = 0.
If a student receives such a prediction of his own prediction error and
recognises it as such, this will be valuable for him, since this additional
information enables him to improve his initial prediction. Mostly, this
additional information does not take the form of a prediction of the
prediction error, but of an alternative prediction of the realised wage.
Such a prediction gives the student equal opportunities to improve his
own prediction. This possibility is an essential point in this study.
7.2 S/a/« o//A<? W?r/rf
In the previous section the prediction error has been introduced as a
random variable. The essence of prediction errors is that the person
who makes the error does not know its value. Therefore the assumption
is made that although the realisation of the prediction error mostly
differs from 0, the expectation of the prediction error, £lAw), equals 0.
The reason for modelling the prediction error stochasticly has to do with
the fact that, from the viewpoint of the student, it is not possible to
correct this error. It does, however, not explain the source of such
prediction errors. There are two basic models of the sources of
prediction errors in economics, which are discussed in this and the next
section. In this section the states of the world model is discussed, while
section 7.3 is devoted to the errors in forecasts model.
This states of the world model is the most widely used model of
prediction errors in economics.' Its basic point is that at the moment
some decision has to be made, the (future) consequences are not known
with certainty. There are different states of the world which can not be
excluded beforehand. Table 7.1 gives an example. In this example a
4 Benassy (1991) generates results about the suboptimality of rational expectations by
neglecting this definition. Therefore, his results have to be interpreted as that it may
sometimes be better if people do not maximise their utility function, which is generally
true in the case of market failure.
5 See rj. Arrow (1951) and Dehreu (1959).student has to make a choice between two schools. At school i4 he will
get some specialised knowledge, while at school B he will be more
generally educated. The question the student is faced with is whether
the labour market for the specialised knowledge will be good or bad at
the moment he finishes his school. Therefore, two scenarios are
distinguished, state 1 in which the market is indeed good and his
earnings measured in utility are 100, while with the more general
education he only gets 50. On the other hand the situation may be bad,
as in state 2, in which case the earnings with school -4 fall to 0 while















In a states of the world model it is crucial that all the information given
in table 7.1 is known with certainty. If for example the payments in the
different states of the world themselves are uncertain, the model has to
be extended with additional states of the world which incorporate this
uncertainty. This model is very powerful. It is able to include every
form of uncertainty. Therefore, the only uncertainty in the model is, by
definition, the fact that it is not known beforehand which state of the
world will occur.
It is clear that /! would be chosen in state 1 and £ would be chosen in
state 2. In both states the cost of a wrong decision (based on a false
belief) are 50. This student's problem is, that he does not know which
state of the world will occur. To solve this decision problem it is
assumed that the student has some subjective probabilities about which
state will occur.' In table 7.2 such subjective probabilities are given.
Based on this probability distribution it is possible to calculate the
expected value (£V) for both alternatives. The expected value of an
alternative y is equal to the weighted gains in the possible states of the
world.
6 See t.;. Savage (1954), Schmitt and Levine (1977), and Singh (1988).82
(7.6)
in which p^ is the probability of a certain state of the world, and (// is



















= 0.8 x 100 + 0.2 x 0 = 80
= 0.8 x 50 + 0.2 x 50 = 50
The states of the world model asserts that, without further information,
the agent chooses the alternative with the maximum expected utility, so
he chooses school <4. More in general, the choice ./ e U^} is such that
(77) MAX
An interesting question in this model is what the welfare costs of not
having perfect information are, or stated inversely, what the value of
perfect information is. These costs of uncertainty (W) depend on the
contents of the information. For a given state it can be defined as the
value of the decision made by the student, minus the value of the
optimal decision in that state.
(7.8) (// - MAX I// $ 0
By definition these costs are always less than or equal to zero. In the
example
W, = 100 - 100 = 0
Wj = 0 - 50 = -50
If the student receives perfect information, which tells him state 1 will83
be the case, his gain is zero, because his decision does not change due
to the extra information. If, however, the perfect information tells him
state 2 will be the case his gain is 50, because now he can anticipate
this state by changing his decision from school /4 to B.
The state the information will predict, however, is not known
beforehand, so a student has to calculate the expected value of perfect
information, which can be calculated by again weighting the welfare
effects with the subjective probability distribution.
(7.9)
In the example this negative welfare effect due to imperfect information
equals 0.2 x -50 = -10.
A problem in this theory of uncertainty is that the calculation of the
value of information is only correct if the subjective probability
distribution is correct. A probability distribution that is correct, i.e.
which corresponds to the 'real' probability distribution is called an
objective probability distribution.
The assumption of a subjective probability distribution asserts that
students regard the future world as stochastic. They mentally assign
probability values to the different states of the world they distinguish.
The assumption of the existence of an objective probability distribution
is stronger. It states that the real world is not only viewed upon as
stochastic, but really is stochastic. Many theories assume, furthermore,
that the subjective probabilities equal the objective probabilities.
Students do, in their view, face uncertainty, and they do make errors
due to this uncertainty, but the real source of these errors is the
stochastic character of the world. Keynes (1937) calls this type of
uncertainty (mathematical) risk, which he compares to gambling
roulette: The probability distribution is known with certainty, but the
realisation depends on chance. In rational expectations theory this
assumption, that objective probability distribution equals the subjective
probability distribution is essential. To operationalise this thought the
objective probability distribution is furthermore assumed to equal the
probability distribution generated by the economic model in question.
The strength of this assumption can be illustrated by the fact that even
in a casino there are people willing to play, although roulette is one of
the best examples of a situation with a knowable objective probability
distribution. The only possible explanation for this fact in the states of
the world theories is that these people have some curious utility84
function.
Thus, a subjective probability function which assigns a too high
probability to the one, and a too low probability to the other state, will
have two effects. The student will put too much emphasis on the
consequences in the first state (because he has overestimated the
probability this will occur), and he will underestimate the value of extra
information, because he underestimates the probability that there will be
a deviation from his expectations. The subjective probability distribution
serves in this context both as a statement about the probability of the
two states, and implicitly as a statement about the quality of this
information. Students do not, according to the model, realise that their
expectations may be incorrect. In a situation in which it is assumed that
the subjective probabilities equal the objective probabilities, this is no
problem because students are always right by definition. If it is allowed
that the subjective probabilities differ from the objective probability, a
discrepancy arises between the complete confidence students have in
their (stochastic) forecast, and the differences between subjective and
objective probabilities, which are assumed to exist.
A way to overcome this problem is by using Bayesian statistics.'
Suppose that in the example the objective probability distribution is
(0.7, 0.3), /.<». the economic environment is such that with 70% chance
state 1 will occur, while state 2 has a 30% probability. Initially,
however, this objective probability function is not known to the student.
To model this uncertainty the assumption is made that conform Bayesian
statistics, for the student the value of p,, the probability of state 1, is
itself a stochast. To operationalise the model, furthermore the
assumption is made that they assign a priori equal probabilities to every
value of /?, (see figure 7.1, (a)). This stochastic variable ofp,
represents student's knowledge about p,. After 1 year the world
provides the students with one realisation of the state of the world. This
information enables the students to update their prior probabilities /»,.,
according to Bayes' rule to posterior probabilities /*,:
(7.10)
Graph (fc) in figure 7.1. gives the prior distribution after one year,
based on a computer simulation. For every year a realisation of the^ ftocfaun'r MorfW 0/ An/iaion Error* 85
objective distribution has been drawn. In this year the state of the world
was 1 and therefore the prior probability of high values of p, has risen.
Graph (c) gives the simulated prior after 10 years, while (d) gives the
situation after 100 years.
FIGURE 7.1: THE PRIOR DISTRIBUTION OF p, AFTER (a)
0, (i)l,(c)10, AND (d) 100 YEAR(S).
This Bayesian approach to model the uncertainty with respect to the
objective probabilities is very disputable. In fact this Bayesian extension
does not solve the problem but moves the fundamental problem to an
additional level. In this extension not the objective probability is given
anymore, but instead the prior distribution, which is an objective
probability distribution of probabilities, is given. The fundamental
problems of the approach have already been observed by Knight (1921),
Keynes (1937), and Shackle (1949). The main issue is that this model
always presumes certain prior knowledge, without clarifying why the
agent obtained this knowledge, and why he did not obtain additional
knowledge. This fundamental problem is usually masked by the
presupposition of a clear relation between past events and future
probabilities. It is a frequentistic approach. The only information about
the probabilities of the states of the world are the realisations in the
past. This requires that (i) the situation in the past was evidently
completely identical to the future situation, and (ii) there are no other
possibilities to say anything about future events than what is enclosed in86
past events.Shackle (1949) stressed that every future event is to some
extent unique. Relating such a future event to past experience is not an
undisputable calculus, but is based on a human assessment about the
nature of the future event. The forecaster uses experience as an
indicator for the future. There is, however, no rule which tells which
indicator is the best. Furthermore, there may be other things than data
on the past, which are informative about a future situation. The
forecaster may have some argumentation or opinion about the future.*
This may also influence his forecast, although there is no precise
relation between the past and this forecast.
It is difficult to show the shortcomings of the states of the world model.
It can model every type of uncertainty (even uncertainty regarding
people's own knowledge as in Baycsian learning models). The agent
who has to model his uncertain situation in this framework, however,
never knows whether he has chosen the right specification: for every
situation there is a states of the world representation, but there is not
one representation for every situation.
In the example used in this section only two states of the world are
distinguished. In general, it can be assumed that there is a continuum of
states of the world. Of course only those states have to be taken into
account which are relevant for the decision that has to be made.
Suppose for example that a student's decision only depends on the
wages, as in chapter 3, then all states of the world can be described by
the wage that prevails in that state. The objective probability distribution
is a distribution of those wages. With an AfS£ loss function decisions
based on this probability distribution only depend on the mean of the
distribution, while for a comparison of the quality of the forecast the
variance is sufficient. The probability distribution therefore can be
summarised by the mean and the variance. If such a forecast (w™) is
based on the objective probability distribution, the prediction error
e" = W*-H>" is unpredictable at the moment the prediction is made,
and therefore the realisation can be viewed upon as equal to the
prediction plus an unforcastable innovation: w*" = w" + e™.
7.3 Errors in ForarasW
The states of the world view on expectation formation asserts that
people recognise that the future world is stochastic to some extent.
Therefore, they base their decisions on the probability distribution of
8 Berger (1989) calls this hermeneutics: people's decisions depend on their interpretation of
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these future events. The model therefore requires a priori knowledge
concerning the states of the world and their probabilities. To avoid this
problem, if these probabilities are not known to them with certainty, the
construction is extended one stage by the introduction of prior
probabilities of these objective probability distributions. The difficulty of
this approach is, however, that it should still be a priori clear to every
person how to infer probabilities from past data. In the construction of a
probability function, the decision has to be made which past events are
similar to the future event, and to what extent. Furthermore,
argumentations and theoretical thoughts may be also viewed upon as
'data' for the construction of the probability function.
The problematic character of these decisions becomes most clear in a
situation in which no extended set of data about the past exists. Suppose
a new study 'environmental sciences' is introduced. A student considers
to take this course. His only concern is the total enrolment. He argues
that due to the fact that the study has not existed until now,
environmentalists will be scarce, and therefore the prospects at the
moment are much better than they will be after four years, at the
moment all these students enter the market. On the other hand it may
also be possible that the total supply will only be a drop in the ocean,
due to the growing demands for this discipline. He may decide to
compare his arguments with the experiences of other studies which
started recently. He could use the frequency of oversupply in those
cases as an indication of the probability that this will happen again, but
then he wonders whether all these situations are comparable. Some
studies were started due to growing labour market demand as in the
case of environmental science, while others were not.
In judging the probability of oversupply, both theoretical and empirical
arguments may be used. The theoretical arguments may differ from
person to person and it will in general be impossible to foresee who is
going to use which argument. The use of theoretical concepts is not
simply a function of some characteristics of the person. The same is,
however, true for empirical arguments. Although the data may be
public domain, the decision which cases to compare the future situation
with, and how to design this comparison is a personal judgement. The
data itself does not provide a method which way of inference is the
best.'
9 Many authors have stressed the problems with the states of the world view on uncertainty.
Knight (1921), Keynes (1937). Shackle (1949). Ellsberg (1961). Runde (1990). and
Davidson (1991) distinguish between risk and uncertainly. Fuhrer (1987) uses the term
'model uncertainty'.88
Because expectations depend on personal judgements, in many cases
they will differ from person to person. Such an interpersonal dispersion
will in general be low in professional situations. In such a situation
forecasts are made by people who join a comparable theoretical
background, and who communicate a great deal about the topic. Both
aspects make the opinions converge. This does not alter the fact that the
forecasts may contain mistakes.
In cases where people make forecast statements which do not include
probabilities, but simply foretell that something is going to happen as if
it was certain, it is clear that forecast errors will be made. These errors
are very easy to detect. If the predicted event does not occur, the
forecast is false. If predictions are formulated as probability events,
such an evaluation is not so easy. If an event which was predicted with
a high probability does not occur, the forecast may be wrong, or the
less probable event may have happened by chance. Although it is not
possible to detect errors with certainty, there is no reason to assume that
probabilities can not be incorrect.
The difference between the two views on prediction errors can be
illustrated by their relation to a hypothetical optimal prediction. Imagine
some prediction to be optimal in the sense that at the moment the
prediction is made it is not possible to make an alternative prediction
which adds extra information. The states of the world view then asserts
that the prediction actually made equals this optimal prediction, but that
the realisation will differ from this optimal prediction due to
unforecastable events in the future, i.e. due to the fact that the
realisation of some random variables is not known at that moment. The
error made here is an iVi/fr/ma/ton error. The errors in forecasts view
asserts that the optimal prediction may equal the realisation, but the
prediction actually made differs from this optimal prediction due to the
fact that students are not able to make such a perfect forecast. The error
in this forecast is an m/prprffa/jo/i error.
Subjective probabilities are examples of incorrect predictions. If the
subjective probabilities do not equal the objective probabilities, the
forecaster makes an error, although he may not recognise his error,
since the realisation may be both explained by the objective and the
subjective probability function. The extension to the model in which the
probabilities are themselves stochastic does not overcome this problem.
The probabilities remain subjective, and therefore possible incorrect, as
long as the prior distribution and the link between past events and this
prior distribution are not known with certainty. The model with
stochastic parameters may be very useful to model learning by doing,/4 ttoc/uufl'c ModW 0/ Pm/i'rtion Errorc 89
but it does not solve the problem of possible errors in the forecast.
The possibility of errors in forecasts has to be accepted, but the
meaning of prediction requires these interpretation errors to be
stochastic. As shown in section 7.2 it makes no sense to preassume
some upward or downward bias in the expectation. The expectation of
the prediction error, £{Avv), should equal zero, i.e. it can not be known
a priori whether an expectation is too low or too high.
Thus, although Bayesian analysis may be very useful to model
uncertainty, it is not fully able to exclude errors of a classical type in
which the forecast actually made is only an approximation to the
optimal forecast. In the states of the world model the prediction error is
the difference between the best possible prediction, given a certain set
of information,'" and the realisation. This best possible forecast given
a certain set of information will be called a per/<?cf exp«rfarion. The
state of the world may deviate from the prediction:
(7.11) w "" =
e" is the information error. Because the prediction is the best possible
forecast given the information used, the error term e" is independent of
the prediction. In this specification, the prediction can be viewed upon
as given and uncertainty arises due to a deviation of reality from the
best possible prediction. In the errors in forecasts model, however,
people make errors because the forecasts deviate from the optimal
forecast, which is in an extreme example equal to the realisation:
(7.12) w"* = w"" + e^
In this case the error, e^', which is an interpretation error, is
independent of the realisation. Of course, both models are extreme
variants. It might be the case that both types of error occur in a
forecast. In that case there is, given the set of information used, an
unobserved optimal forecast (w", in which re stands for rational
expectation) such that:
10 Usually, this best possible prediction is denoted (within an MS£ context) as
w'™ • £lw"*|/,J, i.f. the (rational) prediction equals the conditional expectation of
w"" given the information available at the moment of choice. This notation suggests to
provide a method to calculate the optimal prediction. To calculate Etw"*^,./ it «,
however, necessary to know the 'true model', and therefore with this notation it appears
as if the 'true model' is at hand. To avoid this suggestion, which has led to a one-sided
development of the theory of expectation formation (see chapter 5 and 6), the hypothetical
optimal prediction is introduced without a constructive definition. '90
(7.13)
The information error e" and the interpretation error ef are
independent of w". In this specification the unobservable hypothetical
benchmark w" is the perfect expectation which contains no errors. The
realisation differs from this expectation due to states of the world
uncertainty, and the prediction actually used also differs, due to errors
in the prediction.
In (7.13) there is, given a certain set of information, an expectation
(w") that is optimal. Without extra information this hypothetical
perfect expectation can not be improved. This hypothetical expectation
is, however, not 'observed' by students. Their prediction (w*"*)
deviates from the rational expectation. The information error (e") and
the interpretation error (e*"') are necessarily independent. The variance
of the interpretation error represents the capability of a student to
forecast. Suppose there arc two people, one bad and one good
forecaster. By definition, both will make, if they use the same
information set, the same information error. It is therefore possible for
the good forecaster to predict the interpretation error (e^*) of the bad
forecaster. But if this interpretation error is not independent from the
information error, it would also be possible for him to predict the
information error, which by definition is impossible.
The possibility of interpretation errors is also observed by proponents of
rational expectations, which is a typical states of the world model. In
rational expectations forecast errors caused by unforecastable exogenous
shocks. Muth (1961, p. 321) however states that it is possible that there
will be deviations from rationality. 'Certain imperfections and biases in
the expectations may also be analyzed with the methods of this paper.
Allowing for cross-sectional differences in expectations is a simple
matter, because their aggregate effect is negligible as long as the
deviation from the rational forecast for an individual firm is not strongly
correlated with those of the others.'
Sargent and Wallace (1976, p. 180) remark that 'in this regard, it
should be noted that the rational expectations hypothesis does not
require that people's expectations equal conditional mathematical
expectations, only that they equal conditional mathematical expectations
plus what may be a very large random term (random with respect to the
conditioning information).'
The unproved proposition of Muth, Sargent, and Wallace is thatinterpretation errors do not matter. In the next section it is shown that
this proposition is false. The presence of interpretation errors influences
the optimal predictions.
7.4 //j/brmarion vtrsu5 /n/erpre/ariort Errors
In section 7.2 a model was presented in which forecast errors occur due
to unpredictable events in the future. In section 7.3 it was argued that it
is unlikely that this type of forecast errors is the only type that exists.
Although it may be difficult to make a clear distinction, forecasts are
likely to be incorrect themselves. There is no recipe about the way
optimal forecasts should be made, and therefore the act of forecasting is
always arbitrary to some extent. In this section it is shown that allowing
students' expectation errors to consist not only of information errors, as
is done by the states of the world model, but also of interpretation
errors, leads to a model of prediction errors in which a trade off
between the two errors occurs.
Suppose again that a student has to make a prediction of the future wage
on which to base his enrolment decision. There are many different
approaches to make such a forecast and there is no reason to choose for
one of these methods in advance. One approach is to make an aZ?5/rac/
forecast based on global information and simple theoretical links. An
example of this would be if a student uses the mean of the past wages
as a forecast of the future wage. For such a rough, abstract forecast he
uses a limited set of information, and a rather simple theoretical link
with the future wage which has to be forecasted. The production of
such a forecast depends on certain arbitrary choices, e.g. the decision
which past events are seen as comparable to the future event, /.e. which
events are selected and which are not. The quality of the forecast will
depend on these choices, but the results will be rather robust. The exact
design of the abstract forecast does not influence the result very much.
The major part of the error of such a forecast stems from its global
character: the information error will be large, while the interpretation
error will be small.
On the other hand, it may be possible for a student to incorporate more
theoretical arguments in his forecast. By using extra theoretical insights
it becomes possible to link additional data with the future wage and
therefore it becomes possible to make the forecast more .sped/ic. In the
forecast of the wage, information and insights about the general
development of the economy and its consequences for the labour market
could be incorporated. To make such a specific forecast, and to use
other data than past wages, it is, however, necessary to make choices92
about the exact form of the relationships between the variables. These
arbitrary choices about the design of the forecast model will have a
large influence on the outcome. The forecast becomes more specific,
and thus more informative, but at the same time the probability that
interpretation errors are made increases. The information error is
relatively small but the interpretation error will be larger. It is therefore
not a pr/ori clear that such a specific forecast is better than an abstract
forecast.
TABLE 7.3: THE RELATIVE POSITION OF ABSTRACT AND SPECIFIC EXPECTATIONS






























If students are no longer assumed to make perfect forecasts, a range of
possible alternative ways of forecasting becomes available to them.
They have to choose between the information error of an abstract
expectation, and the interpretation error of a specific expectation. It is
therefore not sensible to distinguish only one (unobservable) perfect
prediction as in equation (7.13), but there will be a continuum of
perfect predictions, rankable from a low degree of informativity to a
high degree of informativity. In this section the analysis is restricted to
two different unobservable perfect predictions, but this can easily be
extended to more. Table 7.3 presents the relative position of these two
forecasts. An abstract expectation is based on a small information set
(e\#. only past wages), but this information can be used for
straightforward forecasting. Therefore the information error will be
large, but the interpretation error will be small. A specific expectation is
based on additional information (<•.#. about the general economic
developments). Therefore the information error decreases, but to use
this information also more insight is needed in the functioning of theH Stocfauric AforfW 0/ /Vnficrion Emvj 93
economy and the labour market. The risk of this specific forecast is that
an error is made in the use of this concrete information. An extended
model may provide very specific forecasts, but as soon as the specific
assumptions do not hold an interpretation error is introduced. In the
states of the world view on prediction errors all expectations are
regarded as extremes of the abstract expectation. No interpretation error
is made, only information errors occur. In the other extreme there
might be only errors in forecasts without any states of the world
uncertainty. Every error is an interpretation error.
It is remarkable that in table 7.3 the states of the world prediction is
nearest to the abstract prediction. Rational expectations, which is a
typical states of the world theory, seems to make very strong
assumptions about the capabilities of people to forecast, but since it does
not allow for interpretation errors it can also be stated that this theory
only allows for simple relationships, since only then forecasts can be
made without errors. It therefore only applies to abstract models.Let
w," be a perfect expectation, based on a small information set /, with
a high degree of abstraction, and therefore a low degree of
informativity, and let Wj' be a more specific perfect expectation, based
on a set of information /j which includes /,. Equation (7.13) can be
extended to:
(7.14) wf = M^ + eJ-' + ej* (7.16) >v™ = < + <£
(7.15) wr* = < + ef (7.17) M^ = W," + <*
in which the error terms have the expected value 0, and are always
independent of the other right hand side variables. Their variances are
assumed to exists and are denoted with respectively o,,y, o^. o«p/ •
and o 2 • The observed forecasts are denoted by w"** and H£*** . Since
in this model the student has more than one expectation at his disposal,
the superscript exp is used to denote expectations which are available.
The forecast actually used is denoted by pre. w," is an abstract perfect
expectation of the realised wage, but since it is based on less
information, it can also be seen as a perfect expectation of the more
specific perfect expectation Wj". Both perfect expectations are only
observed with an additional error: the interpretation error. By taking the
interpretation error of the specific expectation equal to e^*" + e^**, with
e^ independent of e^ the assumption is made that it contains at least94 Owprer 7
the interpretation error of the abstract perfect expectation w,"."
Summing up, the assumption is made that a// error /ernis are mu/ua//y
//kfeperufem. The information errors are independent by definition of the
perfect expectations (since /, c /j). In section 7.3 it is shown that their
meaning requires that also interpretation errors are independent of
information errors. Finally, above the assumption is made that e^* is
independent of ej*''.
In a rational expectations model the interpretation errors e^* equal 0.
In this case the specific model dominates the abstract model, so it is
optimal to use the most specific model. The proposition of Muth,
Sargent, and Wallace, however, is that this will still be the case if
measurement errors are introduced to the model. It is, however, easy to
show that it is possible in that case to gain from a combination, *>*"*,
of both expectations:
(7.18) w'" = Xw^a-XK""
The prediction error of this combined prediction equals
(7.19) iw = w'"-tv'"
The combination is optimal for the value of A for which the A/SE, o$
is minimal. The AfSE of the prediction error equals (because of the
mutually independency of the error terms):
(7.20) o£ =
Minimising equation (7.20) with respect to A. gives:
r$_
11 This assumption avoids the complication that the interpretation error of the specific
forecast is informative for the interpretation error of the abstract forecast./I S/ocfau/f c Modf/ of /"r«/icrion EITOTJ 95
(7-21) ^ = 2A(o^, • <£, * oj*) -2(1 - X)(<4, • oj^ + <£,)
=0
Thus, the combination is optimal for
(7.22) X = /
In the model presented here students can use a range of expectations
between the abstract and the specific expectation. Somewhere in-
between there is an optimal point in which the total error is minimised.
Making the prediction more abstract will increase the information error
more than the interpretation error will decrease, while the gain in
information error by making the prediction more specific does not
compensate the loss due to an increase in the interpretation error. Only
the additional expectation errors are relevant for the choice, o^j is the
variance of the error of the specific expectation compared to the abstract
expectation. By introducing the specific expectation an additional
interpretation error appears, o,,, is the the variance of the additional
information error of the abstract expectation, compared to the specific
expectation.
The most specific expectation is optimal only if o^ = 0 or o^ = «.
The proposition of Muth, Sargent, and Wallace is therefore not true in
this construction. The only exception is the case in which only one
expectation exists, or o^y = «>, /.e. the more abstract expectation is
completely uninformative.
The result (7.22) can be given a Bayesian interpretation (see figure 7.2).
wf, with o^j, can be seen as moments of a prior distribution for the
realised wage. The optimal prediction is the posterior distribution after
inference with w"*\ The variance of this posterior distribution, i.e. the
variance of w^' equals:
(7.23) <£. «**<£,• (l-tfl 4 L96
This Bayesian interpretation of expectation formation differs, however,
considerably from the model presented in section 7.2. In the usual
model the prior distribution is based on some a priori theoretical insight
in the possible distribution of the parameters, while empirical events
provide the model with data for inference. In the model of this section
the prior distribution is formed by the frequency of past events, while
theoretical insights are viewed upon as data from a distribution centred
round the real value of the wages which has to be forecasted.
While in the usual model forecasts improve with new data, the main
improvements in this model come from additional theoretical insights.
New data, however, may also improve the forecast, because it will
improve the prior distribution, which is not without error in the model
of this section.
FIGURE 7.2: A BAYESIAN INTERPRETATION OF (7.22).
Prob
7.5
In this chapter it has been shown that it does not suffice to describe
students' uncertainty by the states of the world model. In this model
agents have to assign probabilities to the possible states of the world.
The assumption that they use the objective probabilities — and therefore
only make information errors — ignores the fundamental question how
students obtain this knowledge. The introduction of subjective
probabilities makes students* expectations deviate from the optimal
prediction. The meaning of prediction requires, however, that suchdeviations are random, as described by the errors in forecasts model.
The introduction of such errors in forecasts is not neutral, as assumed
by Muth, Sargent, and Wallace. If students deviate from the rational
expectation by a random error (the unsystematic error), it may be
optimal for them to use a more abstract, simpler model. This trade of?
between interpretation errors and information errors leads to systematic
errors in their expectations.8 COBWEB VERSUS RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS:
THE JUNIOR SECONDARY TECHNICAL
EDUCATION
The economic literature about educational choice fits in with literature
about expectation formation in general. Most studies are based on the
cobweb expectation theory, in which students expect the current wage to
prevail, while some authors reject this cobweb theory as too naive and
use rational expectations. In this chapter these two expectations models
are analysed empirically. It is shown, in accordance with many other
studies, that the rational expectations model does not dominate the
cobweb model. Later, in chapter 9, it will be shown that, based on the
model of chapter 7, the two models can be interpreted as extreme cases
in a more general expectation framework. The attention in this chapter
is focused on the Dutch junior secondary technical education.' The
estimation of the two models, and their comparison, gives a first
impression of the expectation formation by these students.
Based on these test and estimation results the yearly mismatch is
calculated. As a simple measure for mismatch the number of students
who made a wrong decision due to incorrect labour market anticipations
is taken. These numbers indicate the possible gains from a public labour
market forecast. In the third part of this study the measurement of
mismatch is based on welfare economic concepts. Measuring the
number of students who experience mismatch, therefore, serves as a
first indication.
At the Dutch junior secondary technical schools students start with a
general curriculum of one (until 1970) or two (from 1971) years. After
this general course they have to choose one of the (two year) vocational
specialisations the school offers.
In this analysis, the specialisations are clustered into three groups in
order to integrate corresponding segments of the labour market and to
avoid problems due to changing classification schemes through time at a
lower level of aggregation. These three specialisations are: building
industry (fl), metal industry (Af) and food and catering industry (/•).*
1 In the Netherlands these schools are called LTS (Lower Technical School), or VBO
(Voorbereidend Beroepsonderwijs) and ITO (Individual Technical Education).
2 The data consist of figures about the number of students in the first year of specialisation,
wages and the probability to get a job for the three segments building industry, metal
industry and food and catering industry, from 1949 till 1986. Because of two years lagged100
Figure 8.1 shows the development of the numbers of students choosing
for one of these three specialisations. The figure clearly shows that not
only the total number of students has changed through time, but also
that the distribution among the three specialisations is far from constant.
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According to the model in chapter 3, these changing choices may, apart
from changes in capabilities and the students' preferences, be explained
by changes in the situation of the labour market segments that these
specialisations give access to. According to the labour market model of
chapter 3 it is assumed that students choose a specialisation by taking
into account their preferences and the labour market perspectives of
vocational specialisations. The distribution of preferences among
students is not expected to change quickly, while the labour market
situation may change fast.
Because preferences and capabilities are given for one student, they are
constants in the choice function of that individual student. The only
variables in this individual choice function are related to the labour
market situation (according to (3.7)). Restricted by the availability of
data, the labour market situation is only represented by the wages and
instruments and because of two years forward-looking expectations, the estimation is
restricted to 1951 till 1984. The enrolment in 1972 is missing due to the one year increase
of the general curriculum in 1971. In 1971 first-year students had to decide about their
specialisation, while the cohort of 1972 had to make this decision after their second year
(in 197.)). Simultaneously the curriculum changed from three into four years so the length
of the specialisation period has remained constant.
The figures have been taken from 77* S/oft'tfics <y (A« ,/iuuor Srcwk/ary Vororio/ui/
£x/u<a/ion, Aton/My BuWrrin o/ St)ri<>-Ert>nomic Sto/iwicj and Atoiww/ ,4«t>wi«,
published by Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).101
the probabilities to get a job in the three specialisations. Because
students do not know these figures exactly, the choice function depends
on their expectations of these figures rather than on these figures
themselves.
Wages are measured by the total sum of wages in sectors of industry
related to a particular specialisation, divided by the number of people
working in these sectors. The wages, defined this way, do of course not
necessary equal the wages of entrants, nor do they equal the present
value of life-cycle-incomes. However, the average wage at the moment
of entrance may be viewed as a suitable indicator for the labour market
situation the occupation is in.
The probability to get a job is defined by the number of people working
in the relevant sectors divided by the sum of this number of people
working and the number of unemployed with relevant occupations.
These figures also represent a one year situation for the whole
occupational group.
On an aggregate level the model of chapter 3 leads to an enrolment
function in which the fraction of students choosing a certain
specialisation increases as the expected labour market perspectives for
that specialisation improve. The better these labour market expectations,
the more students will have passed their reservation wage, or
probability to get a job. In the theoretical model of chapter 3 this supply
equation is assumed to be linear. For empirical purposes such a linear
equation has some disadvantages. The form is not very flexible and it
may lead to negative supply predictions. To avoid these problems, the
choice function is assumed to have the logit-form:
(81)
in which 5. is the number of students choosing specialisation
i (i = fl, Af, F), w/"* is the expectation, formed at f, of the wage at
r+2, the moment the student will enter the labour market, related to
specialisation i, and pf', similarly, is the expected probability to get a
job at /+2, formed at r, also for specialisation /.
The ratio of eg. the choice for the building industry and the metal
industry specialisation also depends on the wage and probability to get a102
job in the food and catering specialisation. This is relevant because a
change in the labour market situation in the food and catering industry
may have a different impact on the enrolment in the building industry
specialisation and the metal industry specialisation, which may cause a
change in the ratio.
By assuming that choices only depend on relative wages and relative
probabilities (/.£. by assuming the 'income-effect' to be absent),
equation (8.1) can for estimation purposes be reduced to:
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ni6 = -Y«2 , i = 1, 2, 3
The estimation is based on this model with parameter restrictions, while
the results of model (8.1) will be presented, which has a more
convenient economic interpretation. ...^
(8.1) provides a model of students' choices in which the choices
students make are a function of the expectations they have about the
future labour market situation. Finally, this model has to be completed
with two alternative hypotheses about the way in which expectations are
formed.
In the economic literature, as discussed in chapter 6, with regard to
students' choices, two streams of thought can be distinguished. The first
stream is the so-called cofrurft //i<*ory. which assumes students to base
their decisions entirely on the present instead of the future labour
market situation. In other words, it is assumed that students expect the
future situation to be similar to the present situation. Freeman is thewms Ro/iono/ EiprcTa/iooj 103
most well-known propagator of this view.
The second stream is represented by Zarkin (1983) and Siow (1984). In
their models, students have rariona/ etpecmrions about the future labour
market. The rational expectations theory assumes that students'
expectations are the best possible expectations, given the data available
at the moment choices have to be made.
These two common theories about expectation formation are estimated.
Furtheron it will be shown that these theories can be viewed upon as
extremes, so the truth may be somewhere in between.
8.2 77i£ EMz»uj//0n
In order to investigate the use of information, both the cobweb model
and the rational expectations model are estimated. The next step is the
comparison of both models by an artificial nesting method. It is
calculated to what extent one model is able to explain the unexplained
part of the other model.
The first model to be estimated is the cobweb model. In the equations
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In this model the choices are only influenced by predetermined
quantities, so the use of ordinary least squares for the estimation is
possible. To get a linear equation the logarithm is taken at both sides of
the equations. In this model of three equations, in fact, two equations
determine all the parameters of the third one. Due to the use of OLS
these parameter restrictions between the three equations are
automatically fulfilled. Further, to allow for slow changes in preferences
or the schooling system, a (multiplicative) trend variable (0 has been
added.104 f r 8
The second model, with rational expectations, can not be estimated
directly by OLS since the expectation variables are not observed
directly. Rational expectations will, in general, differ from their future
realisations. Rational expectations are only the best possible forecasts at
a certain moment (r) of this future realisation (at f+2), given the
information available at this moment (/)• McCallum (1976) has shown,
however, that it is possible to use the realisations of the future variables
as proxies for expectations of these future variables. These proxies do,
in that case, contain an error, which is the unpredictable part of the
variable. But if the equation is estimated by use of instrumental
variables which are known at the moment of forecasting, the estimation
will be consistent. Equations (8.2) can be rewritten, including these
proxies, as:
(85)
As a rational expectation is by definition the best possible expectation,
the difference between this expectation and the realisation
(e = w'^-w"") can not be correlated with the expectation. The
expectation is known at the moment of choice, and based on the
correlation between this expectation and the error term, the error term
could be forecasted, and thus the expectation could be improved.
Therefore, there has to be a correlation between this error term and the
proxy variable (the realisation). Furthermore, since the lag between the
moment of choice and the entrance onto the labour market (which is 2
in this case) is more than one year, the error terms will be
autocorrelated. Uncertainty in rational expectations is due to random
external shocks. Every year the realisation of some of the stochastic
variables becomes known, so if the periods of prediction are
overlapping, errors in both forecasts will be affected by the events in
the overlapping year. This causes autocorrelation of the error terms.
Thus, the error term in this model is both autocorrelated and correlated
with the proxy variables. Using OLS in such a situation would lead to105
an estimation that is biased because of the correlation with the variables
and it would be not efficient because of the autocorrelation. Estimation
with OLS would be consistent with the assumption of perfect foresight.
The expectations are, in that case, assumed to be equal to the realisation
of wages and the probability to get a job. According to the rational
expectations theory, they are however only an approximation. Cumby,
Huizinga, and Obstfeld (1983) suggest an estimator for such models (a
two-step two-stages least squares estimator), which is efficient and
unbiased.
The model is estimated with lagged variables as instruments for the
endogenous variables that are correlated with the error term and this
estimation is carried out twice, a first step assuming no autocorrelation
and a second step using autocorrelation estimates taken from the first
step. A disadvantage of this procedure is that the parameter restrictions
between the three equations will not be fulfilled automatically.
As instruments for the expectations the wage and the probability to get a
job at moment r, r-1 and /-2 have been used. Since these figures are
assumed to be known at /, they do, by definition of rational
expectations, not correlate with the error term, which includes the
difference between expectation and realisation.'
Finally, a comparison between the two models will be performed. The
test is based on a regression of the predictions of both models on the






(8.6) and (8.7) are based on a artificial nesting procedure (Fisher and
McAleer, 1981), in which u. is the test-statistic for both hypotheses.
Because the rational expectations model includes an unobserved
3 Representing the right-hand variables of (8.5) by X, the left-hand variable by y, the matrix
of instruments by Z the estimator of Cumby, Huizinga, and Obstfeld become*:
6QH, = (X'Z(Z'aZ)'Z'X)"'jir'Z(Z'6Z)'Z'y, in which 6 is the estimated covariance
matrix, which has been corrected for the gap in 1972.106
forecasting error it will show a larger standard error than the cobweb
model. (8.7) corrects for this difference.*
If the cobweb model is strictly better than the rational expectations
model (i.e. the rational expectation predictions equal the cobweb
predictions except for some noise not correlated with the real data)n
will be equal to 1. The other extreme is |i equals 0. In this case the
rational expectation model dominates the cobweb model. The absolute r-
values indicate the additional information of the model, compared with
the other model.
8.5 Esrimarion /JMH/B
Table 8.1 presents the estimation results of the cobweb model, based on
equations (8.1). It contains six 'triangles'. Each triangle shows the
effects of a change in wages or the probability to get a job (vertically)
in one of the three sectors (horizontally), leaving all other variables
constant. For example, if the probability to get a job in the building
industry (first triangle of the second row) increases by 1%, the ratio of
students choosing building industry specialisation and students choosing
the metal industry specialisation increases by 2.72% (nl2 in (8.1)).
Significant effects (The level of significance is 90%, which corresponds
to an absolute f-value greater than 1.70) are indicated by bold arrows.
All significant effects do have the correct sign. The significant arrows
suggest that probabilities to get a job play an important role in choosing
for the building industry specialisation, while wages are most important
for metal industry and food and catering. The insignificance of the other
parameters may be caused by the fact that these effects are rather small,
or by the fact that the cobweb assumption about the expectations does
not hold.
Since it is difficult to interpret the parameters of table 8.1, an example
of the size of these results is presented in table 8.2. In order to indicate
the trend, the predicted choices of 1951 and 1984 have been calculated
as if no wages and probability differences occurred. Furthermore, the
table presents the predicted choices in 1984, based on actual wages and
probability figures, and the changes in this distribution in case of a 1%
change of one of the six labour market variables.
u is only identified in (8.7) if °cj>i.jr°Ltiti» *** known. Since they are not known
directly, they are replaced by their estimates, which is in fact incorrect because they may
be estimates based on an incorrect model. An incorrect model will, however, lead to an
overestimation of o', which will lead to a correction of (i in favour of the false model.Ro/to/ui/ £xpr crar/aru 107
TABLE 8.1: ESTIMATION WITH THE COBWEB MODEL (r-VALUES BETWEEN
BRACKETS).



















Table 8.2 shows that the growth of the food and catering specialisation
is structural. The growth is not only caused by an increase in wages or
probabilities to get a job, but from 1951 to 1984 this specialisation grew
300%, even with no differences in wages and probability.
In 1984, the labour market situation caused 4956 students to leave the
building industry in favour of mainly the metal specialisation. The
elasticities of supply vary in a range according to the results of similar
studies. For wages the maximum elasticity is 2.9 in the food and
catering industry, while for the probability to get a job the elasticity
reaches its maximum of 2.2 in the building industry.108
TABLE 8.2: AN EXAMPLE OF THE ESTIMATION RESULTS OF THE COBWEB MODEL
(SIONIFICANT VARIABLES ARE PRINTED BOLD).
1951 (all wages and prob. equal)
1984 (all wages and prob. equal)
1984 (actual wages and prob.)






































Table 8.3 shows the estimation results of the rational expectations
model. Four out of the twelve labour market effects are significant and
one of these, the ratio between building and food and catering industry,
has the wrong sign.
S»/Mfrjits fa/jo/ui/ £yvrfttfio/u 109
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Table 8.4 gives an example of the rational expectations estimation
results, similar to table 8.2. As parameter restrictions in the rational
expectations are not fulfilled, the parameters of the third equation, the
ratio of the choices for metal industry and food and catering industry,
have been taken according to the other two equations. In this model the
maximum elasticity of supply with respect to wages is 5.5 again for
food and catering, and 2.7 for the probability to get a job in the metal
industry. •••»••'-• -110 Giap/er 8
TABLE 8.4: AN EXAMPLE OF THE ESTIMATION RESULTS OF THE RATIONAL
EXPECTATIONS MODEL (SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES ARE PRINTED BOLD).
1951 (all wages and prob. equal)
1984 (all wages and prob. equal)
1984 (actual wages and prob.)





































In figure 8.2 and 8.3 the fit of the two models has been indicated. They
show the percentage of students in a certain year that did not choose the
specialisation predicted by the model. Although due to the different
estimation techniques a comparison between the cobweb model and the
rational expectations model is not completely justified, it is obvious that
the rational expectations model fits less well than the cobweb model. It
is, however, not allowed to draw final conclusions from this
observation.
In order to get an indication of the influence of both hypotheses, the two
extreme models will be compared. Zarkin (1983) mentioned the
difficulties of comparing these two models. A comparison of the /?-
square does not suffice because of the correlation of the explanatory
variables of both models. However, an artificial nesting test enables to
make such a comparison.wrrms fcwoW £yvcra/io/u 111
FIGURE 8.2: MISSPECIFICATION OF
THE COBWEB MODEL.
FIGURE 8.3: MISSPECIFICATION OP
THE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
MODEL.
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Table 8.5 gives the results of this test between the models. The
parameter p, of equations (8.6, 8.7) has been estimated for the three
equations of the model. If the predictions of both the cobweb model and
the rational expectations model are regressed on the real data, e.g. in
the complete model of the building industry versus food and catering,
the cobweb predictions get a parameter value n of 0.90 and the rational
expectation model a l-(i of 0.10. If a parameter of this kind gets 1 and
therefore the other parameter 0, the model with the 1-parameter
explains at least everything that is explained by the other model. The 0-
parameter model may be rather good, but it is completely dominated by
the other model.
TABLE 8.5: COMPARISON OF COBWEB AND RATIONAL
























The table shows that in all cases the cobweb model has a higher
parameter value than the rational expectations model, which implies that
the cobweb model is a better description than the rational expectations
model. 1 -JJ. does not significantly differ from 0, and therefore n does112
not significantly differ from 1. On the other hand, only in two of the
three equations (fl/M and fl/F) does ^ differ significantly from 0 at a
5% level ('26005 ~ 170). These parameter estimates indicate a
dominant performance of the cobweb model, although the /-tests
indicate that the evidence is not very strong. This may be due to the
relative short time-series.
An overall conclusion of the analysis of this section might be that in
general the cobweb model gives better estimation results, and also that
it is better able to predict than the rational expectations model. An
important implication of accepting the cobweb hypothesis is that
students make systematic errors in their anticipations of the future
labour market situation. It seems to be the case that students, indeed,
are not very capable to predict the future developments at the labour
market. These errors lead to mismatches at the moment they enter the
market. In the next section some simulations show the extent of these
mismatches.
In the discussion cobweb versus rational expectations, the latter is
becoming, also in the literature about educational choice, increasingly
popular. This popularity is mainly based on the theoretical argument
that it is not reasonable for students to waste information. In the cobweb
model students seem to ignore valuable information. The empirical test
in the previous section gives, however, an advantage to the cobweb
theory. There exists therefore a gap between the theoretical insight
concerning economic behaviour of the rational expectations theory and
the empirical evidence of cobweb behaviour. In the next chapter the
theoretical aspects of this gap will be taken into account. In this section
the implications of the empirical phenomenon is investigated. The extent
of the mismatch is indicated by use of the estimation results of section
8.3.
In order to be able to indicate the extent of the problem, a criterion for
measurement is needed. In chapter 13 such a criterion is derived from a
welfare economic point of view. The criterion used here, which is more
straightforward, is the number of students that (according to the
estimated supply function) regret their decision at the moment they enter
the labour market and the realisation of the labour market situation
becomes known to them. Thus mismatch is measured in this section as
the number of students that would have chosen another specialisation if
they had had full information on future labour market prospects. To
measure this mismatch, the predicted enrolment for two (hypothetical)wfraw Rariona/ £y*cTar/oni 113
situations is calculated. Firstly, the predicted enrolment is based on
actual labour market figures, according to the cobweb theory. Secondly,
the enrolment is calculated by replacing the actual labour market figures
by the figures at /+2. This second enrolment indicates the hypothetical
choice of students if they had known the future labour market situation.
The difference between the two indicates the mismatch.
Three observations have to be made about this criterion. Firstly, it
measures only aggregate, net effects. If one student chooses the metal
instead of the building industry, but another student chooses the building
instead of the metal industry these effects will not appear in the
aggregate supply functions of the previous sections. Secondly, the
criterion does not take into account the fact that if everybody had
chosen the right specialisation, the labour market situation would have
been different. Finally, the criterion gives every mismatch equal weight,
while there will be some students who made a wrong decision, who
were almost indifferent between the 'right' and the 'wrong' decision,
while others' costs of a wrong decision might be rather high. In
general, this will lead to an overestimation of small mismatches and an
underestimation of large mismatches.
On account of the results of the estimation in the last section, the
assumption is made that the cobweb model is the correct model. Thus,
students' choices are completely determined by the present labour
market situation. The extent of the mismatch is measured, based on the
parameter estimations of the cobweb model.




Figure 8.4 shows the fraction of students that made the wrong decision,
per year. The number of students making a wrong decision is,
especially in recent years, rather high: on average 3% of all the students114
at the junior secondary technical schools, but the last ten years on
average 7%, up to almost 16% in 1984. Figures 8.5, 8.6, and 8.7
provide the same data for the three specialisations separately. All the
three specialisations show an increase in recent years; in the building
industry, however, the change is most radical. In the food and catering
specialisation some high percentages of mismatch already occur in the
fifties.The extent of the problem is far from equal for the three
specialisations. In the building industry the fraction making the 'wrong'
decision is 9% on average and goes up to 49% in 1980, while the
average in the metal industry is 4% with a maximum of 22% in 1984.
The food and catering specialisation also had its maximum in 1984, at
60%, but in this sector high scores already appeared in the fifties, with
e.£. 27% in 1956. In this sector the average mismatch is 12%.
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The mismatch fractions indicated in these figures may be seen as an
indication for the value of correct information. If correct information
was available this fraction of students would have chosen correctly, and
thus this amount of students would be better off in that case. Although itGofewrft wrrjkj Aariono/ fjpccfaricww 115
will not be possible for professional forecasters to predict the future
labour market situation perfectly, this value of correct information can
be viewed upon as the opportunity costs of not having better
predictions.
FIGURE 8.8: VALUE OF INFOR- FIGURE 8.9: VALUE OF INFOR-
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In figure 8.8 and 8.9 this value of information is split up into
information about the wages and information about the probability to get
a job. The figures lead to two important conclusions. Firstly, the value
of information about wages is decreasing while the value of information
about probabilities to get a job is increasing. Secondly, while the value
of information about wages is only 0.9% on average before 1972 and
0.4% after 1972, the value of information about the probability to get a
job is 0.9% on average before 1972 but 5.7% after 1972.
The decrease of the value of information about wages may be explained
by the increase of the wage rigidity. If wages do not change much the
value of knowing future wages instead of present wages is not big,
because present wages will be a good predictor for future wages. But,
due to this wage rigidity the fluctuations of the probability to get a job
have risen. If wages do not regulate the allocation process, this task will
be adopted by the unemployment rate.
&5 Cbnc/ns/o/is
In this chapter the choice between specialisations at the junior secondary
technical education has been investigated. The cobweb model and
rational expectations are compared. The empirical results show a
preference for the cobweb model. This provides again empirical
evidence for the theoretical model of chapter 7, which explains that
systematic forecasts errors may occur.116 Oia/wr 8
Furthermore, it is shown — departing from the cobweb model — that
mismatch may be rather large. £.g. in the food and catering sector the
estimation of the average number of students who make the wrong
choice is 12%.
IV. -9 VARIABILITY AND PREDICTABILITY
Uncertainty about future developments on the labour market may be
caused by random elements in the external world, and by errors made
in the construction of forecasts. In chapter 7 it was therefore argued that
prediction errors which are made by students are not only due to
uncertainty with respect to different possible states of the world, but that
the predictions themselves also contain an error. Based on this, it was
shown that not the most informative prediction (/.f. the rational
expectation) is optimal, but that there is a trade off between informative,
very specific, expectations, and more abstract expectations. The first
one will contain a large interpretation error, due to the specific
assumptions it is based on, while the latter contains an information error
due to its generality.
In chapter 8 some empirical evidence was given, which showed that
indeed the rational expectations theory does not dominate the cobweb
theory. From a rational expectations point of view this is, as shown in
chapter 6, unacceptable. For this theory it is problematic that students
deliberately do not use the optimal prediction. In section 9.1 this vision
about optimal behaviour, called the Lucas critique, will be considered.
In section 9.2 this optimality criterium is adopted to the rational
expectations theory, which fits well into this framework. The usual
interpretation of the cobweb behaviour is, as stated before, problematic
from the optimality point of view. In section 9.3 the problems which
arise in the usual cobweb interpretation will be taken into account.
Section 9.4 provides an alternative interpretation which is not liable to
Lucas's critique. A simplified version of the model of chapter 7 is used
to show that cobweb behaviour may be explained by optimal behaviour
of the students. This model is based on two concepts: variability and
predictability.
This model has severe implications. In section 9.5 the implications for
econometric tests of the rational expectations hypothesis will be
considered. Section 9.6 will discuss the implications in the case of a
public policy that aims at manipulation of expectations. The model also
has important consequences for the theory about the provision of public
labour market information. In section 9.7 the predictions model
developed in this chapter will again focus on the main subject of this
study: how does public information influence the individual expectation
formation, and therefore the individual labour market behaviour?118 Ota/xer 9
9.7 Lwcay'5 Criri^ue
In section 5.2 the critique of Lucas (1976) on the econometric program
of Tinbergen and Haavelmo was discussed. Tinbergen (1952, 1956)
viewed the economy as a set of relations which are principally
knowable. By estimating these relations the government is able to
calculate the consequences of its policies and can choose the optimal
policy given its policy target. Part of the economic model /(y^e,) are
the decision rules of the agents, which depend among others on their
expectations. In Tinbergen's theory of public policy these expectations
depend, just as the other economic relations, on other economic
variables. This relation between expectations and economic variables is
fixed.
It is this fixity of the expectation relation that Lucas (1976, p. 25)
opposes to. 'The function / and parameter vector 6 are derived from
decision rules (demand and supply functions) of agents in the economy,
and these decisions are, theoretically, optimal given the situation in
which each agent is placed.' Expectations are, according to Lucas, not
simply variables like other economic variables, as the capital stock and
the money supply, but should be understood as agents' attempts to grasp
their economic environment. If the environment changes, the
expectations will also change. In Lucas's case, if the public policy
changes, the former reaction may be not optimal anymore, and people
may switch to other reaction functions. Expectations about the economic
system will depend on the structure of the economic system itself. 'We
have to attribute to individuals some view of the behaviour of the future
values of variables of concern to them. This view, in conjunction with
other factors, determines their optimum decision rules' (p. 25). The fact
that expectations are directed towards reality is characteristic of
expectations.
Lucas holds on to Tinbergen's assumption about the existence of the
true model/(which may be difficult to discover, p. 25). If such a true
model / is assumed to exist it becomes inevitable to assume that agents
have rational expectations. To obtain a situation in which agents'
expectations are not rational, the economic model attributed to them
must differ from the model known to the investigator. From the
investigator's point of view, the agents therefore will make certain
errors by assumption. The investigator knows the true model, he knows
the (wrong) model of the agents and can therefore calculate (not merely
predict) the prediction errors the agents make. For Lucas such a
situation is impossible. It is not clear why the investigator is able to see
errors made by the agents which can not be seen, by definition, by the119
agents themselves. If the agents make different forecasts than the
investigator, it will, in general, not be possible for him to predict these
differences structurally. 'It is perhaps necessary to emphasize that this
point of view towards conditional forecasting, due to Knight and, in
modern form, to Muth, does not attribute to agents unnatural powers of
instantly divining the true structure of policies affecting them. More
modestly, it asserts that agents' responses become predictable to outside
observers only when there can be some confidence that agents and
observers share a common view of the nature of the shocks which must
be forecast by both' (p. 41).
If the view of the investigator is a completely knowable model, only
with forecast errors due to different states of the world, without any
errors in forecasts, this view should also be assumed to be present for
the economic agents in the model.
Lucas's criterium for economic modelling is that human behaviour can
not be modelled by some arbitrary mathematical rules, but must be such
that behaviour can be understood economically. 'Any disequilibrium
model, constructed by simply codifying the decision rules which agents
have found it useful to use over some previous sample period, without
explaining wfry these rules are used, will be of no use in predicting the
consequences of non-trivial policy changes' (Lucas, 1981, pp. 220-221).
It may not be the case that the way an agent is assumed to behave is
such that someone who considers the model would think that he could
have made a better decision if he were in the agent's situation.
Vercelli (1991, p. 139) criticises the fact that Lucas restricts his critique
to Tinbergen-type of models, and therefore restricting himself to
rational expectations. 'With regard to those models which incorporate
elements of disequilibrium, criticism has concentrated on the most
commonly used large-scale econometric models, since they do not
satisfactorily explain why certain rules of decision are adopted by
economic agents, and hence they cannot explain or predict structural
transformations of the economic system. This is not a new argument; it
has been used many times in criticizing prevailing econometric practice.
We find it clearly sketched out in the last works of Keynes himself, in
particular in his critical review of Tinbergen (1939).
Lucas undoubtedly deserves credit for having managed to reformulate
this criticism in a much more precise and rigorous version. But there is
still no convincing argument to show why such a defect must
necessarily characterize any disequilibrium model. At the theoretical
level there is no reason why one should not postulate a disequilibrium120
path as an optimal trajectory for reaching certain results, which would
permit the solution of the model to be recalculated after a change in the
environment. The conclusions that can be drawn from the so-called
"Lucas-critique" are for the moment purely negative with regard to both
disequilibrium and equilibrium models. In the future, however, there is
no reason to assume a priori that disequilibrium models may not have
an equal chance of circumventing this obstacle.'
P. 2 /tof/ona/ £xpecrarionj
In chapter 7 a model is developed, in which expectations are
distinguished with a varying degree of abstraction.
(9.1) M£» -<*ef*eT (9.3) w~ = < + e?
(9.2) w"" = w,"+e"> (9.4) w" = w," + e7
The rational expectations theory is a special case of this model, namely
the case in which no errors in predictions occur: o^,y = 0, o^ = 0.
In a rational expectations model all uncertainty is due to the stochastic
character of the outside world. Model (9.1)-(9.4) therefore reduces to
(9.5) M£* = w/' (9.7) w "« = *>;'+<£
" (9.6) wj* = w," (9.8) w" = w," + e"
Since the hypothetical rational expectations are measured without error
(i.e. there is no interpretation error), the best prediction is the most
specific one, in which all available information is used. More abstract
predictions are dominated by this specific prediction. The information
error is minimised without an increase in the interpretation error. The
optimal mix between the specific and the abstract expectation therefore
equals
From a policy point of view this theory has severe implications. The
most usual implications are the so called neutrality properties. If two
policies have the same effects on real economic variables, they will also
have the same impact on expectations. It is therefore not possible for a
government to manipulate the expectations of the agents. For the theory
of the effects of providing public information, rational expectations also/V«WtfaM/Jry 121
has severe implications. If the assumption is made that students make
the best possible forecasts, it makes no sense to try to improve these
forecasts. The only reason why students make prediction errors is
according to rational expectations because of the uncertainty with
respect to possible states of the world. It is not a lack of insight in the
functioning of the economic process which causes the errors. The only
way to improve these predictions is to provide new information (data)
about the uncertain states of the world. This is only possible if the
public forecaster has data about the labour market, which are not
available to the students. Such a situation is called a situation of
asymmetric information. Students' predictions will of course always
improve as a result of such information, but it is only the availability
which causes this effect. From a rational expectations point of view it is
not important in what form the information is given. It suffices to make
the pure data available to students. All forecasts and conclusions based
on the information can be deduced by the students as well as the
forecaster.
Rational expectations evidently satisfy Lucas's criterion. The rational
expectation equals the solution of the model with respect to this
variable, so it is not possible to improve the decisions of the agents in
the framework of the model.
In this framework the provision of public information can, as stated
before, only be interpreted as the publication of additional relevant data.
This implies that the most specific prediction becomes even more
specific (o,^ decreases). Since A =0, the prediction error of the
forecast equals the error of this most specific rational expectation:
o^ = o^- Starting from an initial prediction error with an MSE o^,
the provision of information which explains a fraction n of this
uncertainty leads to a proportional decrease in the prediction error:'
(9.10) 6^ = (1-«)<£,
The rational expectations hypothesis fits well in the expectation model
(9.1)-(9.4). It is also possible to view the cobweb expectation formation
scheme from this point. There are, however, two different ways to do
this. These two interpretations have very different implications with
respect to possibilities to improve expectations by providing public
the ' in d^. denotes the new value of <£» after the provision of public information.122
information. The first one of these interpretations, which will be
discussed in this section, does, however, not meet Lucas's criterium for
economic modelling as discussed in section 9.1. This interpretation is,
however, mostly used. In the next section an other interpretation is
discussed which is not susceptible to Lucas's critique.
The cobweb theorem states that:
(9.11) w"* = W*
Usually, this cobweb expectation scheme is interpreted analogously to
the rational expectation. Conform (9.5) and (9.7) it can be written:
(9.11) w"» = w' + 0 (9.12) w'" = w^e"*"**
in which e"*"* denotes the difference between the realised wage and
the wage at the moment the decision has to be made. A problem with
this specification is that in general file"**""*) * 0, and furthermore this
specification does not explain why students use this forecast rather than
another. But it is argued, that apparently students who have a cobweb
behaviour, have the wrong belief that Uie"'*"'**} = 0, and that students
simply think that the present wage is the best predictor of the future
wage.*
In the model no errors in making forecasts are introduced (o^, = 0),
but students are assumed to have a wrong, naive model about the
functioning of the labour market. Therefore, the rational expectation
model is used, but the objective probabilities are replaced by the
subjective probabilities of the naive model used by the students.
This interpretation seems to be analogous to the rational expectations
interpretation. In both cases there is a component which is
unpredictable. The difference is, however, that in the rational
expectations interpretation the unpredictable part is a typical states of
the world uncertainty with objective probabilities. In this cobweb
interpretation the forecast students make is based on a wrong model.
The forecast error included in this prediction therefore not only consists
of states of the world uncertainty, but also contains an error in the
prediction, or stated differently, their subjective probabilities differ from
the objective probabilities. The behaviour of students is interpreted.
2 Of course, in some situations the cobweb expectation might equal the rational expectation.
Such a situation does, however, not validate the cobweb expectation. The optimally of the
expectation is accidental and is no explanation of the cobweb behaviour. Therefore,
although rational expectations and cobweb generate the same results, conceptually they
remain different.VariaM/i'ry and/VwftcTaMViry 123
however, as if they think their prediction is the best possible (/.£. as if
o^p = 0). Since there is no interpretation error in this model, there is
no reason why the rational expectation is not also available to the
students. Furthermore, if o^, equals 0 for every expectation i, the use
of the rational expectation would dominate the cobweb expectation.
This interpretation does, therefore, not satisfy Lucas's criterion.
Students are assigned a view of the world which is wrong by
assumption, and it would be easy, within the framework of the model,
to improve the expectations formed by the students. The model provides
no reason as to why students form this cobweb expectation rather than
the rational expectation.
The implications for the provision of public labour market information
of this cobweb interpretation seem to be the same as those for the
rational expectations model. This is, however, a problematic vision.
Since the model of students' cobweb expectations does not explain why
students use the cobweb expectation rather than some other expectation
scheme, the model also does not provide any reason why students
would alter their behaviour if additional information is given.
P. 4 77ie Coftweft 77jeory: /nterpremrion 2
The rational expectations model of section 9.2 assumes that students
have perfect insight into the functioning of the labour market. As is
shown in chapter 4 this is a very unrealistic assumption. It is evident
that students, but also professional economists, are not able to fully
grasp the true structure of the world. For the provision of labour market
information students' errors are important. Therefore, a model of
expectation formation has to contain such errors in forecasts. The first
interpretation of the cobweb model provides an expectation scheme
which includes errors in forecasts, but the model is unsatisfactory since
it does not explain why these errors are made. Therefore, it is liable to
Lucas's critique, that models which do not explain human behaviour as
optimal behaviour are not useful. In this section another interpretation
of the cobweb behaviour is provided which explains the cobweb
behaviour as the optimal reaction to the limited forecast possibilities
students have.
This second interpretation is, again, based on the basic model
(9.1)-(9.4). In this model students are supposed to have a very specific
forecast of the future wage, and a more abstract forecast. The specific
forecast is, however, subject to an interpretation error. This
interpretation error denotes students disability to forecast the future124 Oiap/f /• 9
wage. For simplicity the assumption is made that this rational
expectation is equal to the realised wage. On the other hand, students
have an abstract expectation. The assumption is made that students use
the current wage as this abstract expectation. The idea behind this is
that the current wage gives a rough indication of the level of the future
wage. Without further investigation it may be equally probable that the
wage will decrease or increase. Of course, this abstract expectation, the
current wage, will contain a large information error, compared to the
specific expectation, but will in general also contain an interpretation
error, because i?Uv ~* - w""} * 0, although this interpretation error will
be much smaller. In order to simplify this error is put equal to 0. The
prediction model becomes:
(9.14) w"P = w"° • e"P
(9.15) w"° = w"* + e""
Both error terms have the expected value 0, their variances are
respectively o^p and o^,, and they are mutually independent, while
e"" s independent of w™ and e"* of w*.
Thus, in this interpretation, the student can dispose of two expectations.
A specific expectation tv"? with an interpretation error, but without an
information error, and an abstract expectation, the current wage W*
which only has an information error and no interpretation error. The
availability of different expectations should be interpreted carefully. Of
course, a student forms only one prediction. The two expectations, the
specific and the abstract, and their combinations, represent, however,
other possible expectations the student could have used. This
construction makes explicit the set of expectations available to the
student and can therefore restrict the capabilities of the student to
forecast: the rational expectation is not available in this set. It is easy to
extend this extreme model conform (9. l)-(9.4) to a model in which
both expectations contain both types of errors. For the main results this
simplification does, however, not matter.
According to (7.22) it is optimal for a student to mix both expectations,
to form his prediction:
(9.16) *"• = Jlw"* + (1-Jl)w"*
with
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This optimal behaviour will equal the cobweb behaviour if o^, = » or
if o^. = 0. Thus, the model explains a cobweb behaviour if the student
is completely unable to predict the future wage, or if the current wage
equals the rational expectation.•*
The advantage of this interpretation of the cobweb model is that it
explains w/jy the current wage is used as prediction. Given the forecast
capacities a student has, according to the model (expressed by o^,) it is
not possible to improve his behaviour. This interpretation of the cobweb
model therefore meets Lucas's criterion about economic modelling.
The assumptions under which the cobweb behaviour comes about are
very strong. As soon as a student has some capacity to forecast the
future wage, i.e. as soon as o^ becomes finite, the optimal prediction
does not equal the cobweb prediction anymore. If o^, is large, the
optimal prediction is, however, very close to the current wage. This is
in accordance with the way the cobweb theory has been interpreted by
the originators of the cobweb theory.* The cobweb behaviour has not
been treated as an absolute law, but merely as a useful approximation of
people's behaviour. Furthermore, if o is finite, an optimal prediction
will come about which equals Theil's formulation, based on empirical
evidence of direct measurement of expectations. The model provides an
interpretation of Theil's parameter 8.' Students have two types of
expectations to their disposal. The specific expectation contains an
interpretation error. The lower the variance of this error (o^,) the
better predictable the future wage is. The use of the present wage as an
expectation for the future wage contains an information error. The A/S£
of this error (o^) is large if the wage is very fluctuative or variable in
time. Therefore, the optimal combination of the two expectations
depends on the variaW/jfy and the pra//cfa£j7i7y of the wage. The
variability depends on external characteristics of the labour market,
while the predictability represents a personal characteristic of the
student, his ability to forecast the future wage.
9.5 £co/uwnefric //np/Zcarions
The model of the second interpretation of the cobweb theory explains
the prediction of students to be a mixture of the not perfectly interpreted
rational expectation and the cobweb expectation. For certain values of
3 See also footnote 2 in section 9.3.
4 See section 6.1.
5 See section 6.3. Chapter 10 provides a more extensive analysis of Theil's underestimation
of changes.126
the variability and the predictability the optimal behaviour of students
can become very close to the rational expectations behaviour and for
other values it comes close to the cobweb behaviour. In this section it is
investigated under what conditions the rational expectations hypothesis
will be accepted although the model of section 9.4 is the true model.'
Suppose the following equation is tested on rationality:
(9.18) 5 = Cj + pjW>"
The variance of the prediction error equals (see (7.23)):
(9.19) <4 = A'oL + (l-X)'<4
This prediction error consists of a systematic error, which can be
explained by w"'', and an unsystematic component, which is caused by





The rational expectations hypothesis states that o^ = 0, which implies
that A. = 0 and that o^ = 0. It implies that both the systematic and
the unsystematic component equal zero. Usually, however, only the
hypothesis that the systematic component is zero is tested. There are
two reasons for this restriction. Firstly, it is easier to test for a
systematic error in the behaviour. Secondly, for most theories based on
rational expectations all results also hold in the case of unsystematic
deviations from rational expectations. According to the proposition of
Muth, Sargent, and Wallace the theory of rational expectations allows
for this type of independent deviations. In section 7.4 it was shown,
however, that this proposition is not as innocent as it appears.
6 Mankiw and Zeldes (1990) show that the consumption of stockholders fits better into the
rational expectations framework than the consumption of non-stockholders. This is a
typical example of a situation in which the rational expectation hypothesis is not rejected
in specific situations.Variaii/i/y a/u/ /Vr</icraM7Jry 127
In a finite sample, tests are always based on the estimated level of a
certain test-statistic. If a test is performed based on the systematic error
or on the unsystematic error, the hypothesis will be rejected if this error
exceeds a certain level. Figure 9.1 provides an isoquant of both tests. If
the values of the variability and the predictability are above the relevant
isoquant the rational expectations hypothesis will be rejected. If the
sample gets larger, the critical value of the test will decrease and the
isoquant will come closer to the axes. The figure clearly shows that a
test based on a systematic error (a) is almost completely used to reject
cases with low predictabilities (o is high) almost independently of the
variability. For a test based on an unsystematic error (ft, sometimes
called excess volatility) the opposite is the case. Rational expectations
are rejected in case of a high variability.
Based on this figure four cases can be distinguished. If both the value of o^,
and are low (1) the rational expectations hypothesis will always be
accepted. If both values are high (4) the hypothesis will be rejected by
both tests. If, however, the variability is high while o^ is low (3) only
a test based on an unsystematic error will reject the rational expectations
hypothesis, while in the reversed situation (2) only the test based on a
systematic error will lead to a rejection.
FIGURE 9.1: A TEST ON SYSTEMATIC (a) AND
UNSYSTEMATIC (6) DEVIATIONS FROM THE
RATIONAL EXPECTATION.
<D
Since most tests are based on the systematic error, it can be explained128 p
why for consumption models the rational expectations hypothesis is
often rejected, while for asset models the hypothesis is often accepted.
Consumption depends on economic variables with a low variability, but
the consumption decision is made by laymen in the field of investments.
Assets are often very variable, but the trade is carried out by specialists
who are bound to have a high degree of predictability and thus a low
value of o^p.
P. 6 lExpecfflft'onj MflM/w/af/ng PO//CIM
The variability-predictability model of section 9.4 has some interesting
consequences for possible economic policies. In section 9.7 the
consequences for the provision of labour market information will be
investigated. The provision of information aims at improving students'
expectations. The way people form expectations can however also be
used to worsen the expectations. Some economic policy instruments
(£.#. the Keynesian expenditure policy) may be based on a manipulation
of expectations. Some economic instruments are chosen in such a way
that a gap between people's expectations and the realisation of a
variable will occur, which is optimal from the government's point of
view. Under rational expectations such policies are not possible. Based
on this, a rejection of the rational expectations hypothesis is sometimes
treated as an acceptance of the possibility of the expectations
manipulating policy. For example Campbell and Mankiw (1989, p. 210)
state after an empirical rejection of the permanent income hypothesis
that 'our findings are suggestive regarding the effects of policies. [...]
The old-fashioned Keynesian consumption function may therefore
provide a better benchmark for analyzing fiscal policy than does the
model with infinitely-lived consumers.' These models, however, mostly
do not satisfy Lucas's criterion. Contrary to Muth's rational
expectations, the Lucas critique is not an empirical claim, but a
fundamental prerequisite for the possibility to model agents' responses
to policies.
This section provides a simple example which satisfies Lucas's
criterion, which 'asserts that agents' responses become predictable to
outside observers only when there can be some confidence that agents
and observers share a common view of the nature of the shocks which
must be forecast by both' (Lucas, 1976, p. 41), but in which the
rational expectations hypothesis does not hold. The effects of
expectations manipulating policies are investigated and it is shown that
even after a rejection of the rational expectations hypothesis this type of
policies is possible only to a limited extent.y 129
Consider again a situation in which an agent's behaviour depends on his
expectation w"* of the future variable w"°. The rational expectations
hypothesis states that it is possible to write w"* as a summation of two
components: w"° = w" + e" in which w" is completely predictable,
while e" is completely unpredictable given the information set /,_,,
available at the moment of choice. The rational expectation hypothesis
is that people predict the predictable component correctly with w",
while they do not predict the unpredictable component e" (or predict it
to be 0). The rational expectation of w"° is therefore w". Agents'
expectations will in general contain an error Aw = H>*"-W'*". From
the rational expectations point of view, this error can be split up in two
parts. Firstly, there is a difference between the realisation of a variable
and its rational expectation: e" = w^-vv"". Secondly, expectations
may differ from the rational expectation (/.«. the rational expectations
hypothesis is rejected): e*"' = w^'-w".
An expectations manipulating policy (EMP) is based on the possibility
to influence economic variables in such a way that the expected (by the
policy maker) expectation error (of the agent) will be at some non-zero
level, /?{e" + e*"* | £MP) = L * 0 and this policy will be more accurate
if VA/?{e" + e""-L|£M/>} is low.
It is not possible to carry out such a policy with respect to the rational
expectation error e", since also for the policy maker e" is
unpredictable. Expectations manipulating policy is therefore only
possible if the rational expectations hypothesis, e*"* = 0, is not true.
Therefore it suffices to consider model (9.14)-(9.15), in which e" = 0,
as an example. Therefore, >v'" = w". If e*"* is written as
€**' =/(/,_j) + e, in which / is a function of all information known at
time /-rf (7,.^) and e does not depend on any variable in 7,.^, with
iJ{e} = 0, rejections of the rational expectations hypothesis can be
divided up into two types. Firstly, it may be shown that/t/,.^) * 0
statistically significant. Secondly, it may be shown that e * 0. It is in
general very easy to find rejections of the rational expectations
hypothesis. For example the situation in which two agents with the same
information set 7,.^ have a different expectation provides such a
rejection. This rejection may be caused, however, by both types,
AA-rf) * 0. and e * 0. But, as mentioned in section 7.3, since the
second type of expectations errors can not be used for a manipulation
policy they are not regarded as relevant for the theory (Sargent and
Wallace, 1976, p. 180, call e the 'mother-in-law' term). From their
point of view only rejections which provide a relation /V,_rf) * 0 are
economically interesting.130
According to (9.14) it is assumed that the agent indeed possesses a
prediction for w"° which equals w""* = w"" + e"'\ the prediction
equals the rational expectation plus a (possibly very large) random term
(random with respect to the information set /,_j). £{e'^l = 0 and the
variance of e™* is denoted by o Furthermore it is assumed that the
agent also possesses an abstract expectation #(/,_,,) for which conform
(9.15) #(',_J = w~*, which may contain a systematic error.
o^ - E{(w~*-w"")*} measures the A/S£ of W* as a prediction of
w"*". In order to minimise the mean square error of his prediction
error, according to (9.17), it is optimal for an agent to mix his two
sources of information. The optimal prediction (w*") is therefore:
w'** = A.w * + (l - A.)w"P, in which X = Oexp/(°w*°«p) minimises the
mean square prediction error. This implies that the optimal prediction
has an error e*** = XW"''-A.H'"'' + (1 -X)e"'\ which contains a
predictable component A,(W*''-H'"").
The mean squared error of w*" is cy, = Ao^ = (l-A.)Oexp, which
can be split up into a systematic component o^ = A.^o^ and an
unsystematic component o^^, = (l-X)^o^,. Thus, a violation of the
rational expectations hypothesis of the second type (a nonsystematic
error) makes it optimal for agents to also introduce a systematic error to
keep total prediction error minimal. There is a trade off between the
error connected with the rational expectation and the bias of the abstract
expectation. The possibility of an unbiased prediction, which seems to
be a necessary assumption regarding Lucas's critique, does not imply its
optimal ity.
The main question of this section is whether a rejection of the rational
expectations hypothesis indeed makes it possible for a policy-maker to
use expectations manipulating policies. The answer is that these
possibilities will occur, but limited to a certain extent. Assuming that
o* and g(/,) do not change, due to the introduction of an expectations
manipulating policy
(9.22) 1" - oi, - •'-' vor •U
(see figure 9.2). This equation links the unpredictable behaviour of the
policy-maker (o^,) to the systematic error L of the agent, o^ reaches
a maximum of V-ioL, for o^ = o* and li™o^.. %» = 0- At the
maximum o^^, = o^,, so o^ Vi^131
FIGURE 9.2: EFFECTS OF EXPECTATIONS MANIPULATING POLICIES ON
SYSTEMATIC AND UNSYSTEMATIC PREDICTION ERROR.
If o^j, or the use of w"^ as abstract forecast of w"" do change due to
the manipulating policy, it seems reasonable to expect that this will be
adjustments to the new situation, which even limit the possibilities for
an expectations manipulating policy.
This limitation of the possibility of expectations manipulating policy is
due to the endogenous character of X. If o^, rises the abstract
expectation will become less valuable as a predictor and therefore
" "~ap + Ow) will fall, i.e. the agent will make less use of this
abstract expectation. Two main conclusions may be drawn from this
example. Firstly, it is not fruitful to separate systematic and
unsystematic deviations from the rational expectations as two completely
different things, since there may be an optimal trade off between the
systematic and the unsystematic forecast errors.132 Oiop/rr 9
Secondly, a rejection of the rational expectations hypothesis does not
immediately imply that expectations manipulating policies will be
possible to every extent.
P. 7 77i£ Prov/jr/on o/ PKW/C /n/omjaf/on
The central problem of this study is the question how public labour
market information may influence the labour market predictions of
individual students, and therefore the functioning of the labour market.
In chapter 4 it was shown that students do face large difficulties in
adequately forecasting the future labour market situation. Rational
expectations assumes, with its typical states of the world uncertainty,
that the only prediction error students are faced with is due to
unforecastablc future events. Regarding the large difficulties in making
forecasts, especially for the unexperienced students, the reduction of
uncertainty to states of the world uncertainty is rather unrealistic.
Section 9.4 provides a model in which prediction errors can be caused
both by states of the world uncertainty and errors in the predictions
themselves. There exists a trade off between abstract expectations and
specific expectations. The first is liable to an information error, while
the latter may face an interpretation error.
The model of section 9.4 makes it easy to interpret the meaning of
provision of labour market information. In this model the optimal
prediction of students depends on the variability and the predictability.
The variability is an external factor, and is therefore treated as constant.
The predictability, however, represents the capacities of the student to
form expectations about the future labour market. The aim of providing
labour market information is to assist the student in making this
expectation. By publishing public labour market information the insight
of professional forecasters about the functioning of the labour market
becomes available to students. The provision of additional labour market
information, therefore, can be modelled as a decrease of o^p. The
future wage becomes better predictable for the student. The larger the
insight in the model, the lower <*„„ becomes. The prediction error of a























A decrease of o^, will lead to a decrease of X, because the
predictability increases and therefore the naive expectation becomes less
valuable. This will lead to a decrease of the systematic error since both
2 2
A ana o^p decrease. The unsystematic error might, however, increase, o^,
decreases, but (1-X) increases, since students are going to use the
specific expectation to a larger extent. If X > Vi, i.e. as long as the
naive, abstract expectation is better than the real specific expectation,
the net effect will be negative and the unsystematic error will increase.
On the total prediction error, however, the effect of a decrease of o^,
is always negative.
The derivative is very small if X is close to 1. In that case students'
predictions depend almost completely on the current wage, because the
real expectation has a very bad quality. A marginal increase of this
quality will have almost no effect since students do not use the real
expectation. To influence the prediction quality in such a case the
improvement of the quality of the forecast should be substantial. Such a
large decrease of o^ will make the students start to use this real
expectation (X decreases) and therefore this real expectation gets
influence upon the quality of the prediction.134
Figure 9.3 shows the relation between o^^ and the two components and
the total prediction error.'
FIGURE 9.3: THE RELATION BETWEEN
UNSYSTEMATIC PREDICTION ERROR.
AND THE SYSTEMATIC AND
The improvement of students' expectations in these analysis arises due to an improved
interpretation of information which is already available ('.^)- If new, relevant, data comes
at the disposal of students (if, if /, ^ increases) expectations may of course also improve,
similar to the effects of additional information in the rational expectations model (see
equation (9.10)). If this information is easy interpretable. the information error of both the
abstract and the specific expectation will decrease and the prediction error will decrease
with this amount. If the additional information is only used in the specific expectation the
reduction of the prediction error will be proportional to the extent to which this specific
expectation is used (1 - X).9.8
In this chapter the question has been considered how to interpret
expectation formation that deviates from rational expectations. Lucas's
criterium for economic modelling requires that agent's behaviour is
always optimal within the context of the model. It therefore makes no
sense to explain cobweb-behaviour as the behaviour of people who are
assumed to think that the cobweb-expectation is the best (as in
interpretation 1, section 9.3). In interpretation 2 (section 9.4) it is
shown that cobweb-behaviour can be explained as an extreme example
of agents with a very low capability to forecast, for who it is optimal to
stick to the simple cobweb-forecast, instead of some other more specific
forecasting model. The agents realise that this is a bad forecast, but also
know that every attempt to improve it will introduce an interpretation
error which is not compensated for by the decrease in the information
error.
The extent to which cobweb-like behaviour (/.e. systematic errors)
occur depends on the predictability and the variability of the economic
variable which has to be forcasted. In a context of low experienced
forecasters and a variable with a low variability, systematic errors will
be relatively large, while in the opposite case, with professional
forecasters and high variability, most part of the forecast error will be
unsystematic. Often, however, the prediction error is the largest in the
second case, with unsystematic errors.
If policy wants to use the systematic expectation errors, however, it has
to increase the variability, what leads to a reduction of these systematic
errors. There are, in this model, therefore only limited possibilities for
expectation manipulating policies.
On the other hand, the model offers a way to explain the effects of the
provision of public information. Since systematic errors result from a
kind of optimising behaviour, not every public forecast will have an
immediate impact upon students' expectations. Only if the quality of
such forecast is good enough, compared to students' predictions, it will
significantly improve students' forecasts. It does not suffice to make
students aware of the fact that a cobweb model is 'too naive', but it is
needed to offer them an adequate alternative.10 THE UNDERESTIMATION OF CHANGES
In most economic studies the expectations formed by agents are
observed only indirectly. While the enrolment decision theoretically
depends on students' predictions, only the enrolment and the realisations
of these predictions are observed. To investigate the link between
decision and expectation, some additional assumptions have to be made
about the way expectations are formed. Sometimes, as mentioned in
section 6.3, however, it has been possible to investigate expectation
formation based on direct measurement of the expectations, by means of
surveys. Theil (1958, p. 154) concludes that 'we observed that the
predicted changes analysed there show a bias in relation to the
corresponding actual changes in the sense that they are on average
smaller. This phenomenon, which amounts to an underestimation of the
level of the variable to be predicted in times of rises and to an
overestimation of this level in times of falls, is not entirely unknown;
but its general occurrence is not sufficiently realised.' This
underestimation of changes can be expressed with the following
equation:
(10.1) (w'"-w•*) = 8(w""->v"Ve with 0 < 0 < 1
with e orthogonal to *v""-w~''.' The difference between the predicted
wage (w*") and the current wage, at the moment the decision is made
(w''), is only a fraction of the difference between the ex pay/ realised
wage (w"°) and the current wage. This relation is based on Theil's
empirical observations of expectations. Two important consequences can
be deduced from (10.1). Firstly, the predicted wage is not only related
to the future wage, but also to the current wage:
w*"* = 6w"" + (l-8)w•** + €. To obtain an unbiased predictor of the
realised wage the prediction, therefore, has to be extrapolated:
(10.2) #"" = w^ + l(w^-w•*)
6
Secondly, (10.1) makes it possible to explain Theil's observation that
the prediction will, compared to the current wage, fluctuate less than the
realisation.* If o,, is relatively small compared to the underestimation
of change — as Theil observes (p. 82) — the variation of the prediction
is indeed lower than the variation of the realisation.
1 See Theil (1958). p. 68.
2 Theil (19S8, p. 82) calls this 'unequal variation'.138 Ouvwr/0
(10.3) Vvi/rtw'" - w ^ = 6* VAR<w"" - w'O + o* < VARUv'" -w"
Since enrolment is related to the prediction, this means that the volatility
of the behaviour decreases if the underestimation increases. A Iow9
implies a passive anticipating behaviour. Theil uses mainly
psychological arguments to explain this phenomenon and proposes to
multiply the survey expectations with 1/9 to obtain a good predictor.
Muth (1961), however, claims that his rational expectations theory
explains this phenomenon in a rational way. Based on the errors in
forecasts model of chapter 9 it is also possible to explain the
underestimation phenomenon. In this chapter both Muth's explanation
and the errors in forecasts model are investigated with respect to the
underestimation of changes. The examples in this chapter show the
important link between the assumption regarding expectation formation
and the econometric treatment of the supply function. The investigation
is based on the data about US lawyers. Furthermore, the
underestimation of changes throws light on the volatility of the
enrolment behaviour predicted by the different models.
70.7 77J<? f/5 Ld»vyer.s
Siow (1984) investigates the enrolment decision for US lawyers. The
training to become a lawyer takes 3 years. It is therefore relevant for
the students not to base their decision on the current wages, but to
anticipate the wages three years in advance. Therefore, the student has
to make a prediction. Siow assumes the expectations to be rational. The
analysis is based on three time series: the enrolment, the average wages
for lawyers, and the average alternative wages. In Siow's model the
students are modelled by a representative agent. Such a representative
agent does not fit in the framework used in this study. Therefore, in this
chapter the data of Siow (1984) are used, but a supply function is
assumed, according to (3.8):
(10.4) 5 = pjw
in which w is defined as the quotient of the average wages of lawyers
and the average alternative wages. The constant Cj is omitted because
the data used are centred. Incorporating Theil's expectation formula
(10.1) in the supply function it becomes:
(10.5) S =
=
This relation is estimated with OLS. Table 10.1 provides the results.These results show that indeed both w"° and vv~* are significantly
related to the enrolment of students at the law school. The estimation
implies 6 = 0.51. In the next sections some alternative explanations of
this phenomenon are presented.












Theil's explanation for the underestimation of change is largely
psychological. Muth (1961, p. 316) claims, however, that his rational
expectations also explain the phenomenon. He remarks that 'two major
conclusions from studies of expectations data are the following:
1. Averages of expectations in an industry are more accurate than naive
models and as accurate as elaborate systems, although there are
considerable cross-sectional differences of opinion.
2. Reported expectations generally underestimate the extent of changes
that actually take place.
In order to explain these phenomena, I should like to suggest that
expectations, since they are informed predictions of future events, are
essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory,'
Consider the following model. ^
(10.6) 5 = pjw"
(10.7) w"° = w" + e" -7
(10.8) w" = O~* + e*"
The rational expectation w" is an prediction which is optimal in the
sense that the resulting prediction error e™ is minimal given the
information available at the moment the expectation was formed. This
implies that the prediction error does not correlate with any variable
known at the moment of choice, so e" does not correlate with w"' or140 Owprtr /0
with w". The rational expectation is, typically, assumed to be
calculated based on current and past data, so w" may, and will in
general, depend on, for example, w'*. As will be shown later, such a
relation between available information at the moment of choice and the
rational expectation is useful for the estimation of the enrolment relation
(10.6). H»'* functions as an instrumental variable, according to
McCallum (1976). Since the instrument w'** does, generally, not
completely explain the rational expectation, there is an additional error
€***, which is not correlated with w"*.
Based on (10.6)-(10.8) it is possible to relate both 5 and w"" to the
instrument w"** and the error variables.
(10.9) 5 » p/w^
(10.10) w*" - (w-' + e^ + e"
The covariances of 5, w"°, and tv"* equal:
(io.il) o* = pJcV-rf + Pii
(10.13)
(10.14)
Table 10.2 gives the estimations of these moments based on centred
data of Siow (1984). The model is overidentified. There are five
equations for four unknown variables. A direct OLS regression of
5 = P$vv"° will provide a biased estimation due to the variance of the
error, o^ in the variable w"°. One way to estimate the model
consistently is by the instrumental variable method of McCallum (1976).
With (10.15) f can be solved, and (10.13) provides, based on the
estimation of f an estimation of P$. This method is equivalent to a two
step OLS estimation, with w"* as the instrument. Firstly, f is estimated
by a OLS regression of the equation w'*" = CW*. and secondly, the
predictions of this regression are used in the OLS regression of
5 - P^w-0.
The alternative way to estimate the model is to use the fact that
°s ~ Ps°s.™«>- Th'S 'S equivalent to an OLS estimation of
w"*" = I/P5S. This reversion of realised wages and the enrolment is
typical for rational expectations. The realised wages do not cause the
enrolment, because they are partially unknown at the moment of choice,7V 141
but the enrolment 'causes' the realised wages. A change in enrolment
indicates a change in the predicted wages, and thus a change in the
objective probability distribution of the realised wages.'
TABLE 10.2: ESTIMATION OF












The results in table 10.1 can be easily explained by the rational







The estimation results of table 10.1 can be seen as a weighted average
of the instrumental variable CW* and the realised wages. 5 theoretically
depends on w'"'. The instrument and the realised wage both measure
these predicted wage with an error. The instrument contains an error
with o^ and the realised wages contain an error with o^. These
errors are independent. The optimal estimation weights these two errors
such that the total error is minimised, i.e. they provide the best
approximation of the predicted wage. The estimation is unbiased and
equal to the instrumental variable estimator, although the /-values are
larger, due to the use of additional information available in w"°.
E.g. Campbell (1987, p. 1249) uses the 'ignored implication of the permanent income
hypothesis', that 'it follows that saving should be at least as good a predictor of declines
in labor income as any other forecast that can be constructed from publicly available
information'.142 Cfwpw /O
This result also explains why the regression 5 = p\w'" provides a
biased estimation. In this regression the instrument w~* is replaced by a
trivial instrument 0. With 0 as an instrument the variance of the error of
the instrumental variable becomes CVw+o^. The estimated
coefficient therefore equals P5(°L + (Vj/(<W(V,, + o,,) (= 0.281
x 138144.4 = 38791.65), which is less then Pj. The other part of the
coefficient pj (0.719 x 138144.4 = 99352.75) is not observable,
because it is multiplied by 0.
Table 10.3 provides the estimation results of the three estimation
methods. The first column provides the estimates of the instrumental
variable method, while in the second column the estimates are based on
the reversed equation w"° = 1/PjS. The two correct estimation
methods do not provide the same results. The basic difference is that the
first method gives a smaller estimate for o^ than the second method.
In the instrumental variable estimation this o^ is based on the
unexplained residuals in o^. In similar studies about financial topics
oj^ is usually estimated to be too large by the instrumental variable
method. This is the so-called excess volatility. It is remarkable how
much the estimates for P^ differ. For reference also the (incorrect)
direct OLS estimates of 5 = P^w"° are added. This method also gives
completely different results, indicating the enourmous sensitivity of
estimations for specification and method of estimation of a model.
Estimated elasticities of supply and demand therefore should always be
handled with great care.
TABLE 10.3: THREE ESTIMATIONS OF THE RATIONAL























Muth (1961) claims that rational expectations theory is able to explain
the underestimations of changes. The rational expectations model indeed7te (MAm/i/no/io/i 0/ OuwgM 143
predicts the phenomenon (10.3):
(10.18) ^ ^J
Rational expectations theory is, however, not able to explain the other
form of the underestimation of change (10.2). In rational expectations
(10.19) w"" =
so 8 = 1. Rational expectations explain the smaller fluctuations of the
prediction compared to the realisation but this small variance is not
equal to real underestimation of changes. Bossons and Modigliani
(1966) show that the explanation of the role of w~* in the rational
expectations specification is purely statistical (i.e. w'* is an
instrumental variable), while the surveys indicate a real underestimation
of changes. They therefore reject the rational expectations model.*
70. i Errors w Forecast
In the rational expectation theory expectation errors are always caused
by uncertainties in the future state of the world. Given these
uncertainties the expectations are perfect. In this section it is shown that
the errors in forecasts model is also able to explain the results of table
10.1, and that this model does explain both the lower variance (10.3)
property and the underestimation property (10.2). In this section an
extreme variant of the model is presented. Section 10.4 and 10.5 relax
the assumptions.
The basic assumption of the errors in forecasts model is that students
are only able to make a forecast of future realised wages with an error.
Furthermore, conform section 7.4, they can use other forecasts which
are less specific, but which also contain a smaller error. The assumption
is made that the rational expectation equals the realised wage, and that
the alternative expectation equals the current wage.
(10.20) 5 = pyw""
(10.21) w*" = JLw^ + (l-;i)w"»
(10.22) w"P = w""+e"P
(10.23) w~ = CW+e*"
Equation (10.23) is the instrumental variable relation conform (10.8).
4 Theil (1958, p. 73) already recognised that 'the danger exists, therefore, that the
underestimation of changes is a spurious effect produced by the regression technique, so
that we should ask the question whether the effect still manifests itself if we accept the
second approach. The answer is affirmative.'144
This equation is not necessary in this model, but is only used to
facilitate a comparison with the rational expectations model.
Students will choose X such that the prediction error is minimised:
(10.24) X = —^2L—
* 2 2 O + O exp tw
in which o^ is the M5£ of the current wages as a forecast for the
realised wages:
(10.25) oi, = £{(w-"-w^» = (l-OV^oL
The comparison of (10.24) with (10.16) and (10.17) is interesting. In
(10.6)-(10.8) the researcher does not know v/' and therefore uses a
combination of w'*" and Cw **, which both contain an error, to
approximate the rational expectation. In (10.24) the student does not
know w" = w'*" and therefore combines w"' and w"'' to approximate
the rational expectation.
The model based on errors in forecasts is able to explain the
underestimation of changes. (10.21) directly gives (10.2) with
8 = 1 - X, and the variance of the prediction equals
(10.26)
This implies (10.3).
Similar to (10.9) and (10.10) 5 and v/'" can be expressed in w^.
(10.27) 5 =
(10.28) YV™ = C>V
The covariances are:
(10.29) oj = (pjX ••
(10.30)
(10.31)
(10.32) o^ = C^o^ + o*^
(10.33)
•i j r':<:.i.Hi?;u
The model appears to be identified exactly, but (10.24) is a parameter
restriction on the model, which makes it overidentified. OLS estimation« 145
of 5 = a^ + OjW^ gives:
(10.34) a, = XPj
(10.35) Oj = (l"X)Pj
from which X and Pj can be solved easily.
Table 10.4 provides the estimation results, o is calculated from the
residue in (10.29). The overidentifying restriction (10.24) makes it
possible to calculate an alternative estimation of A. based on o^ and
o^p or reversely, based on o^, and X an alternative o,,p can be
calculated. These alternative values are presented in the second column
of table 10.4. Again, the variance of the residual actually measured
(0.00440) is smaller than the value which is expected on theoretical
grounds (0.02359). Therefore, also this model explains more volatility
than actually measured. For final conclusions about the significance of
the gap between predicted and measured volatility a test-statistic is
needed. Because of the non-linear character of the relationships, this
statistic is omitted. Due to the small size of the data set such a test






10.4: ESTIMATION RESULTS OF












In the errors in forecasts model of the previous section the assumption
has been made that w" = w™, i.e. that «£ = O. A model which
relaxes this assumption may in general solve the violation of the
parameter restrictions due to the overidentification of both the rational
expectations and the errors in expectations model. If the rational
expectations model generates excess volatility in the enrolment and the
errors in expectations model generates too few volatility, this146 Diaper /o
combination may equalise observed and theoretical expected volatility.
The extra parameter o,, reduces the overidentification to an
identification. In this section this combined model is introduced. But
since in the data-set used, both models have too small volatility, the
combination does not give empirically satisfactory results. Some
variances become negative to explain the volatility. For that reason only
the analytical model is provided in this section, while estimation results
are omitted.
The model of section 10.3 becomes:
(10.36) 5 = pjw"<
(10.37) w>" = Aw^d-A)*/"'
(10.38) W"P = H»" + e""
(10.39) w™ = w"+e"
(10.40) w" * CW^e*"*
This leads to:
(10.41) 5 = pj(X+'^






These covariances are almost equal to (10.29)-(10.33). The difference is
the appearance of o^ in equation (10.46). The model has 5 equations
with f, o^, o^, o,,p, A,, and p$ as 6 unknown variables, but due to
in which
(10.49) o^ = d-C)Vrf + o
the model is exactly identified.7fc l/ikfr/wrimariofi qf GfaifigM 147
The equations (10.43)-( 10.47) can be solved by initially putting X equal
to a constant. All other variables can then be solved easily. Based on
these values of the other variables the value of A. should be:
(10.50) X =
(1-0°*,
Therefore the system can be solved by searching a fixed point for X.
If o^ equals 0 the combined model is identical to the errors in forecasts
model. As noted in section 10.3, in this case the measured variance of
the residual is too small. Introducing a higher value of o,, may explain
this result. An increase of o,, lowers the estimated value of X until
X = 0 and the combined model equals the rational expectations model.
In this example, however, in that case the value of the residuals, is still
too small, while a further increase of o^ is not possible anymore. Such
an increase would lead to a negative value of o,^,, which is of course
impossible. The estimations of this model therefore make no sense and
for that reason they are not provided.
70.5 Endogenous A/ar&e/ /teacf/ofts
The combined model of section 10.4 is not able to explain the low
variance of the enrolment figures. The realised wages seem to fluctuate
too much compared to these enrolment figures. The realised wages,
have been treated, however, as endogenous, while according to (3.14)
they should be related to the prediction error. If too high wages are
predicted the realised wages will drop, while if the predictions are too
low, the realised wages become higher than the equilibrium wages.
ft
(10.51) w"" = w w(ww0
Thus, to predict w*"', students have to predict the equilibrium wage,
plus an additional term, which depends on the prediction error
(w^'-tv'*). The prediction error consists of a systematic component
and an unsystematic component. The assumption is made that students
can not predict their own unsystematic prediction errors. Therefore, this
part of the realised wages is assumed to be a random shock to them,
which can be taken into account by the rational expectations model. For
the other part of the realised wages, i.e. w** plus the systematic part of
the prediction error, the errors in forecast model is used. Thus it is148 Owprw /0
assumed that students are able to forecast this part completely, but only
with an error. This error generates the unsystematic prediction error,
and therefore the rational expectation error becomes endogenous.
(10.52) 5 = p^w'"
(10.53) w*" = Xw
(10.54) w"" = w"
(10.55) w" = w'«
(10.56) w™ = w'«-YAw
in which
(10.57) T = -!-*-
and Aw"' is the predictable part of the prediction error:
(10.58) Aw"" = A.Ov-'-w'*)





(10.60) w" = w"°
Therefore (10.53) can be rewritten as: ,, ,,
(10.61) X' ()fiW^ ^ ^
The model, therefore, is equal to the errors in forecasts model of
section 10.3, except for the /—J factor by which e"* is multiplied.
Estimation results therefore also equal the results of section 10.2. The
difference between the estimation of o^p based on residuals and the
estimation based on equation (10.24) makes it possible to identify P^ in
this model. Their quotient 0.00440 / 0.02359 = 0.018652 equals
1/(1 -Y)*. Therefore, T = 8.32. P,, therefore equals in this
estimation -7381.43.7V (/fu/irori/na/io/i o/' Qia/rgM 149
Table 10.5 presents the estimations of P$ and Pp in this chapter
recalculated to elasticities in the last year of the sample (with 40190
enrolments).






The elasticities of supply correspond very well to the elasticities
mentioned in section 4.2. The elasticities of demand in section 4.2 were
divided into a group of large negative and a group of small negative
elasticities. The elasticity calculated in this chapter corresponds best to
the lower elasticities, implying a low reaction of demand to wages.
70.6 Conc/ws/oru
The examples in this chapter show the consequences for estimation of
different assumptions regarding expectation formation. Different
assumptions about the non-observed prediction of students leads to
completely different estimation results, and different assumptions make
different estimation techniques necessary. There is a close link between
the expectation formation theory and the way the model can be
estimated.
The results of this chapter show that the errors in forecast model
developed in chapter 7 and 9, contrary to the rational expectations
model, is able to explain the underestimation of change, which has been
observed by Theil (1958), and more recently by Lovell (1986). Rational
expectations explain the low volatility of expectations, but do not
explain the real underestimation phenomenon.
Finally, the results of section 10.5 show that it is important to
incorporate the market reactions to changes in the supply in the model
to explain adequately the expectation formation of students.11 THE COBWEB THEOREM: A RATIONAL
INTERPRETATION
From a rational expectations point of view, which departs from the
existence of a true model of the world, naive behaviour like assumed in
the cobweb theory is irrational. From this point of view, people
voluntarily waste available information which has value for them. In
chapter 7 it was shown that if the assumption of a given model is
dropped, and the assumption is made that people can not know the true
structure of the economy with certainty, but have to produce their own
interpretation of the economic relationships, it may become optimal to
exchange the theoretical specific expectations for more naive, abstract
expectations. The interpretation error of the specific expectation, may
exceed the information error of the abstract expectation.
Based on this insight, chapter 9 explained the cobweb behaviour of
students is the observation that the current wage may serve as such an
abstract expectation. If the developments at a certain segment of the
labour market are rather stable, the variability is low, and the use of the
current wage as predictor of the future situation may be valuable. This
is mainly the case if it is difficult for students to theoretically predict the
future situation, i.e. if the predictability is low.
The calculations in chapter 9 are, however, based on the assumption
that the variability of the market is an exogenous constant. This
assumption serves to keep the analysis simple. The assumption is,
however, in conflict with the original cobweb thought. In cobweb theory
an error in the expectations causes mismatch at the future labour
market, but also this mismatch or disequilibrium generates new errors
in the expectation formation of students. Therefore, the extent to which
students use the current wage as abstract expectation, the more the
current wage will move away from the equilibrium situation, and
therefore the worse will be its value as predictor for the future situation.
The variability therefore is, in cobweb theory, an endogenous factor.
The implementation of such a feedback mechanism in the expectations
model is possible but makes the model rather complex. The aim of this
chapter is to show that the model of chapter 9 can indeed be used to
explain the real cobweb, and to draw some conclusions about the
stabilisation properties of this model. Because of its complexity the
analysis in further chapters are, however, based on the more simple
model of chapter 9. ,,152
77. / 77J^ £^u<7/frriii/R Concep/ 0/ Wages
In a dynamic context the current wage serves two ends in the
expectation model. Firstly, as in chapter 9 it can be used as an abstract
forecast of the future wage. If one does not possess an adequate theory,
the current wage gives at least a rough indication of the level at which
the future wage may be expected to be. Secondly, however, the current
wage itself is the realisation of the expected wage some years ago. And
since the former expectations will not have been perfect, the current
wage is affected by these past prediction errors. It is therefore important
to realise that the current wage may deviate from the equilibrium, and if
the prediction errors in the past have been large, these deviations will
also be large.
If the labour market has some long lasting structural characteristics, it
seems reasonable to view the current equilibrium wage as an abstract
forecast of the future equilibrium wage. Contrary to the current
equilibrium wage, there is no reason to expect that these deviations
from equilibrium are also a good predictor of the future deviations from
equilibrium. In this chapter, therefore the assumption is made that the
current deviation from equilibrium has no informational contents about
the future wage, and that the future deviation from equilibrium is
unpredictable. The natural link between the current situation and the
future is that the current equilibrium wage serves as an abstract forecast
of the future equilibrium wage.
(11.1) w>" = u-3+e""' with o^,, = Ete""'*}
This equilibrium wage itself is, however, not observed. The only thing
that is observed directly, is the current (realised) wage. Again, if a
student has no specific theory about the extent of this disequilibrium
deviation, the current wage may be seen as an abstract forecast of the
current equilibrium wage.
(11.2) H-* = w^ + e* with o^ = Ete*'}
Indirectly the current wage again serves as an abstract forecast of the
future wage, but contrary to the model in chapter 9 this relation is based
on two steps. By the use of more specific theories or insights in the
situation students can improve the quality of their forecast. This
improvement may be based on both steps of the relation. Students may
have additional insight into the current disequilibrium situation, and they
may have insight into the future changes in the wage. Therefore, it is
assumed that they possess two specific forecasts. One forecast of the77w Coftvupfc 77i«>r«>m 153
current equilibrium wage (w'^*') and one forecast of the future wage
(11.3) w_7" = w'2 + e"" with E{e"*'} = 0 and
(11.4) >V«P = w*» + e^ with E(e"^l = 0 and o
The covariances between all error terms again are 0 (see section 7.4).
These concrete forecasts are again not without an error. Therefore the
forecasts include zero-mean forecast errors, e"*"' and e***, with
variances o^,; and o^, which denote the forecast quality. Departing
from these sources of information, the 'natural' proxies (11.1) and
(11.2) and the forecasts (11.3) and (11.4), which all contain an error, it
is possible to derive the optimal anticipations. Firstly, students have to
estimate the current equilibrium wage. These can be based on the
current wage, which is in a disequilibrium situation not exactly equal to
the equilibrium price, or they can use their forecast, which is not
completely correct. Conform (7.22), depending on the quality of both
sources of information again a certain mix:
(11.5) , ,
between them is optimal (/. e. minimises the A/S£) when:
(11.6) X, =
The MS£ of this predicted current equilibrium equals:
(11.7) j *
so, if this predicted equilibrium price is used as a proxy for the future
equilibrium wage the A/S£ of the error is:
(11.8) o^ = oL, + Vl
A similar dilemma exists for the anticipation of the future wage.
Students can use the (predicted) current equilibrium wage, representing
the current value of the subject, which will not be totally equal to the
future value, or use their forecast which also contains an error. A
similar optimisation of:154
(11.9) w'" = X^'™' + (1 -
leads to:
(11.10)
The use of w'"* as an anticipation of future wage leads to the minimal
error, given the forecast qualities (o^,,,):
U i in n* = X n* = X /a* +X o*^
On a market with a usual linear demand and supply curve (3.2 and 3.8)
an underestimation of the wage leads to a realised wage above the
equilibrium and an ovcrestimation leads to a realised wage below the
equilibrium wage (see (3.15)):
(11.12) w"" = w"
and therefore:
(11.13) 0^ = (A
Note that by relating the aggregated market disequilibrium to the
forecast errors of individuals, it is implicitly assumed that forecast
errors are not dispersed. A high forecast of one person does not
compensate for a low forecast of another.
Under the assumption that o^ is constant through time it follows from
(11.11) and (11.13) that: . .,. , ,„„..„... ..... ,, „
(11.14) ol = oj
The system of equations (11.6), (11.10), (11.8) and (11.14) determines
a unique solution for X,, Xj, o^j, and o^, due to the monotony of
the functions.
In this interpretation of the cobweb model, students try to anticipate the
future wage, but they understand they have limited capacities to do this.155
As their forecast errors (with M5£ o^ and o^) increase they use
the current wage as an indication of current and future value of the
equilibrium wage to a larger extent (equation (11.6) and (11.10)). But
on the other hand, the use of this abstract expectation increases the
systematic error, which makes the current wage less valuable as a proxy
for the future wage (equation (11.8) and (11.14)). This decrease of the
'equilibrium revealing' character of the current wage has the opposite
effect: students use the current wage to a smaller extent. Somewhere in-
between the total use of current wages and no use of current wage there
is an optimum, in which a certain mix between the use of current wage
and the expectations about the future wage minimises the A/SE (o^,).
Schultz (1930) draws this situation (see figure 7.1): 'The real process
will more likely look like the dashed lines aft', ft'c' etc'.' In this
equilibrium a systematic error in the behaviour occurs, but it is
reasonable for students not to correct this error since this biased error in
their anticipation, in the case students understand they do not forecast
perfectly, is smaller than the unbiased error in the case 'he has no
doubts of their accuracy' (Hart, 1937b, p. 277).
77.2 7mp//cari<ms
Figure 11.1 illustrates the model in a simplified case in which students
are not able to correct the current wage for the fact that it may not be
the equilibrium wage: o y = °° and therefore A., = 1. In that case the




The figure shows an example of the equilibrium between the use of the
forecast and the 'myopic' cobweb behaviour.* (11.16) states that the
1 Schultz (1930), p. 35. 'Der wirkliche Vorgang ahnelt eher den gestrichenen Linien
fc'c'usw'.
2 The figures in this chapter are based on P,/(Jp * 3/2, o^., = 10, and o^, • 10.
1-XJ —156 //
quality of the current wage as a proxy for the future wage decreases as
it is used to a larger extent. If A.j = 1 students totally rely on the
current wage as prediction for the future wage. In the case illustrated in
the figure this would lead to diverging wages, i.e. o^. would become
infinitely large. According to (11.15) people make less use of the
current wage, as a proxy for the future wage, if its forecast quality
decreases (o^, increases). At the intersection there is a point at which
the optimal use of the abstract expectation corresponds to the variability
caused by it.
FIOURE il.i: THE OPTIMAL TRADE OFF
BETWEEN A SYSTEMATIC (COBWEB) ERROR AND
A FORECAST ERROR.
<-:**
Figure 11.2 shows what happens when the ability to forecast increases
(i.e. o^,j decreases). (11.15) shifts to the left, since for a certain value
of o^, students make more use of their (improved) forecast. Initially
this leads to shift « from the use of the myopic expectation to the use of
the forecast. But due to this the error of the current wage as proxy of
the future wage (o^) decreases. To reestablish the equilibrium,
students again use the current wage to a greater extent (shift 6).156 7/
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Figure 11.2 shows what happens when the ability to forecast increases
(i.e. o^pj decreases). (11.15) shifts to the left, since for a certain value
of o^ students make more use of their (improved) forecast. Initially
this leads to shift a from the use of the myopic expectation to the use of
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destabilising effect of the use of the current wage as a proxy for the
future wage decreases, given the extent to which it is used (A,j) (shift
a). Again the decrease of o^y is compensated by the fact that students
use the myopic forecast to a larger extent (shift 6). In the new
equilibrium the use of the current wage is larger than initially, but also
the systematic error (o^,,) decreases.
FIOURE 11.4: CHANGES IN THE OPTIMAL TRADE OFF
CAUSED BY INCREASES IN THE ABILITY TO CORRECT THE
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Finally, in figure 11.4 the assumption that the current equilibrium is
unpredictable (o«^;=~. *, = 1) is released. The picture allows for the
feet that students are able to correct the current wage for its
disequilibrium character, to some extent. If students are more able to
correct for disequilibrium situations (11.16) also depends on A, (see
equation (11.14)):
(11.17) o77ie Cbfcvwfft 77i«wrm 159
and this function becomes less steep if o^; decreases. Therefore, the
market stabilises and students make more use of current wage as
indicator of future wage.
The model introduced in this chapter gives an interpretation of the
cobweb theory developed in the thirties by economists like Tinbergen
and Schultz. An attempt has been made to illustrate the dilemma which
characterises their expectations theory. On the one hand, inspired by
Walras and Pareto, wages were seen as indicators of value and people
were assumed to use this information and to 'take prices given'. On the
other hand, these equilibrium wages could (in a dynamic context) only
be the result of people's economic behaviour. The model in this chapter
shows that it is possible to give 'myopic' expectations a rational or
reasonable interpretation. The cobweb-expectations which are biased
may be preferred by people since this systematic error may be smaller
than the unsystematic error of the alternative, an expectation which is
not biased. This naive behaviour has, however, a feed back influence
upon the quality of the current wage as forecast of the future wage what
limits its possible use.
77.5 Conc/u^/OAis
The cobweb model is typified by its cycle. In chapter 9 cobweb
behaviour was explained, but its dynamic character was left out of the
analysis. If people use the current wage a an abstract forecast for the
future wage, there may occur an endogenous relationships. The quality
of the prediction determines how far the wage will be out of
equilibrium, while a wage out of equilibrium may decrease the quality
of the forecast based on it.
In this chapter these endogenous relationships are investigated. It is
shown that an equilibrium variability of the market will come about,
which consists of the variability of the equilibrium wage plus an
additional component determined by the prediction errors. Comparative
statics show the relationship between the variability and predictability of
the wage and the endogenous market fluctuations.12 THE MARKET FOR PRIMARY SCHOOL
TEACHERS
In the Netherlands one of the most famous examples of vocational
training which has to contend alternately with shortages and surpluses is
the school for primary school teachers. While recently there was a large
surplus, at present the Forecast Committee for Primary Education
predicts shortages in the near future.' Mostly, these mismatches are
explained by certain incidents, such as changes in payment, an
educational reorganisation or e.g. the introduction of mathematics as an
entry-requirement. Furthermore, the problems on this market are often
explained by the cobweb phenomenon. These explanations have,
however, never been systematically investigated.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the market for primary school
teachers and to estimate to what extent several sources of uncertainty
contribute to the mismatch problem, based on the theoretical model of
chapter 9. As mentioned before, two types of models are used in
literature to explain markets for certain occupations: the cobweb model
and the rational expectations model. Sections 12.1 and 12.2 will provide
an overview of the implications of these theories with respect to the
market for teachers. Both theories provide a completely opposite
characterisation of this market. While from the point of view of the
cobweb theory the market for teachers is expected to be very
problematic, from a rational expectations point of view it is expected to
function rather well. Both theories, as remarked in chapter 9, fail to
take into account one particular factor which seems to be crucial in
anticipating behaviour. This is the capability to forecast. In section 12.3
the model of section 9.4 on the trade off between variability and
predictability is considered as a framework to explain the Dutch market
for primary school teachers. The basic assumption is that the future
labour market situation ideally is predictable but that students' limited
capabilities to make adequate forecasts cause deviations from the
equilibrium.
In section 12.4 the market for primary school teachers will be
introduced by providing some general statistics with respect to the
theory of section 12.3. In sections 12.5 and 12.6 two models will be
estimated which explain the enrolment at the teacher colleges. The
estimation is based on the results of section 10.3. In the first model,
policy behaviour is treated exogenous while in the second model policy
is seen as, partially, endogenous. For both models the consequences of
1 Commissie Prognose Primair Onderwijs (1989).162
these estimates with respect to the causes of mismatches are calculated.
It turns out that replacement demand and policy influences upon demand
are indeed difficult to forecast for students. Demographic changes, on
the other hand, are more easily forecast. Finally, section 12.7 will
provide some policy implications.
72.7 Cofrwfc 77««>ry
The mismatches, frequently observed on the Dutch market for teachers,
seem to fit very well into the cobweb model. The extent of the cobweb
phenomenon depends on some characteristics of the labour market
segment involved. Factors which, in the cobweb model, are positively
influencing the mismatches are:
- the length of the curriculum,
- a low potential mobility to other occupations,
- an inelastic demand, and
- a strong reaction of students to the labour market situation.
The Dutch market for teachers shows at least three of these four
characteristics. Firstly, the curriculum takes four years. Secondly, a
qualification from the teachers' training college does not provide many
job opportunities outside the teacher market. De Grip, Heijke, and
Dekker (1989) measure the flexibility of educational groups with respect
to occupation, by using the Gini-Hirschman-index.* The group to which
primary school teachers belong have a flexibility 0.37 at a scale between
0 (no flexibility) and 1 (total flexibility). This result is very low. Only
four out of the 53 educational groups show less flexibility. Thirdly, the
demand for teachers is rather inelastic since demand is determined by
policy decisions and not by free market forces.
For these reasons the market for primary school teachers is a typical
example of a market on which, due to low mobility opportunities, the
responsiveness to changing market connditions is relatively high, while
the responsiveness of demand is low due to its institutional character
(Pj/(-Pp) is large). In such a case the cobweb theory predicts that
disturbances are preserved for a long time, and that the cobweb cycle
might even diverge.
The Gini-Hirschman-index is defined as Gtf - (l-I^)-^- (« is the number of
occupations) in which /», is the fraction of students with a certain education who have a
certain occupation i. If people with this education are spread uniform over the occupations
(j>, - - for every i) the index equals I. If all people with this education are concentrated
in one occupation the index becomes 0.Primary 5r/ioo/ 7nicAm 163
72.2 /toriona/ Exp^ctar/ons 77ieory
A completely different vision with respect to the market for teachers is
provided by the rational expectations theory. In contrast with the
assumptions of the cobweb theory, f.g. Siow (1984) and Zarkin (1983,
1985) suggest that students base their choice between different courses
on rational expectations about the future labour market, and therefore
the only reason which explains a mismatch between supply and demand
is a change which was totally unpredictable at the moment the choice
was made.
For a characterisation of the market for teachers this change in view has
enormous consequences. In a cobweb model the market for teachers is a
prototype of a market with mismatch problems, due to the length of the
curriculum, the low potential mobility and the inelastic demand. The
rational expectations theory claims, on the other hand, that there will be
large matching problems only if the future labour market is largely
unpredictable. But as Zarkin (1985, p. 410) states about the market for
teachers, 'this market has an obvious special feature. The primary
driving variable is the number of children enroled in school, which is
essentially deterministic once people are born. This feature makes the
task of forecasting future demand conditions much easier.' According to
Zarkin the market for teachers must be one of the best predictable
markets, since the number of children determines the demand for
teachers. Therefore, from a rational expectations point of view, one
may expect few mismatch problems with respect to teachers.
This conclusion seems to contradict the Dutch experience that the
market for teachers often shows quite large mismatches. This
observation either indicates that rational expectations theory does not
provide a good explanation for educational choices, or that the
presumption that the future market for teachers is largely predictable
does not hold. Furthermore, the empirical justification of the rational
expectations hypothesis in the theory of educational choice is difficult.
Zarkin (1983) tries to compare the cobweb model with his rational
expectations model, but does not provide a real test between both
hypotheses. On the other hand, he observes 'that perhaps the most
striking feature is that overall the cobweb model fits the data about as
well as the forward looking, i.e. rational expectations model' (p. 91).
72.5 /V«//cfaW///y and VariaW///y
In the case of the market for teachers, two different theoretical points of
view lead to very opposite characterisations. The cobweb theory164 Diaper /2
predicts the market for teachers to be sensitive to mismatch problems,
while rational expectation theory predicts few problems. The Dutch
experience would therefore suggest the cobweb model to be the most
appropriate.
As mentioned in chapter 9, there is, however, besides the testing
problems, a theoretical problem with this cobweb explanation. If it is
concluded that the market is cobweb-like, this does not explain w/ry it is
cobweb-like. In fact, cobweb theory assumes that independently of the
situation of the market, students do not anticipate future changes. But in
a market with many matching problems it is hard to believe students do
not take these problems into account. If the cobweb theory is right, the
most appropriate policy would be to inform students about the danger to
base their decisions on the present labour market situation and to tell
them they should anticipate the future. If this is the only thing needed to
overcome the mismatch problems, one could wonder why it had not
already happened.
It is clear that the situation is much more complicated. Not only the
notion that one has to anticipate the future labour market, but also the
ability to do this is a relevant factor. Agents' impotence to calculate the
rational expectation is one of the major points of criticism of the
rational expectations hypothesis (e.g. Spear, 1989). In fact Zarkin
(1985, p. 440) indicates the problem with rational expectations by the
statement: 'This market has the special feature that future demand
conditions can be readily forecast.' This is, from a rational expectations
point of view, no argument to expect proper anticipations. The rational
expectations argument for few mismatch problems would be the special
feature that future demand conditions can be /arge/>> forecast. The
dictionary defines 'readily' as 'without difficulty', which is not an
argument in the rational expectations thought. Rational expectations
theory only distinguishes between a predictable and an unpredictable
part. The prediction is accurate if the predictable part is relatively large
('largely' is defined as 'to a great or preponderating extent').
In this chapter the Dutch market for primary school teachers is
investigated, based on the model of section 9.4. The assumption is made
that the future labour market situation is predictable (/.e. there is no
states of the world uncertainty), but that students' capability to make
forecasts limits the quality of the prediction. This model will put new
light on the contradiction between cobweb and rational expectations at
the market for teachers.Primary Sdwo/ 7WJC7IWJ 165
72.4 77ie A/ar&er For Fnmory Sc/100/ 7eac/iers
In this section the Dutch market for primary school teachers will be
investigated within the framework of the model of chapter 9. Students'
decision to go to a teacher training depends on their predictions about
the future labour market situation. Over the years teacher training in the
Netherlands has passed through several changes. Until 1967 the regular
course took four years, but there were possibilities to enter the program
after the first or second year for students with a higher preliminary
education. The extent to which these side-entrances were used changed
slowly throughout the years. Furthermore, it was possible to extend the
study with an additional fifth year, to get an additional qualification. In
the empirical analysis only the students who followed the entire
program (four years) are taken into account. Furthermore, the
assumption is made that all students intend to leave the school after four
years. In 1968 the program became three years without further
possibilities for side-entrance or extension of the curriculum. Therefore,
the time-lag between the choice for the teacher training and the entrance
at the labour market has been set on three years from 1968 till 1983.
In fact, not only the situation of the market at the moment one enters
the market is important, but also the situation during the whole teaching
career. Since the Dutch tenure system protects employed teachers
against teachers entering the market, this facet is not taken into account.
Therefore supply will depend on the prediction about the future labour
market rf (rf = 3,4) years in advance:
(12.1) C_, =/{*"<)
in which JC represents the relevant factors affecting students' choices,
such as wages, probability to get a job and working conditions. Because
on the one hand, not every student will enter the labour market (e.g.
school drop-outs) and on the other hand other students might enter, e.g.
those who followed a shorter program, the supply, rf years after the
choice is assumed to be a factor /4, of the enrolment. 4,
(12.2) 5 = — , ;
Since it is difficult to determine which factors are relevant, and since
there are no adequate data on possible factors, x is taken into account
only implicitly. As stated in the introduction of this chapter, JC will be
affected by the demand for teachers. By treating the demand for labour
as exogenous every D can be associated with a JC which clears the166 72
market (/.<?. S = D).
(12.3) x
A combination of (12.1) and (12.3) leads to
(12.4) C_, = /k^'"))
If expected demand is substituted by realised demand this equation
equals the market clearing condition 5 = D. Taking into account the
factor between enrolment and supply at the market (12.2) gives:
(12.5) C_, - ,4,D>"
In formula (12.11) the enrolment decision depends on the prediction of
the future demand for teachers. The demand for teachers is depicted in
figure 12.1.* In the statistics used as a source for these data,
replacement demand* has been distinguished from expansion demand.
Furthermore, it is possible to split up the expansion demand into a
demographic component and a policy component.
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The data used for estimation has heen taken from ftariwirt KM Art
/wr/i/ijfrn en ^r/nrfrn, Sfa/iiw* vu/i Art iKui'soiu/frwi/'j,- inimwm, doors/room fn ui/jmwm
von /too/Urn en oiu/rnvj/zm, and Srciritfi'rt van Aw frnvpto/kfrnrfyj/ op/cidin^McAo/M
wx>r Weu/fr/fWWfrj, /vJtjjfoyijcAr aoidfmiw and their predecessors of the Centraal
Bureau voor de Statistiek. For an extended description of the data see Borghans (1991a).
Replacement demand is defined as "the number of teachers needed to replace teachers who
left. |...] Replacement demand therefore refers to a. regarding its size, completely
constant teaching staff" ("d.i. het benodigd aantal leerkrachten ter vervanging van
vertrokkenen. l...| De vervangingsvraag heeft dus betrekking op een wat omvang betreft,
volkomen ranstant onderwijzerscorps'). CBS (1953), p. 5. From 1958 till 1971
replacement demand was not measured every year. In the estimates in the next two
sections these missing values have been replaced by interpolations.Primary Sc/ioo/ 167
The demographic component is constructed by imposing the
student/teacher ratio from year r upon the change in the number of
children at primary school between year / and year r+1. This figure
indicates the demand for teachers that would be created due to a growth
in the number of children under the assumption that the average clas
size does not change. The remaining part of the expansion demand is
called the policy component, because it is caused by (intended or
unintended) changes in student/teacher ratio. The changes may be
caused by explicit governmental decisions about the class size, but may
also occur due to the flexibility of the system which allows schools to
employ a number of teachers within certain limits. This kind of changes
is also classified in the policy component. Although the decision to
change the ratio between teachers and pupils in this case is not directly
taken by the government, they indirectly did so by allowing for a
certain flexibility of the system.
The demand for teachers can therefore be split up into:
(12.6) Z) = fop/+Dem+Po/
These data make it possible to calculate the variability of the three
components. To adjust for the changing scale the variability of the




In table 12.1 this variability is indicated for a period in the fifties, a
period in the seventies and the total period. In the fifties demographic
changes were the most important cause of variation. In the course of
time the importance of this cause has diminished considerably, while the
variability of the two other components, the replacement demand and
the policy component has grown. For the period as a whole the policy
component is the most important factor, with replacement demand very
close to it. The demographic component is much less important.
This is an important objection against Zarkin's hypothesis. The idea that
the demand for teachers is largely determined by these demographic168
changes is, at least for the Netherlands, not true. The two other
components, replacement and the policy component, appear to be much
more important.
The table does not provide a measure of the variability of supply. This
is the case because supply is modelled as a reaction to demand. But
there also may be changes in supply that change the equilibrium
situation. Firstly, the preferences of students may change. Secondly, it
is possible that some students anticipate the forecast errors of others.
Thirdly, due to mismatches a stock of unemployed teachers may exist,
which is large after years of excess supply and which is small if supply




















These three supply side factors are not taken into account, because there
is no data about them. For changes in preferences it can be argued that
they are not very important since they are very slow changes and in the
analyses only unexpected changes matter. Forecasts of other students'
forecast errors may also be seen as unrealistic. The stock of
unemployed teachers may, however, be a rather important factor at the
market for teachers. This might make the estimates less reliable but it
has no influence upon the assignment of the causes of mismatches to the
three components, since changes in the stock of unemployed are
ultimately caused by the unexpected changes in demand.
In the next section the expectation model of chapter 9, explaining the
enrolment of students at the teacher training is estimated. Indirectly, the
results provide information about the predictability of the several
components of demand. These components have been treated as
exogenous variables. It is, however, possible that policy changes are not
random, but are to some extent reactions to shortages and surpluses at
the market. The institutions will for example be flexible to a certain
5 For replacement demand the fifties measurement of the variability is based on the period
1951-1958 while for the demographic and policy component the period 1954-1961 has
been used. The seventies measure is based on the period 1971-1981.Primary SC/KX>/ frac/im 169
extent which might lead to an adjustment of the demand to the market
situation. In section 12.6 this is investigated: the policy component will
be viewed as endogenous. On the other hand, it is also possible that a
substantial part of replacement demand is, alternately, caused by policy
changes. New policies may make the job of a teacher less or more
attractive, resulting in a decrease or increase of the outflow of teachers.
An example of this is the introduction of early retirement. With the data
used in this paper it is, not possible to measure such links. Replacement
demand will therefore be treated as exogenous.
72.5 /fnro/mem w//A Exogenous A?/»'cy
The aim of this section is to explain, departing from this expectations
framework, students' enrolment at the teacher training. A combination
of the enrolment function (12.5) and the demand-function (12.6) gives:
(12.10) C_, = X,(/?ep/^ + Dem"" + PoP")




Furthermore, a specific form for /4j. has to be taken:
(12.14) ^, = O(, + a,f + O2^ with r = 1 in 1946
Since the forecast errors do not correlate with the realised demand, e.g.
/tep/,^, these realisations can be used as approximates for the
expectations of these realisations, as is shown in section 10.3.
It takes three or four years before wrong predictions are falsified by
realisations. Therefore errors might persist some years which cause
autocorrelation in the errors. Therefore an AR(1) error-term has been
added, indicated by a parameter p .
To adjust for changes in scale and to make the results comparable with
the variability measure of section 12.4, equation (12.10) is estimated by
least squares, with the observations weighted with total demand. The
results are shown in table 12.2.
Equation (9.17) gives the link between X, the variability and the
predictability. This can be rewritten as:170 /2
(12.15) o
exp TTT-
Therefore, the predictability of the components of the future demand
can be calculated. In the common literature, estimates of the
predictability largely depend on the forecasting rule that has been
adopted. In the approach followed here, the results depend on the
correctness of the enrolment function (equation (12.10)). In the next
section a slightly different model will give slightly different results.
Furthermore, the calculation of o may have a bias since it is a non-
linear function of X and CJ .












































Relatively speaking not only the variability of the demographicPrimary Jr/wo/ 7i"acVier.r 171
component is low, but also its predictability is very good. Replacement
demand and the policy component therefore not only are larger sources
of fluctuations on the market, but it is, for the students, also more
difficult to predict these changes. This result rejects Zarkin's (1985)
hypothesis that the demographic component is the only important factor
on the market for teachers.
It is remarkable that the policy component appears to be better
predictable than replacement demand. This result may be explained by
the endogenous character of policy changes. If policy reacts on supply
surpluses or shortages, there is a link between enrolment and policy
changes, but the causation is alternately. In the next section a model
will be examined in which this possibility is taken into account.
According to (9.19) the optimal prediction satisfies:
(12.16) <£, = Xo^,
FIGURE 12.2: THE SYSTEMATIC
ERROR.
FIGURE 12.3: THE SYSTEMATIC
ERROR IN THE REPLACEMENT
DEMAND.
•54 '60 •54 '60
FIGURE 12.4: THE SYSTEMATIC
ERROR IN THE DEMOGRAPHIC
COMPONENT.
FIGURE 12.5: THE SYSTEMATIC
ERROR IN THE POLICY COMPONENT.
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This is the variance of the prediction errors which remain after students
have adjusted their expectations because of inaccuracy. This variance of
the prediction error can also be written as
(12.17) <£, = A*o^*(l-X)*<4,
by using the calculation rules for the variance. Equation (12.23) shows
that the prediction error consists of a systematic part (X*o^) and an
unsystematic part ((1 - X)*o^p). The systematic part is a fraction of the
difference between demand at the moment the choice was made and the
moment of entering the labour market. Figure 12.2 gives the
realisations of this part of the prediction error. It provides the predicted
surpluses of students who enter the market for teachers yearly. Figure
12.3, 12.4 and 12.5 provide the same data with respect to replacement
demand, the demographic component and the policy component. It is
important to note that the total prediction error exceeds the error
illustrated. The graphs only provide this systematic component of the
error, which is only a X -fraction of the total variance. These figures are
denoted in table 12.4.
TABLE 12.4: THE PREDICTION ERROR AND THE SYSTEMATIC
COMPONENT.










The unsystematic part of the prediction error can not be measured
directly. Figure 12.6 provides data about the residuals of the estimation.
These may partly consist of these unsystematic errors, but also other
kinds of specification errors are included in these figures.
The extent to which the unsystematic part of the prediction error affects
these residuals depends on the correlation of this part of the prediction
error with individuals. If everyone makes the same errors, they will be
reflected completely in the residuals, but if the errors compensate each
other, this leads to a zero error on the aggregate level. In that case the
market is not influenced by this error. This does not mean that the error
has no consequences. Due to differences in the predictions, some
students become teachers who did not want to, while others do not
become teachers although they had wanted to, if they had known the7>ac7wrj 173
labour market situation. Although at aggregate level the match is
perfect, at individual level regret exists and therefore a disequilibrium
situation.




The model of section 12.5 is based on the assumption that the three
components of the demand for teachers are exogenous. Whether this
assumption is true for the policy component is highly doubtful. Firstly,
policy instruments may be used just to compensate for mismatches on
the market. In a situation of shortages the government may decide for
instance to increase the student/teacher ratio. Secondly, these
adjustments of the policy component of demand may occur not because
of an explicit policy decision but unintendedly, due to the flexibility of
the system. Governmental rules with respect to the number of teachers a
school is allowed to employ are not totally exact but may allow some
flexibility.
In this section the model is adjusted to make such policy reactions to
shortages and surpluses possible. Therefore the enrolment function
(12.10) is changed into:
(12.18) C_^ =/l,(Rep/^' + Dem"" + £x/'o/'"0
The difference with (12.10) is that supply does not anticipate the policy
component of demand anymore, but only its exogenous part £xPo/. The




The predictions for replacement demand and the demographic
component are unchanged. It is assumed that the exogenous changes in
the policy component of demand are totally unpredictable (o,^ = <»).
Therefore this term is excluded (A.,, = 1). Furthermore, because the
policy component is partly endogenous, it is not likely students will
treat the present policy component as a prior for future policy demand.
Therefore students' predictions consist of a mix between 0, i.e. no
future policy demand, and the present policy demand. The larger ^,
the more students expect present policy demand to be incidentally.






























Furthermore, it is possible to explain the policy component of demand
as a reaction to shortages or surpluses in supply. The model provides
two types of errors: the systematic error explained by the model and the
residuals e of the estimation. The systematic error is called £' and the
unsystematic error is called E*. By dividing them by i4, they become
comparable to the policy component of demand. .,_• ^ ,Primary Sc/ioo/ 7<rac**rj 175
(12.22) £'
(12.23) E* = —
The policy component of demand may depend on both these enrolment
errors.
(12.24) /»o/ = Conrtanf+ Y,E!rf + Y2^w
Table 12.5 provides the estimation results of equation (12.18), while
table 12.6 gives the results of the estimation of equation (12.24).
Table 12.5 shows that the estimates for the extent to which future
demand is anticipated decrease in this alternative model. Furthermore,
Up is almost 1 which implies that students expect policy to be
incidental. Table 12.7 provides the calculations of the predictability,

















Table 12.6 shows that the attempt to explain policy demand as a
function of surpluses and shortages is not very successful. The /?* is
very low and both parameters (y, and Y2) are not significantly different
from 0. ,j , „
The relative success of the model with endogenous policy is entirely due
to equation (12.18). This is not caused by the endogenous character of
the policy component of demand. It seems that the assumption that
students view demand as transitory is correct.
The finding that the demographic component of demand is the best
predictable component is confirmed. The predictability of replacement
demand is rather low.
Table 12.8 shows that despite the low predictability of the replacement
demand the variance of the prediction error is rather low. This is caused
by the possibility for students to use present replacement as an176 /2
approximation for future replacement. The variance of the prediction
therefore never exceeds the variability of the component that is
predicted.






















Figures 12.7-12.10 give the calculations for the systematic error (E,),
the unsystematic error (£,), the systematic part of the error in the
replacement demand and in the demographic component.







•54 "60 '70 '80
FIGURE 12.8: THE UNSYSTEMATIC
ERROR £*.
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FIGURE 12.9: SYSTEMATIC ERROR FIGURE 12.10: SYSTEMATIC ERROR
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72.7
This chapter departed from the observation that cobweb and rational
expectations theory, which are both used in research with respect to
students' enrolment, provide completely different predictions with
respect to the market for primary school teachers. The large mismatches
on the Dutch market for primary school teachers would, at first sight,
indicate the appropriateness of the cobweb model. However, this
cobweb model does not explain why students do not use better
predictions of the future labour market situation, from which they would
profit.
In this chapter an attempt has been made to explain this behaviour by
the use of the concepts of chapter 9, variability and predictability. In
rational expectations literature it is assumed that students dispose of the
correct model to predict the future labour market situation. In the
framework presented here this assumption has been abandoned, and it is
assumed that students have a model which is not perfect and which will
therefore generate a forecast error. If the predictability of this model is
rather low, it may become useful to exchange the specific prediction of
the model for the naive predictions of the cobweb model. Especially
when the variability of the market involved is low the current situation
is a good alternative for a bad prediction.
Both the model with exogenous policy (section 12.5) and the model with
endogenous policy (section 12.6) provide a similar typification of the
market for primary school teachers. The demographic component of the
demand has a relatively low variability, but also a high predictability.
Replacement demand and the policy component of demand have,
6 This section is based on Borghans (1991b). ' --- -178 Owprrr /2
however, a high variability and a low predictability.
Therefore, replacement demand and the policy component of demand
seem to be the most important causes of the mismatch problem, while
demographic changes seem to have little impact. The model provides
two strategies to combat the mismatch problems: a reduction of the
variability and an increase of the predictability of replacement demand
and policy changes.



































Based on the estimation results of section 12.5, table 12.9 gives the
effects on the prediction error for some imaginary scenarios. It has been
calculated how much the prediction error will diminish, caused by a
public labour market forecast. These effects are depicted in figure 9.3
for a theoretical situation. The quality of the forecast is in this example
10%, 20%, 50% and 80% better than those of the students themselves.
In brackets the relative improvements of the match between the relevant
component of supply and demand are provided. The figures show that
an improvement of the labour market forecast leads to reduction of
prediction errors which are relatively much lower. This is mainly the
case for the minor improvements of 10%. For the replacement demand
this leads to only a 0.8% improvement of the prediction error. This is
caused by the fact that, as indicated in table 12.2, with respect to
replacement demand students almost totally rely on the current situation
(A. = 0.93). The variability is very small compared to errors in the real
forecast. Therefore, an improvement of the labour market forecast
initially has only a small effect. Only if the quality of the forecast
becomes comparable to the variability, the effect on the prediction error7>actors 179
becomes substantial. This can also be shown by the fact that a decrease
of the forecast error has, even absolutely, a larger effect upon the
demographic component, which is much better predictable.




























As indicated in section 9.7, in a situation in which students base their
predictions largely on the current labour market situation (i.e. in a
cobweb situation) a substantial improvement of the labour market
forecast is necessary to induce a significant improvement of the match
between education and labour market. To halve the prediction error due
to replacement demand an improvement of 93.5% of the forecast is
needed.
In general, it is not possible to change the variability instead of the
predictability. In the case of the policy component of the expansion
demand this is, however, possible. Government could try to maintain
policies which have consequences for the demand for teachers as long
as possible, or could introduce changes gradually. Table 12.10
compares the effects of a decrease of the variability of the policy
component with an improvement of the predictability. Since also for the
policy component students base their predictions mainly on the current
situation (X = 0.85) such a reduction of the variability immediately
affects the prediction error, while the effect of an improved forecast
initially only has a marginal effect. At least for small changes it seems
to be the case that a reduction of policy changes has much more effect
than an improved labour market forecast.
The other instrument to reduce mismatch problems, therefore, seems180
more appropriate. For replacement demand it may be possible to
improve the quality of expectations by supporting students with
professional forecasts of future replacement demand, based on detailed
information about the age structure of the current teaching staff. The
predictability of policy changes will not be improved by econometric
investigations. For these policy changes, the only appropriate solution to
increase the predictability and thereby to decrease the mismatches, may
be to announce these changes at an early stage. In order to correctly
anticipate, students should know these changes before they decide to
enter teacher training.
72.8 Conc/uWonj
The market for primary school teachers is an interesting case for this
study. On the Dutch market there are large mismatch problems, which
can be easily explained by the cobweb theory: the training is very job
epor-ifin and Hamund io vary infloxiblb. Zaikin (1903, 1905), IIOWCVCI,
mentions the market for teachers as an example in which few problems
are to be expected. He argues that the demand for teachers will be
largely determined by the demographic component (the number of
children of a certain age) which is easily predictable.
The analysis of this chapter indicates that students have problems in
predicting the future demand, but these problems are largely due to
replacement demand and changes in public policy, while the
demographic component both has a low variability and is easily
predictable.
The results suggest that it would be important to provide better public
forecasts about the replacement demand, and that it might be useful to
reduce the amount of policy changes with respect to the demand for
teachers. If a change is needed, mismatch problems could be avoided by
an early announcement of this change.WELFARE13 THE MEASUREMENT OF WELFARE
In the second part of this study, the errors students make in forecasting
the future labour market situation were explicitly related to their ability
to forecast. In this model the mismatch, which is caused by these errors
in predictions, can be diminished by the provision of public labour
market forecasts. The idea behind this is that professional forecasters
are better able to forecast the developments on the market. Their
prediction errors therefore will be smaller. If students use these expert
predictions they can improve their own predictions which will lead to a
decrease in mismatch.
The evidence in chapter 4 shows that the extent of the mismatch
problem due to educational choices is rather large, suggesting the
desirability of such public forecasts. The analytical results of the second
part are, however, mainly restricted to individual students, while
providing public labour market information at a large scale influences
the functioning of the labour market as a whole. Public information will
change students' behaviour which also has consequences at aggregate
level. The positive effects at individual level may be accompanied by
negative effects on the market level. To evaluate the welfare effects of
the provision of public forecasts it is therefore necessary to compare
individual welfare changes. This third part is devoted to such welfare
analysis, based on the surplus concept. In this chapter, the measurement
of welfare and the use of partial equilibrium models are discussed. The
other chapters are devoted to the welfare effects in the labour market
model of chapter 3.
In section 8.4 about the junior secondary technical education a kind of
welfare calculation was presented based on the calculation of the
number of mismatches. Although this figure gives an interesting
description of the matching problems at the vocational market studied in
chapter 8, this indicator has, as remarked, several disadvantages.
Firstly, all mismatches are treated equally severe. There will, however,
be students who have ex pos/ a very small preference for the education
which they have not chosen, but there may also be students for which
this gap is rather large. A more adequate measure should therefore take
these differences into account. Secondly, in section 8.4 the mismatch is
compared to the realised labour market situation, which is in general not
equal to the equilibrium. The provision of public labour market
information changes students' behaviour and thus also changes the
market realisations. In the ideal situation these realisations equal the
equilibrium. It would therefore be better to compare the actual situation
to the equilibrium situation. Thirdly, as already mentioned, the
provision of additional information influences the labour market, which186 Oiopff r / J
has, besides the allocational aspects, welfare implications for both sides
of the market. Shifts in the wages due to changes in aggregate
enrolment have welfare consequences for both supply and demand side
of the market.
To overcome these shortcomings the surplus measure is used. This
chapter will discuss the use of this measure. The use of surplus for
welfare measurement has been criticised very much, and there are many
confusions with respect to this. Samuelson (1990) overviews all these
criticisms against surplus measures. These criticisms and confusions are
related to two aspects of the criterion. Firstly, the use of partial instead
of general equilibrium models as point of reference has been attacked
often. In section 13.1 and 13.2 the general equilibrium model and the
partial equilibrium model are discussed, and the relevance of the usage
of the second is set down in section 13.3 and 13.4. Secondly, the use of
the surplus area as a measure for welfare is often refuted. In section
13.5 it is shown which problems are related to this index, but it is also
shown that as long as one takes into account its limitations the surplus
may, especially in the context of this study, be a very fruitful
instrument for the analysis.
75.7 Gfrtera/ £<7ut7/l>r/u/n
Samuelson (1990, p. 266) stresses the 'theoretical superiority of
equilibrium over pflr//Vj/ equilibrium'. In this section, general
equilibrium models and in the next section partial equilibrium models
are discussed, and it is shown that the usefulness of both models
depends on the problem which is investigated.
In a general equilibrium model a certain number of goods is
distinguished. The initial endowments, the production possibilities, and
the individual preferences constitute the context of the model.
Furthermore, some assumptions are added about the way people
exchange their endowments. If for simplicity the assumption is made
that every good is only exchanged for money, then for every good a
market institution has to be described which explains the outcome of the
exchange process, and thereby the production, on every market. For all
circumstances these market institutions describe the exchange of
endowments of a certain good, with the accompanying exchange of
money. Although at every single market only one good is exchanged for
money, the exchange process may of course be influenced by the results
and possibilities on other markets. The existence proof in a general
equilibrium model shows under which conditions the whole system of
interdependent markets has a solution (/.<». a fixed point). In the usualW/are 187
model the exchange outcome is assumed to be generated by price taking
agents. This assumption is, however, not essential for general
equilibrium analysis.
The strength of general equilibrium is that it takes into account that
results for one market depend on the functioning of the economy as a
whole. This advantage, however, sometimes turns out to be its
weakness. While the interdependency of all markets is modelled in an
elegant way, the results on a particular market become sensitive for the
way other markets are modelled, and since it is impossible to build a
model in which everything is perfectly modelled it is questionable
whether simplifying assumptions about other markets provide an
advantage or a disadvantage. Mostly it is assumed that these other
markets have perfect competition, but it is evident that in reality many
other market institutions exist.
75.2 Parr/a/ E<7«i7/6/7wm /4/ia/y.sts
In studies in which the interdependency of markets does not play a
crucial role it may be useful to abstract from all other markets. This
results in a partial equilibrium model. A challenge to partial equilibrium
analysis is to carry out this abstraction in such a way that the results are
as much as possible consistent with the general equilibrium framework.
Such a consistent construction is often regarded as theoretically
impossible. It is indeed impossible to make one partial equilibrium
model which is consistent with general equilibrium in all possible
analysis, but the consistency may be obtained to a satisfactory degree if
the partial equilibrium model is constructed with regard to the specific
problem which has to be investigated.
A partial equilibrium model is usually constructed by the introduction of
a supply and demand curve. General equilibrium does however not
directly provide such curves which can be used in the partial model,
and this causes the problem in the definition of an adequate partial
model. In fact general equilibrium models provide (in case of
uniqueness of the equilibrium) only one single point in the price-
quantity space, namely the resulting equilibrium point after exchange.
To define a supply curve it is needed to fill in what would have been the
supply of the good under consideration if the price had been different
from the equilibrium price. But such deviation is, from the general
equilibrium point of view, logically impossible. As soon as the price on
one market is changed, the interdependency causes that the equilibrium
conditions on other markets are not satisfied anymore. Therefore some188 Oiop/rr /j
hypothetical deviations from the equilibrium have to be introduced in
the model.
To make such variations in the price on one market possible the system
itself has to change or some error has to be assumed to exist in the
behaviour of the agent. This error specifies the possibilities people
expect to have on the other markets, given the price on the market
under consideration. Such an error can result in the possibility that an
agent 'announces' his supply in a situation which is in fact impossible.
The remaining problem is that in order to operationalise a supply curve,
the structure of the 'error' has to be modelled. This implies that for an
exact derivation of a partial equilibrium model from a general
equilibrium model a full description has to be made of the way people
expect other markets to behave out of the equilibrium. The structure of
this error determines the meaning of the supply or demand curve. The
two best known concepts of supply and demand curve fill in this error
structure in some specific way. In the Marshalian demand curve people
expect constant prices on other markets and a constant income, while
the price at the market under consideration varies. In the Hicksian
demand curve people also expect the price on other markets to remain
constant, but also expect their utility to be constant. The specific
structure of the hypothetical error which people are assumed to make,
together with the price taking behaviour of the people on other markets,
makes it possible to define the supply and demand curve in a partial
equilibrium model.
Many problems related to the use of partial equilibrium models are
caused by the fact that the structure of the hypothetical error is not
appropriate for the problem under investigation. Assume e.g. two
occupations with a high degree of substitutability. In that case the
introduction of a supply curve for one of these occupations by the
assumption that while the wage for one job changes the other wage
remains constant is based on a very typical type of error, which will not
be useful for most practical purposes. A certain type of error might lead
to changes at all related markets. Therefore to each type of error a
supply or demand curve on every market corresponds.
75.5 77»e Swpp/y ami Df/nnnrf Curve
The model of chapter 3, which presented a model of the supply and
demand behaviour on a particular labour market, fits very naturally into
the concept of partial equilibrium described above. The possibility that
students make prediction errors generates a useful and obvious way to
introduce an error into the general equilibrium, which makes possible189
the definition of the partial supply curve. The demand curve of chapter
3 is not based on errors made by employers, but is generated by
changing circumstances. The prediction errors of students are the source
of a variation in the total supply and the demand curve gives for every
level of notional supply the resulting wage.
The supply curve (3.8) implicitly assumes (besides assumptions about
the distribution of the reservation wages) a certain specification of the
error made by students. The advantage of a partial equilibrium model is
that it is not necessary to make this error explicit. Such an explicit
description of the prediction error requires a theory about the way
students perceive the economic reality, and it will generally be
impossible to make such a description. The introduction of a supply
curve per .se makes it possible to allow for students making errors in
their predictions, without stating explicitly its source.
Theoretically, there could be a problem with the introduction of such a
supply curve which is not deduced from the general equilibrium model.
Supply curve (3.8) has one given form. The specification of a supply
curve based on a general equilibrium model may change, however, if
the source of the error changes. If the analysis allows for unspecified,
and therefore also possibly different errors, the uniqueness of the supply
curve is not guaranteed anymore. A necessary approximation
assumption to allow for the use of the partial equilibrium model is
therefore that all types of prediction errors under consideration generate
(approximately) the same supply curve. In the example of the model
with two completely substitutable occupations this assumption is violated
if it is sometimes thought that these wages will always move together,
while in the same analysis in other cases assumed that one wage will
remain constant while the other changes. The two supply curves
generated by these two types of errors are too different.
75.4 77K? ProWem o/Secern*
According to the definition of chapter 2, the labour market model is in
equilibrium if the students make a decision which is in accordance with
their decision in the case of full information. This implies that the
equilibrium equals the intersection of supply and demand curve. In a
general equilibrium context it is however not necessary that this partial
equilibrium situation is Pareto optimal.' Pareto optimality requires, as
can be easily shown, an equality of the marginal price with the marginal
1 See e.g. Ng (1983).190
utility or costs on all markets. This is called a first best situation. But as
soon as on some market this requirement is not fulfilled, i.e. if there is
a market distortion, the equality of marginal price and marginal costs at
other markets is — even given the distortion as constraint — no
guarantee anymore for Pareto optimality. This implies that, although on
the labour market under consideration the requirement for a first best
solution is fulfilled, it may be a Pareto improvement to deviate from this
equilibrium point, because of some market distortion on another market.
This is caused by the fact that the extent of market distortions are
generally not constant. If the good on the distorted market is a
complement for the good on the market under consideration, the welfare
costs of the distortion are positively correlated with the amount of trade
on the market in consideration. More trade, therefore has a negative
external effect on the distorted market, and therefore it may be a Pareto
improvement to increase the price in order to reduce the external effect,
at the cost of a (smaller) distortion on the own market. A calculation of
the optimal price which takes into account these external effects is called
a second best solution.- By the introduction of, e.g., taxes and
subsidies a situation can be created which optimises welfare given the
market distortion.'
Based on such tax system a corrected supply and demand curve can be
derived. The optimal (second best) situation equals the equilibrium point
of these new curves. In such situation the equality of marginal costs and
marginal price (after tax) remains the optimal point. If these taxes are
not introduced, the equalisation remains problematic, however.
Ng (1975) argues, however, that often the relation between the
distortion and the market under consideration is too vague, making it
impossible to calculate the second best solution. In such a case of
informational poverty it is optimal to make the marginal price equal to
the marginal costs. This is called a third best solution. A partial market
model provides no information about the relationship with other
markets. Therefore, the welfare analysis in a partial market model can
never go beyond such a third best solution. In this study, therefore, the
assumption is made that taxes and subsidies, or other market
interventions, are such that the (constrained) Pareto optimum is reached
if marginal costs or utility equal the marginal price, i.e. if supply equals
2 See Samuelson (1947).
3 See Little (1951). and Corlett and Hague (1953).77K- Mrajurrmtw of Wf(/Sw* 191
demand in figure 3.1.*
75.5 Swrp/ttf ay a
Figure 13.1 shows a supply and demand curve conform figure 3.1. In
this figure students' prediction of the wage (assumed to be equal for all
students) is too high. Therefore too many enter the market and the wage
falls. The welfare effect of this deviation from the equilibrium situation
can be measured by the surplus.'
FIGURE 13.1: STUDENTS' (NEGATIVE)
SURPLUS, DUE TO A HIGH PREDICTION OF
THE WAGE.
This surplus compares the welfare in the actual situation with a certain
benchmark. In this study the equilibrium has been chosen as a
benchmark. The benchmark should, of course, be feasible, and the
equilibrium is a feasible situation in which no information problems
occur, i.e. in which the cost of the information error is zero.
The (negative) surplus for students, compared to the equilibrium
situation consists of two parts. Firstly, since the realised wage fell due
to the large surplus, all students who enter the market earn less than the
Gunning and Keyzer (1993, p. 32) show that market distortions can, within the Negishi
general equilibrium format, he viewed upon as additional notional agents who aim at the
distortion. This implies that the welfare effects of the market distortion can be
distinguished from the functioning of other markets.
The concept stems from Dupuit and Marshall (see Pfouts, 1953).192 Oiap/cr /J
equilibrium wage. The total loss due to this factor equals the rectangle
area a. In this study this is called the stability component of the surplus.
Secondly, there are some students who regret their enrolment decision.
The wage for these students is lower than their reservation wage. The
surplus loss they face therefore equals the difference between their
reservation wage and the realised wage. Partly, this regret is caused by
the relative low wage. This effect has already been counted in a. The
remaining loss ft, therefore equals the difference between the reservation
wage and the equilibrium wage, for those whose reservation wage
exceeds the equilibrium wage. These are the students who regret their
decision, not only compared to the realised wage, but also compared to
the equilibrium wage. In this study this is called the allocation
component of the surplus. As remarked in section 13.2 there corresponds
a supply curve at each market to a certain type of error. The surplus
only measures the welfare costs at one market. Due to the
intcrdependency between markets, additional information about wage on
one market is also relevant information for the choice on other markets.
Therefore, there might be welfare changes on all markets, each
measured by the surplus on that market. In this study the analysis will,
however, be restricted to welfare effects on one particular market.
The use of this surplus concept has been criticised very often.' The two
main arguments against the surplus measure are, firstly, that it assumes
that the marginal utility of money is constant, and secondly, that it may
be the case that students are not indifferent between getting the surplus
paid in money, and a realisation of the equilibrium.
The first criticism is opposed by Harberger (1971, p. 788). 'The origin
of this criticism is probably the thought that changes in consumer
surplus ought directly to measure changes in utility. That this would be
a fruitless pursuit should be obvious — among other things consumer
surplus would not be invariant to monotonic transformations of the
utility function.' Just like national income surplus does not aim at
measuring 'utils'. Harberger shows that all criticism against surplus
calculation also holds for national income calculation, although the latter
is much more accepted.
Many attempts have been made to base welfare measures on
compensation or equivalence schemes. In such schemes it is £.g.
calculated how much a person is willing to pay, if a certain (positive)
change is carried out, such that his utility stays constant. There are
many ways to implement such a comparison. The critique on surplus
6 Samuelson (1990) gives an overview of the criticisms. ,;77v Mffljuremen/ o/ »W/cwf 193
measurement is that surplus can not be described as the answer to such
a comparison question. This is true, but the question is whether this is
problematic. The problem of compensations is that the transfer of
money changes the problem under consideration. While initially only
one disturbing factor is taken into account (in this case the wrong
predictions of students) the compensation scheme introduces another
disturbing factor, and the measures based on it add both welfare effects.
Therefore, every compensation scheme may lead to another welfare
measurement. The surplus measures a potential welfare change, under
the condition that these changes are not disturbed, /.*. they are not
compensated for these changes by side-payments. Therefore surplus is a
theoretical but natural way to measure welfare changes.^ For a small
gain in surplus it is always possible to reallocate money such that there
is a Pareto improvement. Since these realisations are not actually
carried out this property does not necessarily hold for all changes, but
in this study such pathological cases do not occur. In chapter 14 and IS
the welfare effects of the provision of information are investigated,
based on this surplus welfare measure.
Finally, a remark has to be made about risk aversion. In the following
chapters calculations are based on average welfare surpluses, based on
probability distributions. The equalisation of a welfare effect by means
of the distribution of welfare effects assumes risk neutrality, j.e. people
are indifferent between two stochastic outcomes if the averages are
equal, regardless the other aspects of the distribution. There are two
reasons to abstract from such risk aversion due to a concave utility
function. Firstly, it increases the value of information, and therefore the
results without risk aversion serve as a lower bound for the welfare
improvements due to the provision of public labour market information.
Secondly, some recent studies question the validity of the expected
utility framework as an explanation for risk aversion.* Their results
imply that the welfare effects due to the concavity of the utility function,
may be very low. Most observed 'risk aversion' may be caused by
other factors, of which mismatch possibilities, described in this study,
are one possible explanation.
7 See *.*. Allais (1949), Allais (1973), Burns (1973), and Willig (1976).
8 See e.g. Machina (1987).14 THE VALUE OF INFORMATION
In the model of chapter 7, prediction errors were modelled as random
variables. Since in this model uncertainty is not only caused by external
random shocks, but there is also uncertainty in the production of
forecasts, two forecasts based on the same data-information need not be
the same. A prediction made by a person who has better capabilities to
understand the functioning of the labour market may be an improvement
to the prediction of less capable persons. This makes it possible to
regard the provision of public labour market information as the
publication of such an expert-made forecast. Even if a public forecast is
not strictly better than the student's prediction, it may be useful, since it
may contain insights which are not incorporated in the student's
prediction. A combination of the public forecast with the student's
forecast incorporates all information available.
In their famous paper, Grunberg and Modigliani (1954) have shown the
possibility of a correct public forecast. Although a public forecast will
change the expectations of future events of human beings, and will
therefore change their actions, it still theoretically is possible to provide
a public forecast that does not falsify itself. Grunberg and Modigliani
base their existence proof on a fixed point argument, /.e. a correct
public forecast has to be based on those presumed actions which will be
chosen by the people, after they have received the public forecast. In
the model of chapter 3 this means that as a public forecaster predicts the
equilibrium wage, this prediction will not be self-denying.
The possibility of a correct public forecast does, however, not imply its
desirability. In a situation in which a public forecast is available, people
will react to this prediction which may influence their situation, but also
other people's situation. Grunberg and Modigliani give an example of a
situation in which the provision of a public forecast has such welfare
effects. 'In the absence of public prediction, suppliers were found to act
on the basis of unwarranted price expectations, so that they bring to the
market a quantity which either falls short of or exceeds what can be
sold at the expected price. Consequently, there is a misallocation of
resources. If the market price is higher than the expected price, not
enough resources have been allocated to this particular industry (and too
much to other industries) and conversely. If, on the other hand, correct
public prediction is made, suppliers will make their decisions on the
basis of warranted price expectations, and no misallocation of the
resources used in the industry occurs. By making available to the
suppliers relevant information previously unknown to them, the public
prediction causes an improved allocation of the resources used in the
economy' (p. 476).196
In the seventies and in the early eighties some studies appeared which
investigated these welfare effects of public price predictions by a cal-
culation of changes in consumer and producer surplus.' In most of this
literature the welfare effects of public predictions have been related to
the welfare effects of price stabilisation.^ Studies about the welfare
effects of price stabilisation' were based on the comparison between a
situation of no public intervention in which demand or supply fluctuate
in time and a situation in which the government intervenes, e.g. by
introducing a kind of buffer stock, in a way such that supply and
demand equal the long term equilibrium situation. Analogously, the
study of the welfare effect of a public prediction may be based on a
comparison between a situation in which supply or demand differ from
equilibrium due to prediction errors and a situation in which supply and
demand are 'constant' because of the availability of the correct public
forecast. Variation in time is replaced by probabilistic variation due to
forecast errors.
In the theory of price stabilisation new elements, like rational
expectations and futures markets, have come to the attention,* which
pushed away the theory based on surplus calculations. However, for a
study about the value of information of public labour market
information the surplus model is still useful. Firstly, as shown in
chapter 7 and 9, it doed not seem reasonable to presume rational
expectations in this context, since the reason for interest in public
predictions is the notion that students are not able to form predictions
that are sufficiently accurate. Students are no professionals in investment
decisions. Secondly, on the labour market there is no such thing as a
futures market.' Although labour is also not storable, and thus the
stabilisation model makes no sense on its own in the context of
educational choices, the link between the value of public predictions and
stabilisation policy remains (conceptually) valuable.
The aim of this chapter is to reconstruct the literature concerning the
value of public predictions, with a special focus on the labour market.
The existing literature on this subject is incomplete and contains some
errors, so a reconstruction of the ideas and a recalculation of the
1 See <•.£. Freebairn (1976), Turnovsky (1978), Freebairn and Withers (1979), and
Antonovitz and Roe (1986).
2 See rg. Smyth (1973), Turnovsky (1974), and Devletoglou (1961).
3 See r«. Waugh (1944), Oi (1961). Massel (1969), and Turnovsky (1978).
4 See rj. Turnovsky (1979), Campbell and Turnovsky (1985), and Weller and Yano
(1987).
5 Institutions like the internal labour market have a similar function, but they are not
relevant for full-time students.77if Va/ur of/n/onna/Zon 197
formulas might remove several misunderstandings. Based on the model
of chapter 3, the welfare costs are calculated, compared to a situation in
which government completely stabilises wages and provides exact
forecasts. The possibility for government to provide perfect information,
is left out of the discussion. The equilibrium only serves as a
hypothetical bench mark.
74.7 S/a£»7/.rari0n
The question whether government should stabilise prices has been a
point of contention for a long time. Advocates of stabilisation policy
stressed the fact that the market should be transparent in order to make
optimal allocation decisions possible. Prices that vary too much will
make many economic consequences very uncertain, and will cause
people to make the wrong decisions. Opponents stressed the importance
of free markets without any governmental intervention in order to get an
optimal allocation process. In 1944 Waugh wrote a remarkable article in
which he showed that consumers gained more from instable prices than
from stable prices. In 1961 Oi demonstrated that producers gain from
fluctuations in demand, and thus from price instability. Since high
prices and high demand coincide, producers will gain more from a rise
in prices than they lose in a situation of low demand and low prices.
A naive combination of Waugh's and Oi's results would lead to the
conclusion that both consumers and producers gain from price
instability. The incorrectness of this conclusion has been shown by
Massel (1969). Waugh and Oi do not take into account the same type of
price instability. While Waugh's price instability is caused by a
changing supply function, Oi's instability is caused by changes in the
demand function.
Massel takes into account both types of instability. Written in
accordance with the basic model of chapter 3, this basic model of a
partial equilibrium consists of the following equations:
(14.1) 5 = Cj + Xj+pjW .
(14.3) 5 = D
in which p^ * 0 , p^ < 0
Equation (14.1) is the supply function, which relates the supply of a
certain type of labour (5) to the wage (w). X^ is a random variable
with expectation 0 and variance o^, which denotes the changes in the
underlying utility functions that cause changes in the supply. Shifts in198 Owp/M- 74
the supply function are only allowed to be parallel. It is also possible to
allow for changes in the slope of the curve, but Massel (1969)' shows
that this does not lead to qualitative different conclusions, while it does
lead to more complex calculations. Equation (14.2) is the demand-
function for labour (D). It also contains a random part, X^,, with
expectation 0 and variance o^, which represents changes in the profit
function, caused by, e.g., changes in prices on other markets or by
technological innovation. The linearity of the supply and demand
function reflects an implicit assumption about the distribution of
preferences and production functions. This linearity is used to get
analytical results. In comparison with the model of chapter 3, in this
model supply and demand are 'solved' simultaneously, without the time-
lag for supply, and the model contains the random components X^ and
Xp. X^ and Xp are assumed to be independent.
Solving the model gives an equilibrium wage and an equilibrium amount
of labour:
(14.4) w" = <VXa-C,-X,
(14.5) 5" = D" =
and a random shift affects, compared to the situation in which
Xj = Xp = 0, the equilibrium wage and equilibrium amount of labour
as:
(14.6) Aw" = —-—Xn (14.7) Aw" = ~* X-
PP PP
(14.8) AS" = —^-Xp (14.9) AS" =
PP
Figure 14.1 shows the partial welfare effects of a shift in the demand
function, using the surplus values as a measure of the welfare effect.
Government may, by some imaginary kind of buffer stock policy
6 Massel (1969), note nr. 9. Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) dispute Massel's arguments. Non-
linearities and risk aversion might indeed influence the average wage or average utility,
but this effect, which does not occur in the linear case, has nothing to do with the
stabilisation and information issue that is the subject of this chapter. These effects of non-
linearities affect all suppliers and demanders on a market, not only the 'marginal' who
doubt whether they should enter or not. It is therefore more appropriate to separate these
income-effects from the concept "value of information'.7V 199
(imaginary, because labour can not be stored) keep the wages equal to
the normal level (/.«. the expected wage with X^ = X^ = 0). If the
wage is above the normal level, students will earn this higher wage, but
also more students will enter. If the wage is below the normal level
students will earn less, but also their number will decrease, making the
loss in case of a price fall less than the gain of an equal price raise.
Therefore the expected welfare effect of instability is positive. This
difference in expected welfare, compared to the stabilised situation is
called the welfare gain for students of demand instability:
(14.10)
FIGURE 14.1: WELFARE EFFECTS DUE TO AN UPWARD (a) AND A DOWNWARD







Welfare loss '" '
The part of the equation in which X^, appears in the first moment is
equal to zero, because its expectation is equal to zero. This welfare gain
7 Comparable 10 figure II in Massel (1969), p. 287.200
is positive, so a public stabilisation will have the inverse, and therefore
a negative effect on welfare. This is similar to the result of Oi (1961).
Similarly, the gains of an unstable supply function can be derived.
Figure 14.2 illustrates this welfare effect. If the supply function moves
to the right, students will, compared to the case in which the
government keeps wages equal to the long-term equilibrium, lose a part
of this equilibrium wage while many students enter the market.' In the
case of a shift to the left a small number of students gets a higher wage,
so unstability makes students worse off:
(14.
In expectation the welfare gain from fluctuations in the supply function
is negative.
Similar results can be derived for employers' welfare. Employers lose
welfare due to shifts in the demand curve, but gain from shifts in the
supply curve, which is the result of Waugh (1944). Adding up both
sources of instability gives the total welfare costs of price instability:'
, , (2PnP)Oc Oo >
(14.12) Wa(<£o£) = ^ ^ ' ^ ° < 0
2
(14.14) fVUoio;,) = -— — < 0
* * * 2(PP)
2 2
O(*On
Note that in these calculations the welfare is compared to the situation in which students
earn the average equilibrium wage, but in which their supply function remains constant,
i.?. the welfare in the case of r.£. supply function S' and wage w** is compared to the
case of supply function 5' and wage w'<! The buffer policy only affects the earnings and
not the preferences which determine the supply curve.




FIGURE 14.2: WELFARE EFFECTS DUE TO AN UPWARD (a) AND A DOWNWARD (fr)
SHIFT IN SUPPLY FOR STUDENTS.'"
a *
1 I Welfare gain
E§3 Welfare loss
Equation (14.15) gives the wage variance that is related to the two
sources of instability. While the welfare gains for students and
employers may be both positive or negative, depending on the ratio of
the two sources of instability and the parameters of the supply and
demand function, in total (equation (14.14)) there is always a welfare
loss due to instability. This completely agrees with Samuelson's (1972)
intuition who, without giving proper arguments, criticises Waugh
(1944), because of the impossibility of a Santa Claus. If instability
would be desirable, extra instability could be introduced, making
everyone better off. Samuelson stresses that somebody has to pay for
these gains.
This theory of the welfare effects of price stabilisation has not been
without critique. One of the main points against the theory is that if the
government is able to keep a buffer in order to stabilise the market,
entrepreneurs also are able to do so. Buffering, in fact is a technology
which makes it possible to transform a product in a certain year into the
10 Comparable to figure I in Massel (1969), p. 286.202
same product in another year. Since this transformation is profitable,
there is no need for the government to do so. The market system will,
by arbitrage, stabilise the market itself. If, on the other hand, it is not
possible to keep goods in buffer, as is the case with labour, this is
impossible for the government. Keeping wages constant becomes a
difficult and costly affair, of which the costs are not taken into account
in the model.
A second objection against the model is that it does not incorporate one
of the essential aspects which makes stabilising important. Stabilisation
has been seen as desirable, because it makes the market more
transparent. A stable price makes it more easy for people to predict the
prices, which enables them to allocate more accurately. This, in fact, is
an informational aspect, which does not appear in the model. The model
contains no predictions.
In accordance with these two points of critique the theory of price
stability has been extended with the study of futures markets." At
futures markets the relation between the price of a certain product in
different years is explicitly taken into account, and futures prices can be
seen as mechanisms to optimise the accuracy of price predictions. For
the study of the value of public information with regard to the relation
between educational choice and the labour market, the simple welfare
model has, however, not lost its appeal. Although labour is non-
storable, government may try to stabilise wages by the provision of
wage forecasts. On the labour market there is no such a thing as a
futures market, by which the need for information can be fulfilled.
Several studies have shown the link between public price stabilisation
and public price forecasts. Unfortunately, they contain some errors, are
incomplete or have not been expressed clearly. In next two sections the
welfare effects of public forecasts are reexamined.
74.2 77i<> VO/M? O/ /V«//crtons: 5/flft///5a//o« ond /4//ocario/i
Price instability in the last section is caused by stochastic changes in the
supply and demand function. Another cause of price instability is the
existence of forecast errors. In chapter 7 the stochastic character of
prediction errors has been investigated. In this section the labour market
model of chapter 3 is interpreted within the stabilisation framework.
Similar models can be found in Freebairn (1976), Turnovsky (1978) and
Freebairn and Withers (1979).
II See <>.*. Turnovsky (1979).77w 203
Prediction errors can be compared to the equilibrium wage, «'.«. the
wage that would prevail if no information problem occurred (if
prediction is equal to realisation), or to the realised wage. Here the first
approach is chosen.
Figure 14.3 shows what happens in case of a prediction error. In figure
14.3a the predicted wage is too high. Therefore, too many students
choose this particular course and after several years too many students
will enter this segment of the labour market. Since at this moment
students can not switch anymore, the short term supply function (5,) is
completely inelastic. The counterpart is illustrated in figure 14.36. The
prediction is too low, therefore too few students decide to enter, so the
short term supply function shifts to the left.
FIGURE 14.3: WELFARE EFFECTS FOR STUDENTS IN CASE OF AN OVERPREDICTION
(fl) AND UNDERPREDICT1ON (fc).
I | Welfare gain due to instability
^3 Welfare loss due to instability
[gggg Welfare loss due to allocation problems «•-, ;
Due to the prediction error the short term supply function fluctuates
around the equilibrium, analogous to the stability problem in the
previous section. There is, however, a difference between the stability
problem and the prediction error problem. In case of over-prediction,
some students enter the market who would not even have entered if they
had known they would receive the equilibrium wage. These students do
not only lose money because the wage decreased, but also because their
reservation wage is above the equilibrium wage. In case of under-
prediction, some students do not enter who would have entered if they
had known the equilibrium wage. These cases are indicated in the figure204
with a checked triangle. If the prediction error disappears, not only the
wage becomes equal to the equilibrium wage, but also some students
will make a better match which induces an extra gain besides the
stabilisation gain. Better predictions will thus provide welfare gains to
students, due to stabilisation effects and due to allocation effects. Using
the assumption that the prediction error Aw has a zero expectation and




FIGURE 14.4: WELFARE EFFECTS FOR EMPLOYERS IN CASE OF AN OVER-










I I Welfare gain
ES Welfare loss
From the employers' point of view this allocation argument plays no
role (figure 14.4). To them it does not matter whether a student enters
the market mistakenly or not. Furthermore, in the model employers do
not face any forecast problem. They can immediately adjust their
demand to the situation without any costs. So, from the employers'
point of view the situation is exactly the same as in the case of unstable7V Vo/ur <^//{/bniutfi(Ni 205
supply and demand functions:
(14.17) OJr.) = 0
74.5 //i/ormar/on verms /n/erpreftWi'on Forecast fmorr
In the previous section it has been shown that the welfare effect of a
forecast error can be split up into the welfare effect of stabilisation and
the allocation welfare effect. The allocation welfare effect has been
calculated, but the precise relation between the prediction error problem
and stabilisation problem has been omitted. In this section this stabilisat-
ion effect is fitted into the model of section 14.1. The nature of the
prediction error determines the exact relation between the prediction
error effect and the stabilisation welfare effect.
By incorporating stochastic elements in the model of chapter 3, the
prediction error problem can be modelled as:
(14.18) So = C,*X,+ PX"
(14.19) 5, = So
(14.20) D = Cj, + *0 + p,,w""
(14.21) S, = D
The supply function is split up into a long term supply function (14.18),
similar to (14.1), except for the fact that it depends on expected wage
rather than the wage itself. The subscript 0 indicates the fact that the
prediction has to be made before the market is cleared. (14.19) is the
short term supply function, which is actual at the moment of market-
clearance (moment 1). Short term supply is completely fixed. Students
made their choice some years in advance and do not have the possibility
to change to another market segment in the short term. Because the
prediction error problem focuses on information problems, X^ and X^
have a slightly different interpretation. In chapter 7 it is shown that if
agents have non-rational expectations their prediction error can be
divided into two parts. The first part of the prediction error, the
information error, is caused by the fact that students do not use all
relevant information. This may be the case because they do not possess
this information (which is the case in rational expectations) or because
they do not use it. The second part of the prediction error, the
interpretation error, consists of the errors made in the processing of the
information which is used. . ,i •206
Xj and Xp represent the shifts in the supply function and the demand
function which were not predicted by students, i.e. they represent the
information errors. Due to the well-known rational expectations
argument they have a zero expectation. If expectations are non-rational
students will also make an interpretation prediction error e, with
variance o*. This error can be interpreted as caused by incomplete
insight in the functioning of the market. The labour market is very
complex, and it is very likely students do not know 'the true model'.
Therefore they will make interpretation errors.'*
In the model of chapter 7 students have a whole range of expectations at
their disposal, ranging from abstract, with a large information error and
a small interpretation error, to very specific, with a small information
error, but a large interpretation error. Out of this range of possible
expectations students choose the optimal prediction. In this chapter this
choice is considered as given and therefore only one prediction (w*"),
i.<\ the optimal prediction is regarded. In section 14.5 it is investigated
how the welfare effects relate to possible changes in the optimal
combination of an abstract and a specific expectation.
The hypothetical rational expectation is the expectation in which no
interpretation errors are made, but in which the values X^ and X^, are
unknown. Formula (14.22) and (14.23) give the supply and demand
function determining the rational expectation wage:
(14.22) 5 = Cj + pX*
(14.23) D = <Vp>o"
The predicted wage equals this rational expectation plus the
interpretation error:
£ _£ X -X •
(14.24) *>'" = —^ *+e = w''+e = w*»-——-+e
The predicted wage equals the equilibrium wage minus the
unpredictable part (X^-X^)/(pj-Pp), together forming the rational
12 Most literature on this subject (<\£. Freebairn (1976), Turnovsky (1978), and Freebairn
and Withers (1979)) only recognises this interpretation error and does not include the
rational expectations type of prediction error. These two types of prediction error will,
however lead to completely different results.
Antonovitz and Roe (1986) use the rational expectations error, but they only take total
welfare into account and only provide empirical and no analytical results.o/fo/brmoft'cM 207
expectations prediction (H>Q') plus the interpretation error e.
If students use the wrong prediction of (14.24) the supply and demand
change into:
(14.25) 5, = <Wp>o"*
(14.26) D = ^•X^i*'"
In formula (14.25) 5, is completely fixed, /.«. it does not depend on the
wage (H>'~).
The supply and demand curve as a function of the rational expectation
prediction, makes clear that the prediction error model is, except for the
allocation effect, a variant of the stability model of section 14.1 with:
(14.27) Xf = X^P^e with o^ = o^ + pjoj
(14.28) X*" = *„ with o^ = o£
Three sources of prediction errors can be distinguished. Miscalculations
of the expected (ex a«/e) equilibrium wage (type I) and unpredictable
changes in the supply curve (type II) cause the welfare effects
comparable to the stabilisation effects caused by a shift in the supply
curve, while unpredictable changes in the demand curve cause effects
similar to welfare effects of fluctuations in the demand curve (type III
errors). Thus, type I errors consist of errors in interpretation, while
type II errors consist of information errors with regard to the supply of
labour (e.g. unexpected changes in students preferences), and type III
errors refer to information errors with regard to demand (e.g. unknown
changes in technology, new investments ere).
It is more convenient to interpret prediction errors due to differences in
the quantity as caused by predictions errors due to differences in the
wage. Formulas (14.29), (14.30), and (14.31) relate the variance of
supply or demand to the three types of prediction errors with respect to
wage.
(14.29) o^ = p^o?
(14.30) <4 = (P,?
(14.31) oL = (P208
The reformulation of the prediction error problem into the stabilisation
problem of section 14.1 makes it possible to use formulas
(14.12)-(14.14) on the welfare effect of price stabilisation. In the case
of interpretation errors (type I) this is straightforward. Table 14.1
presents the welfare costs of these interpretation errors.
















The prediction errors of type II and III are caused by unpredicted shifts
in the supply or demand curve. As shown in section 14.1 shifts in the
supply and demand curve cause, however, welfare effects even if they
are perfectly predicted. To get a proper valuation of the prediction error
a correction has to be made. Therefore, the welfare costs in the caseXj
or Xp were known in advance (H^,) due to the shift of the supply or
demand curve, are subtracted from the total welfare costs (W^). This
results in the stabilisation and the allocation component of the welfare
effect of the prediction error:
(14.32) »i-< :
Therefore the stabilisation effect e\g. for students of type II error
equals: ..::•_., *- .
13 Although they explicitly refer to stabilisation theory, Freebairn and Withers (1979)
mistakenly assume the redistribution effects of stabilisation to be zero. Therefore their
calculations are incorrect. In their formulas the welfare effect of prediction errors for








TABLE 14.2: WELFARE EFFECTS OF TYPE II ERRORS: INFORMATION FORECAST
















The welfare costs in the case of perfect foresight (wj,) are calculated by
use of (14.12). For the welfare costs with anticipating supply decisions
and therefore prediction errors (H^,), the same formula is used with the
short term supply parameter p^ = 0. o^ is converted into o^ by
(14.30): oj = (Pj-Po^oJ,. Similar calculations give the stabilisation
components for employers and for errors of type III. Table 14.2 and
14.3 present the welfare costs of prediction errors of the information
error types II and III.
The three sources of prediction errors do have the same consequences
for the total welfare, but have completely different consequences for the
distribution among students and employers of this welfare. Type I error
in which a students' prediction error is caused by a miscalculation or
misinterpretation, gives rise to a large welfare loss for the student (due
to both stabilisation and allocation effects), but is a gain for the210





















Type III error, which is the information error, caused by insufficient
data about the demand side, for students only leads to allocation welfare
losses, but leads to stabilisation costs for the employer. Students do not
have advantage in this case, like employers in the type I case, because
their short run supply elasticity equals zero. They are not able to react
to changes in the demand function e
Type I errors make students react more than optimal to labour market
changes, while in the case they do not have or use enough information
(type III) their reactions are damped. Changes in the labour market
situation are not noticed and therefore do not influence the behaviour.
Crucial for the distribution of the welfare effect is the correlation
between students' supply decision and the wage. For type III there is no
correlation since the supply decision is fixed, while the wages vary. For
type I errors there is some correlation, since wages fall as supply rises.
For type II errors, which is an information error with respect to supply,
the distribution effect is very unfavourable for students. In this case the
correlation between supply and wage is very high. Wages will fall due
to both the fact that supply itself rises and due to the fact that this fall is
not anticipated.
These results would imply that there is a great difference between
welfare effects due to an interpretation error, compared to the effects of
an information error. Employers as a group have an interest in a
reduction of the information error of the future labour market situation
with respect to demand, but have an opposite interest with respect to theTTif Va/ur <y/n/bnna/iofi 211
interpretation error. Students, on the other hand have an interest in both
types of information in order to gain from the allocation effect but for
the stabilisation effect they only have an interest in a reduction of the
interpretation error and in information about changes of the supply
curve. Information and interpretation, however, are related according to
chapter 7. In section 14.5 it was shown that the provision of public
labour market information has a rather complex influence upon the
welfare. The provision of information can be interpreted, according to
section 9.7, as a decrease of o Such a decrease of o^,, however,
not only affects the total prediction error, but also a shift from
information to interpretation errors may be introduced. Since
interpretation errors have worse welfare effects for students than
information errors, this leads to a complicated relation between
students' welfare and the provision of information.
74.4 7\vo £mp/rica/ Eramp/es
In the previous section formulas were derived that express the welfare
cost of prediction errors. Reversely, these costs express possible gains
from public forecasts. If government provides a public forecast that
reduces the prediction error of the students, there is a gain equal to the
difference between the cost with public forecast and without public
forecast. If the forecast is perfect this gain is equal to minus the welfare
effect in the situation without public forecast. Several welfare effects are
distinguished. A distinction can be made between interpretation forecast
errors (type I), information forecasts errors with respect to the supply
side (type II), and information forecast errors with respect to the
demand side (type III). Furthermore, the costs are split into stabilisation
effect and allocation effect and into students' part and employers' part.
In order to get an impression of the extent of the forecast error problem
and the relative importance of the distinguished parts, two empirical
examples are presented in this section. Freebairn and Withers (1979)
have used two studies of Freeman to calculate the welfare costs of
prediction errors. They have used data and econometric results from
Freeman (1975) about the market for US lawyers and Freeman (1971)
about the market for US engineers. Because the calculations of
Freebairn and Withers have a more restricted scope and contain some212
errors,'* their figures have been recalculated with the formulas of
section 14.3.
Freeman's estimations of supply and demand functions are based on the
cobweb model. In this model it is assumed that students expect that
future wages will be equal to the present wages.
Based on the cobweb assumption Freeman is able to estimate the
demand and supply parameters and the variance of the wage forecast
error (table 14.4«). These figures can be used to calculate the welfare
effects of these prediction errors. Although the estimated figures in fact
represent a specific type of error, it is interesting, for reason of
comparison, to calculate the welfare effects for all types of forecast
errors of the same extent. These results are presented in table 14.46-rf.
It should be stressed that these empirical results have to be interpreted
with care. Their construction is based upon strong assumptions about
the way students form their expectations. Especially the variance of the
prediction error may be influenced by this assumption. Therefore, the
relative magnitude of the several effects is more important than their
absolute values. As shown in table 4.6 estimates of the elasticity of
demand vary quite largely. Freeman's estimates are very large, and
therefore allocation effects are in his analysis more important than
stabilisation effects. In a market in which demand does not so easily
adjust itself to changes in supply, these stabilisation costs will be much
larger.
Freebairn and Withers calculate their welfare measure for a great deal
of hypothetical situations with respect to interest rate, experience
premium salary growth rate and distinguish a non-substitution and a
substitution case. The welfare effects of these different variants all
provide the same picture about the welfare effects of prediction errors.
Their differences can completely be explained by the different
assumptions." For that reason in table 14.4 only one case is reported.
It gives the welfare effects for engineers and lawyers, with respect to
their salaries of the first 10 years after graduation, under the assumption
14 Firstly, they only take type I errors into account. Secondly, as indicated in note nr 13,
their formula about the distribution of welfare between students and employers is
incorrect. These implausible results are masked, because the columns representing
employers and students' welfare have been exchanged.
15 Except for the difference between substitution and non-substitution. Freebairn and Withers
report higher welfare losses in the substitution case, while intuition would predict a
reverse result.7V o/M/rvrna/ion 213
that graduates are no substitutes for experienced workers, an interest
rate of 0, no experience premium.














































































































In case of a type I error (interpretation error) roughly 66% of students
costs are due to allocation effects. Employers have a small gain in case
of this type of forecast error. In case of a type II error (an information
error due to changing supply), this gain increases enormously, while
students face very large costs. For engineers these costs are more than
10% of their income, while for lawyers these costs are almost 5%. In
case of type III errors (an information error due to changing demand)
students do not face stabilisation costs and the gain for employers turns
into a loss. Allocation effects are the same for all types of errors.
74.5 77if /Vov/s/on o//«/omjo//o/i
As stated in section 9.7 the prediction used by students can be
interpreted as an optimal trade off between a specific forecast which
contains an interpretation error (o ), and an abstract forecast
containing an information error (o^,). If it is — due to the complexity
of the labour market — difficult to make an adequate forecast, the
optimal mix is close to the abstract forecast. The provision of public
labour market information can be interpreted as an improved
predictability, i.e. a decrease of o^. If the quality of the specific
expectation changes, the optimal mix between the two also changes.
Therefore, a decrease of o^, leads to both a change in the unsystematic
(interpretation) error, and to a change in the systematic (information)
error. These effects are provided by (9.23)-(9.25). The systematic error
always decreases due to the provision of information, but the
unsystematic error also may increase.
Information errors are, depending on the source of uncertainty, errors
of type II or III, while the interpretation error corresponds to an error
of type I. If public forecasts improve students' predictions a substitution
may occur from information to interpretation errors and therefore from
type II or III errors to type I errors.
Since the welfare effects of both types of errors are not equal, regarding
its distributional properties, this has implications for the value of
information for the two groups distinguished: students and employers.
In this section the results of section 9.7 about the effects of the
provision of information are related to the welfare calculations of this
chapter. Assuming that uncertainty is caused by changes in the demand









For a fixed variability and fixed elasticities of supply and demand these
formulas provide the relation between welfare and predictability. Figure
14.5 gives an example in which o^,, = 100, P^ = 3, and Pj, = -1.
The welfare of students, employers, and total welfare are at the vertical
axis. At the horizontal axis is the predictability. An improvement of the
predictability corresponds to a shift to the left of o . The figure has
two remarkable aspects. Firstly, the welfare of students does not always
increase if o^p decreases. For large values of the predictability (low
values of o^p) the marginal effect of public labour market is, for the
students, negative. Secondly, the welfare effect for employers becomes
positive (compared to full information) for low values of o^. Total
welfare, however, always increases as o^ decreases.
If public predictions are provided (in the case in which uncertainty is
due to changes in the demand) o^, decreases, which is advantageous
for students. The improvement of the predictability, however, also
causes a shift from a more abstract prediction to a more specific
prediction. Therefore, information errors are partly replaced by
interpretation errors. The welfare effect of these interpretation errors is,
for students, worse than the welfare effect of information errors. This is
so because in the case of information errors, students do not react to
signals of the market. Their enrolment behaviour is therefore relatively
stable. In the case of interpretation errors students do, however, react
incorrectly to these signals. Therefore their enrolment behaviour
becomes more fluctuative than the market conditions themselves. While
for information errors the realisation moves around the prediction (states
of the world uncertainty, section 7.2), for interpretation errors the
prediction moves around the realisation (errors in forecasts, section
7.3). For interpretation errors a correlation exists between the number
of students and the realised wage. If too many students enrol the wage
will be low, while if too few enrol the wage will be above equilibrium.216
The gain of the small number does not compensate the loss of the large
group. By becoming more responsive to future labour market situations,
students as a group become more vulnerable to these problems. This is,
however, only a matter of distribution. The total welfare always
improves due to public information. The loss of students therefore is
compensated by an extra gain for employers.
FIGURE 14.5: WELFARE EFFECT OF THE PROVISION OF LABOUR
MARKET INFORMATION.
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The problem of a negative marginal effect of the provision of
information upon students' welfare only occurs under specific
circumstances. The derivative of students' welfare with respect t
must be positive for certain values of the predictability:
(14.37) 0
This leads to the condition77lr Vo/ur qf/n/bmui/ion 217
(14.38) A > i
If this condition is fulfilled the marginal value of public information is,
for students, negative for large values of X, or o^,. The minimum is
reached if
(14.39) X = ^ + -j—^ or o*
uil!a
In the example in figure 14.5 this is the case if X = 7/12, and thus
o = 140. The welfare of students exceeds the level of welfare in the
case all errors are information errors (o^ = » or X = 1) not until
X = -Pp/(2p^). If uncertainty is caused by possible changes in supply
this inversion problem does not occur since the welfare costs of
information errors exceed the interpretation costs.
In table 4.6, in which elasticities are reported of studies which estimate
both a supply and a demand function, most results do not fulfil the
condition p^/(-p^) > V2. In these cases P^ is largely negative, making
impossible the inverse welfare effect for students. Hansen er a/ (1980)
and Huffman and Orazem (1983), however, report very low elasticity
values for -p^. The first estimates of Huffman and Orazem (1985)
imply Pj/(~Po) = 0.66. In this case the minimum welfare for students
is reached if o^p = 7.19o^, while the welfare of students compared to
a complete naive prediction (o^p = <») is better if o^p < 3.10o^.. The
values of the predictability for which problems may occur are rather
high, although in table 12.2 two of three estimates of the predictability
exceed the X = -p^/(2Pj) = 0.76 at which the welfare for students
equals the welfare of a completely naive prediction.
If students' prediction errors mainly consist of interpretation errors the
welfare of employers may become positive, compared to the situation of
full information. This is the case if X < 1/2, or oL> = o^. The
maximum welfare is reached if X = 1/4, or o^, = l/3o
It is difficult to see whether the negative effect on students' welfare due
to the provision of information is a robust result, i.e. whether it still
occurs if assumptions are slightly changed. As an example it shows,
however, that the provision of labour market information may have218
negative welfare effects for a specific group. In total the provision of
information is, however, always a gain.
74.6 Conc/wj/oAiy
In this chapter it is shown that the provision of public information has
welfare effects which are comparable to the effects of price stabilisation.
Besides these stabilisation effects, allocation effects have to be
distinguished, because prediction errors not only cause changes in the
wage, but also cause people to make educational choices which they
regret.
The distribution of the welfare costs of prediction errors heavily
depends on the type of prediction error made by students. Interpretation
errors are unfavourable to students compared to information errors with
respect to changes in demand (while information errors with respect to
changes in supply are the most unfavourable for them). In chapter 9 it
was shown, however, that the provision of public labour market
information causes a substitution from information errors to
interpretation errors. It might therefore be the case — for certain values
of the parameters of the model — that public information decreases
students' welfare. Total welfare will, however, always improve.
»**>'15 THE CASE OF DISPERSED PREDICTIONS
In chapter 14 the value of information was calculated based on a model
in which students make their educational choice with forecasts which
contain a certain prediction error. A simplification of this calculation,
which is implicit in much literature on expectations, is the assumption
that the predictions of the future labour market are equal for every
student. This assumption is made by all similar studies about the value
of public information.' All these papers relate the problem of forecast
errors to stabilisation theory. Their main argument is that if students
decrease their prediction error by use of a public forecast, the supply of
labour will become more stable and this leads to a welfare gain similar
to gains from stabilisation in studies like Massel (1969). Due to this
simplification there is no aggregation problem. Individual prediction
errors can be directly related to phenomena at aggregate level such as
the stability of the market. But more important, this assumption
excludes a negative aspect of public forecasts. The prediction error of
one individual student does not influence the market stability and an
overprediction of some students may compensate for the underprediction
of others. A prediction error in a public forecast is more dangerous. It
influences everybody in the same direction and may therefore destabilise
the market.
Under the assumption that students' predictions are dispersed a public
forecast has an additional effect of reducing the dispersion. Students'
predictions become more correlated and therefore may disturb the
market equilibrium more easily. The purpose of this chapter is to
calculate the effects of labour market information in a context of
dispersed predictions.
75.7 /In Ettwip/e w/7/i Dispersed /V«ftcrio/ts
Before starting the theoretical analysis of dispersed prediction in this
section an extreme example is given about the consequences the
introduction of dispersion might have. Consider the following special
case of the labour market model of chapter 3:
1 See «.jj. Hayami and Peterson (1972), Freebairn (1976), Bradford and Kelejian (1977),
Turnovsky (1978) and Antonovitz and Roe (1986) in another context, while Freebairn and





(15.3) 0 = 200 -w™
(15.4) D = S,
In this example with p^ = 1, C^ = 0, p^ = -1, and C^ = 200, the
equilibrium wage equals 100, and the equilibrium supply also equals
100.
Now, suppose that the students are divided up randomly into two
equally large groups I and II both forming their own prediction, with
w/"' = 140 and wjj" = 60. Since the probability to be in group I
equals the probability to be in group II, the expected forecast error
equals 0, conform requirement (7.5). Table 15.1 shows that the
oversupply of group I compensates the undersupply of group II.
Therefore, total supply equals the equilibrium supply.





























Now a public forecast (AO is published which has a better quality
(measured with an MS£ loss function) than the students' predictions.
Again the expected prediction error has to equal 0, therefore, it is
assumed that with probability 0.5 the public forecast is N = 120 and
with probability 0.5 the forecast is N = 80. Thus the probability that
the public forecaster overestimates the future wage equals the
probability that it underestimates this wage. If the assumption is made
that students completely adopt this public prediction, supply becomes
120 with a realised wage 80, or supply becomes 80 with a realised
wage 120. The public prediction therefore caused the total supply to
deviate from the equilibrium value. Such effects can only occur in case
of dispersed predictions. In this chapter it is shown, however, that these
results do not immediately imply that public predictions might have a
negative impact on the functioning of the labour market. Firstly, it is
argued that it is unlikely that students completely adopt the public
forecast. Since students will realise that also a public prediction is notDi^v««/ Prm/icri<w 221
perfect, it is optimal for them to combine their own prediction with the
public prediction. Secondly, table 15.1 only presents aggregate
consequences, while the provision of public labour market information
also influences individual welfare: In the case without public
information there are 20 students in group I who erroneously enter the
market, while in group II 20 students erroneously do not enter. The
public forecast reduces this allocation effect from 40 to 20.
75.2 Genera/ and /ru//vi</ua/ /Vw//cfionj
In the welfare calculations of the previous chapter the realised wage
depends on the equilibrium wage and on the predicted wage. The
prediction, however, does not need to be the same for every student.
Surveys indicate a considerable dispersion of students' expectations.*
Students will have different information relevant for predicting the
future situation, but most important, students will have different
interpretations on the information. Every student has his own 'theory'
of how the labour market develops. Therefore, their predictions are
dispersed. On the other hand, students may use similar insights, and
they will discuss their opinions, which leads to a correlation between
their prediction errors.
According to chapter 3 the individual predictions can be split up into a
general and an individual component.
(15.5) wf = G+/,
In this section the model of chapter 3 is extended with some
assumptions about the distribution of the predictions. For every
individual prediction it is assumed that:
(15.6) £{w/"'|w"} = w'«
This assumption implies that all errors made by the students are
interpretation errors. Since dispersion of predictions is likely to be
mainly caused by different interpretations and not by different sets of
information, the analysis in this chapter is mainly restricted to
interpretation errors. This restriction, furthermore, has the advantage
that it keeps the calculations manageable.
Furthermore the assumption is made that w'*-w"° is unpredictable for
students. Since predictions are not assumed to be equal for every
2 See e.g. Kodde (1985), pp. 55-56.222 Owpftr /5
student one student may be able to predict the prediction errors of
others. But it is assumed that students are not able to predict the
forecasts errors of others. This component of the prediction error,
which is equal for every student is an information error. Therefore,
their prediction of w'* in (15.6) can also be seen as a prediction of
For simplicity the assumption is made that every student predicts the
future wage with the same precision.
(15.7) VA/tfwHw"} = <V, Vi or
(15.8) VArtWHw'") = oj-, Vi
The assumption is made that the individual part of the prediction error
does not correlate with the general prediction error or with the
individual part of others:
(15.9) fiUJ/^G) =0 Vi #;
Consequently, because of (15.5) and (15.6),
(15.10) £{G|w'«} = w"
and by calling •- .
(15.11) VAJW/Jw"} = oj Vi %• -M-o
it follows that . ... >
(15.12) VAJ«G|w*} = Og = oj^-oj " ^ ; ; j; :
Finally, an additional labour market prediction Af exists, which is
independent of the individual components but which may be correlated
with the general prediction.
(15.13) £W|w'«} = w" with
with
(15.14) ^
(15.15) COVW,/,|w*} = 0
This additional prediction represents the information of the government
or an institution, published with the purpose to improve the match
between schooling and work.223
Table 15.2 summarises the covariances between the general prediction,
the predictions of two students (1 and 2) and the additional prediction.
TABLE 15.2: THE COVARIANCES BETWEEN THE













All moments defined above refer to the relation between the predictions
and the equilibrium or the realisation of the wage and indicate the
'prediction quality'. To indicate the j/afo7/ry o/" f/ie marfcef (o-, the
variance of the difference between equilibrium and realisation is used:
(15.16)
75.3
In chapter 14 the welfare effects of interpretation errors have been
calculated in the case that the prediction is equal for every student.
These welfare losses are not the only costs students face. Due to the
fact that predictions are dispersed some students will make a better
prediction than the general prediction while others make a worse
prediction. The costs of a worse prediction are not fully compensated by
the gain of a better prediction.
The individual prediction error is distributed in two ways. Firstly, there
is a distribution over the students such that for the aggregate enrolment
the individual prediction errors do not matter (see equation (3.9)).
Therefore the individual prediction error does not influence the
realisation of the wage. Secondly, the individual prediction errors are224 Oujpfer 75
the realisations of a stochastic variable, with a certain distribution (see
section 7.1). To calculate the expected welfare costs of the individual
prediction error (W$,(o,)) the costs of prediction errors have to be
integrated over all possible errors and over all individuals:
f f k>ss.(w,'",/.)dF//,)d/^/w/"). On the assumption that the
individual prediction error is independent of the reservation wage the
integrals can be exchanged, i.e.
(15.17) F*yo?) = //LO^K™,/) dF^(O dF/7)
Therefore, the welfare costs can be calculated as if every student makes
the same prediction error /, but such that the realised wage is not
affected by this prediction error. This is illustrated in figure 15.1.
These welfare costs equal the allocation part of students' welfare costs
of a general prediction error. Because an individual prediction error
does not influence the realised wage, the stability component does not
play a part in this calculation. For employers the individual dispersion
has no consequences. For them only the total supply is relevant, and it
does not matter to them whether students entered correctly or not. In
this model employers do not have to base their decision on expectations
since they do not face adjustment costs. Therefore they experience no
uncertainty, only fluctuations in the market wage.
To evaluate the effects of public information it is possible to use the
welfare costs of students, employers and the total welfare costs. Table
15.3 summarises these results of section 14.3 (table 14.1) and this
section. A student who has to decide which prediction he should use
will, however, not base his decision on welfare arguments of the group
he belongs to, but tries to maximise his own individual welfare.
Therefore, according to section 7.1, it seems appropriate to assume
students will minimise the A/SE of the prediction error itself, and not a
weighted sum of individual and general prediction error. Furthermore,225
the prediction error that is relevant for students is the prediction error
with respect to the realisation of the wage and not with respect to
equilibrium. One individual student has no influence upon the
realisations.
(15.18)
For convenience will be abbreviated by T Y>0.
FIGURE 15.1: STUDENTS' WELFARE IN CASE OF AN INDIVIDUAL PREDICTION
ERROR.
Finally, table 15.3 contains the stability of the market. In practice
public forecasts are mostly evaluated based on aggregate level.' They
do not take into account individual prediction errors, or the individual
mismatch. The stability of the market represents this market level
evaluation criterium.
3 See e.g. Becker and Dewulf (1990), and Dewulf (1991).226
The use of public information has two consequences, as mentioned in
the introduction. Firstly, it decreases the variance of the prediction error
of each student o^,,,. Secondly, it decreases the individual component
and increases the general component of the prediction error. Since only
the general prediction error influences the market both types of errors
can not be seen as equal. Both types of errors lead to different welfare
costs as shown in table 15.3. To choose an optimal use of the public
information it is necessary to balance the advantages of a decrease of
the prediction error and the disadvantages of a decrease of the
dispersion. The third column of table 15.3 gives, for students,
employers and the total, the relative welfare costs of general prediction
errors compared to individual prediction errors.
TABLE 15.3: AN OVERVIEW OF
ERRORS AND THE STABILITY OF THE
Welfare effects:
students


























The ratio between the importance of general and individual prediction
errors from the point of view of individual students, does not equal the
ratios of the three welfare measures. This indicates that there are some
external effects which the student does not take into account. Firstly, by
weighing up the consequences of individual and general predictionIf-
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errors students do not take into account the (very small) effects their
choice has upon other students. On aggregate level these small effects
are, however, substantial. This results in a transfer of (negative) welfare
from students to other students. Secondly, by minimising their
prediction error students also cause redistribution between themselves
and employers, since employers gain from prediction errors. Thirdly,
students will overvaluate the importance of general prediction errors,
because for individual students the difference between their prediction
and the realisation is important. They do not take into account that an
improvement of the prediction with respect to the equilibrium wage will
also lead to a decrease of the gap between equilibrium and realisation.
75.4 77ie Ifae q/" //i/bmwrion
Last section was addressed to the measurement of the costs of prediction
errors. An important conclusion is that individual students relatively
overestimate the importance of general prediction errors. In this section
it is derived to what extent students will use additional labour market
information in order to minimise their risk.
Departure of this calculation is the possibility for students to choose to
what extent they use the public information. Mostly, it is assumed that
students completely adopt the public prediction and give up their own
prediction.* This would be very unrealistic and inefficient. Unrealistic,
because it is hard to imagine students completely changing their mind
due to public information. In accordance with studies about expectation
formation public information will only partially influence students. Since
public forecasts will never be infallible it is also rational not to use
public information completely. The public forecast contains an error, so
other information, like students' own predictions, still has some value.
Providing public information may be seen as adding new elements into
students' discussion, which generates their expectations.
Students will, however, by deciding the extent of using of public
information not take into account the three external effects of their
decision upon the stability of the market (see section 15.3), since
individual students have no influence on the aggregate market situation.
As noticed in the previous section students will not avoid using public
information because this would cause destabilisation, but they use public
information to a less extent because it appears less reliable. The
4 Or alternatively, that some students completely adopt the public prediction, while othen
stick completely to their own prediction, f.g. because they did not receive the public
information (Turnovsky, 1978).228 auvwf/- /5
disadvantages of using public information have to be transformed into a
decrease of its quality (measured with respect to the realised wage)
before it will influence students' behaviour.
The provision of an additional labour market prediction, published by a
(governmental) forecasting bureau, gives students the possibility to
adjust their expectations about the labour market, on which they base
their decisions which school to attend. As said before, since also this
additional prediction is not perfect they can, comparable to the optimal
mix between abstract and specific expectations, form a new prediction
by mixing their prediction with the additional prediction. Indicating this
new, mixed, prediction with a circle (") this leads to:
(15.19) <" = A.u<f" + (l-A)W
Although the decision about this mix is made at an individual level, X
does not contain a subscript /. Since the variances of the prediction
errors are the same for every student all individual A,'s will be equal.
Therefore the subscript / can be omitted.
The variance of vv*" can again be split up in a general part and an
individual part (o^, o^), both depending on the mixing coefficient X
and the variances of G, /., and N. Students are, according to the results
of the last section, not interested in minimising the welfare costs of
o^. Individual students do want to minimise the MS£ of the prediction
error, as defined in last section. Minimising this prediction error is
equivalent to minimising the variance of the difference between the
prediction w/"' and the realised wage (not the equilibrium wage).
Students choose weight A. such that the resulting prediction error is
minimal. This A,, from a students point of view, is thus a function of
the prediction errors of the two initial sources, and of their covariance
with respect to the realised wage.
The variance of this difference between prediction and realisation
depends, however, on the extent to which the several sources of
information are used. If an information source is used to a greater
extent, its influence on the realised wage will be bigger and this will
influence the reliability of all sources, e.g. becauseDupr rarf fmft'cri<w 229
(15.20)
Similar calculations for oj and o^ lead to:
(13.21)
The implication of these formulas is that the usage of both /V and
w/** = G+7, affects the reliability of the predictions. Since students use
the predictions depending on their reliability, a simultaneous
dependency occurs between the reliability of N and G and its usage.
The decision to use the additional labour market information is taken at
an individual level. On this level the extent to which the additional
prediction is used does not affect its reliability, since the decision of
only one person does not have any effects on aggregate level. A student,
thus, does not take these effects into account as he optimises the extent
of usage. He will take the reliability of both his own prediction and the
additional prediction as given.
In formula (15.22) the prediction error that is minimised by the students
is calculated. Because a student takes the variances of the predictions as
given, he does not take the relation between the prediction qualities of
G and N and A. into account. The A. 's that are treated as constants by
the students have been indicated by a tilde (X). (15.22) will be
minimised with respect to X without tilde only.
(15.22) oj* = £((H','"'-w'~)i)
•X'o?
• ((1 - X) • (1 - X)t)*(o J - 0^) • (1 • t^o^, • X'oJ
Students minimise this equation under the assumption that
• X'oJ230 Oi^prer /5
(15.23) ^ = 0
dA
Correct minimisation of o^-, by use of the additional public information
would require taking this external effect into account:
(15.24) — = 1
dX
The first order condition for the minimum of the prediction error is:
ax
Solving for X gives the equilibrium X":
2 _
(15.26) r = °" °*°
dX,
Since \|F > 0 it follows immediately that students' A* (with — = 0) is
less or equal to the prediction error minimising A. (using — = 1).
Figure 15.2 shows the variance of the prediction error, depending on
the variance of the additional, public information according to the
optimal use by individual students, without considering the
destabilisation effect (— =0) and according to an optimisation in
dA j£
which the external effects are taken into account (— = 1). For
reference, the straight line indicates the prediction error in the case no
public information is provided. The figure shows that the prediction
error may exceed the prediction error in the case that additional public
information is not available. •
A certain value of o^ leads to a choice of X* which is smaller than the
prediction error minimising X, /'.e. aiming at a minimal prediction error
the public information is used to a 'too large' extent. For certain values
of the parameters a decrease of o^ leads to an increase of the
prediction error, until Ojy has reached a certain level at which the
quality of the public information compared to the general prediction
error without public information is high enough to cause the overusage
to improve the prediction error.DisprrxrJ Pm/icrio/u 231
FIGURE 15.2: THE PREDICTION ERROR DEPENDING ON THE
NCE O VARIANCE OF THE ADDITIONAL PREDICTION.'
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As noticed before, the stability of the market only depends on the
general prediction error, since only the general prediction error affects
the aggregated supply, and thereby the realised wage. The graph in
figure 15.2 depicts the total prediction error, which consists of both
individual and general prediction error. In figure 15.3 the general
prediction error is depicted. Multiplying this general prediction error by ——
gives the stability of the market. The straight line again provides a
reference for the prediction error in case of no public information.
For the stability of the market the inverse effect of a public prediction
will be even larger since it does not include o.. The individual
prediction error always decreases as the public prediction improves.
From this example it can be concluded that providing the additional
labour market information does not always make the market more
stable. Conditions for which additional information increases the
stability of the market are deduced later.
5 In numerical examples the following figures are used: .- ,, , >,«
oj - 300
<4 = 50 ••••••'.'•
<Vc = 30 '- , : ' •• -•' ^
P, = 2 ,.. .-• .,..;; v-•*••'••,.•
Po • "2/3 :.'• •:; „ ^.;.
so * = 3
The figures are chosen in such a way that effects of public information include all possible
negative aspects.232
Taking the partial derivatives of the equilibrium X* with respect
and o,,~ leads to:
(15.27) ax* ^ X*(l-X*) ^o
(15.28) ax* _ x*(2x*-i)
o., - owe
> 0 if X* > V2
$ o if r $ 'A
The implications of these formulas are obvious. An increase of the
variance of the public prediction decreases its use and an increase of the
covariance between the general prediction and the public prediction
makes the use of information more extreme, /.e. if own information was
used more than public, the use of public information further decreases,
while if public information was used to a greater extent its usage
increases. If the covariance increases the advantage of mixing the two
sources diminishes.
FIGURE 15.3: THE GENERAL PREDICTION ERROR, /.£. THE
STABILITY OF THE MARKET.
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75.5
After these calculations about the usage of additional labour market
information we come to the main question of this chapter: What are the
welfare effects of additional information? This question can be solved by
substituting the formula for the usage of additional information (15.26)
into the three cost functions of table 15.3.DiiyxTjrt/ /V««crfo« 233
Before solving these substitutions the reverse question will be answered:
If students do not minimise their cost function and if they do not take
external effects into account, what function do they minimise? This
question can be solved rather easily. In section 15.3 it is derived that
students minimise
(15.29) <£, = (XVJl
(equation (15.22)) with respect to X, under the (false) assumption that





This equation gives the derivatives of the prediction error from the point
of view of one individual student. At every value of A the equilibrium
condition A = A is imposed. Integrating this derivative gives a function
i4/ with the property that students behave as // they minimise this
equation:
(15.31) A/ =
A )o^+2Aj(l - A)O^Q) + A Oy + constant
+ constant - . .•<
This is, apart from a constant -Vfep^, the total cost function from a
welfare economic point of view (table 15.3). Thus, students behave as //
they minimise total costs, /.e. the sum of students' and employers'
costs, of the use of information. This is a remarkable result. Firstly,
students do not take into account the destabilising effect of their use of
public information. They base their decision on the usage of public
information on the observed quality of the two sources of information.
The quality of the sources itself is influenced by their usages.
Apparently, the observed quality of information (with respect to the
realisation, thus including the destabilisation effect) transforms the
information about the disadvantages of general prediction errors in such234 Chapter /5
a way that students choose a mix A.', which maximises total welfare.
Since the unpredictability of the gap between equilibrium wage and
realised wage influences both students and public prediction, this does
not influence students' decision. Furthermore, students do not take into
account the redistribution of welfare from themselves to other students
and to employers. Redistribution does, however, not influence total
welfare what may explain the result.
In general, this mix does not minimise other criteria which have been
distinguished before. In table 15.4 five criteria have been summed up:
(1) students' welfare, (2) employers' welfare, (3) total welfare, (4) the
prediction error, and (5) the stability of the market. The first column
gives the value of X for which these criteria are optimised. These X 's
are always ordered like:
(15.32) X* = X**"' * A*"* s X""' <;
This means that for the criteria of students' welfare, the prediction error
and the stability of the market the additional public information is
always used to a too great extent. For employers' welfare is optimised
if the prediction error is at its maximum. This means that their optimal
X*"* equals 0 if the public prediction is better than the students'
prediction, and X'""' = 1 otherwise. The second column of table 15.4
gives the intervals for X in which the value of the public additional
information is non-negative, compared with the situation in which no
additional information is used. The lower bounds of these intervals are
ordered the same way as the optimal X 's.
The third column of the table gives conditions for the value of
information to be positive, /.e. it gives conditions for the cases in which
the optimal X with respect to total welfare, which will be chosen, is in
this interval.
The implications of the results in table 15.4 are the following. Although
the mix of own predictions and public prediction is not optimal with
regard to students' welfare, for students this mix never results in a
negative value of information. An important condition for this result is
that the equilibrium mix is actually used. The results depend on the
assumption that students know the quality of their own prediction and
the public prediction. Therefore students need to have a correct
estimation of the prediction error of both sources of information. In the
next section this assumption is relaxed, by investigating the effects of an
overestimation of the reliability of the public prediction.Ouprrwrf />m/itt<oiu 23S
TABLE 15.4: OPTIMAL X, NON-NEGATIVE INTERVALS, AND CONDmONS FOR THB VALUB
OF INFORMATION TO BE NON-NEGATIVE.
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Conditions for increase of the stability of the market:'
(15.33)
O, < d++)(Oc
-* - . < ^
or
2
The value of information with respect to the total welfare will of course
also be positive, because this is what is actually optimised. Employers'
welfare, on the other hand, may be negative. This is the case in
situations in which additional information increases the stability of the
6 Proof in appendix 15.A.
7 The conditions for which additional information decreases the prediction error are
cumbersome and do not have an interesting interpretation. Therefore they have been
omitted. ;><•.? .•;.•;
8 Proof in appendix 15.B.236 75
market. This can be explained by the observation of table 14.1 that
employers' welfare increases as the instability of the market increases.
Formula (15.33) in table IS.4 gives the condition necessary and
sufficient for the market to become more stable as a result of additional
labour market information. This stabilisation is assured if (1) the
individual component of the prediction error is smaller than the general
component, or if (2) the additional information has a prediction error
below a certain level. If the public prediction error is smaller than the
general component this stability condition will be fulfilled.
In figure IS.4 the value of information depending on its variance is
depicted. The value of information is a relative concept. The straight
lines indicate the welfare costs in the case no public information is
provided. The value of information equals the difference between the
welfare costs after some public forecast is provided and the costs before
the provision. In fact the relation between the variance of the public
forecast and the costs is indirect. The variance influences A.*, the extent
of usage, and together with this A.' it influences the costs.
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In section 15.1 an example illustrated the questions related to dispersed
predictions. In this example the aggregate supply of students equals
exactly the demand, although individual students made errors in their
predictions. Due to the introduction of a public prediction this aggregate237
equilibrium is disturbed. In section 15.5 it is shown, however, that the
provision of public information leads to optimal improvements in
welfare. This is illustrated in table 15.5.
Contrary to table 15.1, in the calculations of this table the assumption is
made that students optimally use the public information. According to
15.3 this means that students take A' = 1/5. Therefore the destabilising
effect is less severe than in table 15.1. Furthermore, the table shows
that although there is a destabilising effect, the welfare advantages are
in total positive. The stabilisation component of students' welfare
decreases but this loss is compensated by an increase in welfare in the
allocation component. The number of students who receive wages for
which they would have decided not to enter that segment decreases.
Finally, employers gain from the destabilisation of the market.
The results of the previous section and this example show that it is not
justified to evaluate, as has generally been done, the effects of public
forecasts only with measurements at the aggregate level. The match
between total supply and total demand is only one aspect of the relation
between education and the labour market, the importance of which can
be easily dominated by mismatches at the individual level.
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All results presented in previous sections depart from the assumption
that students know (or correctly estimate) the quality of the public
prediction, i.e. they know its variance and its correlation with their own
prediction. It is very doubtful whether this is a realistic assumption. In
figure 15.5 the results of the welfare calculations in the case students
have a wrong perception of these figures, have been depicted. (In this
example they estimate the variance to be half the real variance and they
think the covariance to be 0 instead of its real value 30).
FIGURE 15.5: CONSEQUENCES FOR THE WELFARE EFFECTS, DUE TO A
MISPERCEPTION OF THE QUALITY OF THE PUBLIC PREDICTIONS.
employers
The figure immediately makes clear that the effects of such an
overestimation of the reliability of the public prediction may be rather
bad. Due to the overestimation of the public prediction students make
too much use of this additional information. Therefore the negative
welfare effect of the decrease of dispersion overwhelms the positive
effect of a decrease of the prediction error: the welfare costs for
students are lower than the costs in case no information is provided
(indicated by the straight line).
In this section an indicator is developed to measure the sensitivity of the
welfare results of section 15.4 to an overestimation of the quality of the
public forecast. This indicator consists of two parts. Firstly, the
elasticity of X' with respect to an overvaluation of o^,, indicates to
what extent behaviour changes as a result of the overvaluation. Ifo^
will be perceived incorrectly, the A. that will be chosen depends on the239
perceived o^ instead of the real o^. The elasticity indicates the
sensitivity of X for a slight misperception of o^,.
Secondly, table 15.4 gives the interval of X's for which the total
welfare effect is positive. The ratio between the break-even X at which
the welfare effect is exactly 0, and the optimal X* provides an
indication of the maximum relative change in X (due to misperception)
for which the welfare effect remains positive.
In section IS.4 (equation (15.27)) the partial derivative of X with





With the use of the non-negativity interval of table 15.3 the ratio
between the X for which total welfare is exactly zero and X*, which




FIGURE 15.6: THE DERIVATIVE OF X WITH RESPECT TO O^.
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The derivative of X* (equation (15.27)) and the ratio between the
break-even X and the optimal X are graphed in figure 15.6 and 15.7.240
Figure 15.7 shows that if X' < V2 total welfare can not be negative as a
result of a misperception. The risk of a misperception will be large if
the derivative is high, i.e. a small misperception leads to a relative large
change in A,, and will be large if the gap between optimal and break-
even A. is small, i.e. if the ratio in (15.35) is large. The risk-indicator,
/.e. the product of the elasticity and the break-even-ratio is:
(15.36) RISK = (l-r)(2-—)
Figure 15.8 shows this
A* = y^ = 0/707.
'risk'. Its maximum is reached at
The risk of a negative value of public information due to a
misperception of its quality is relatively high if the variance of the
public information is slightly less than the variance of individual
students. In this situation the public forecasts are still substantially, used
while its reliability is relatively low. Such a low quality forecast may be
very useful, but only if it is used in the right way. If its quality further
diminishes its use also decrease, which decreases its risk.
This risk-measure indicates that it is very important to report is quality
together with a public prediction. Since it is not unlikely that many
public predictions do not really dominate individual predictions by
variance, most part of their value comes from the combination of
individual and public prediction which makes necessarily a correct


















In this chapter it has been shown that the possibility of dispersion in
students' prediction complicates the relation between public information
and aggregate market outcomes. Since the value of public information
not only stems from stabilisation but also from allocation improvements
as shown in chapter 14, there may be — due to the dispersion —
situations in which aggregate supply is close to the equilibrium supply,
although many students are misallocated. Public information may
improve welfare in such a case even at the costs of destabilisation, by
improving this allocation.
An important conclusion is therefore that it is not sufficient to evaluate
the effects of public labour market information at aggregate level, but
that indiviual gains have to be taken into account.
Furthermore, it is shown that public information always improves
welfare if the condition is fulfilled that students know the relative
quality of the public forecast. This indicates that it is very important to
give students — together with the public labour market forecasts — an
indication of its reliability.242 Oio/'"''' /5
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what is the lower-bound of the interval (table 15.4) for which the value
of information with respect to students' welfare is non-negative •.243
. fl
Proof of condition (15.33) for which additional information increases
the stability of the market:
2 2







The educational choice is often an important but difficult choice. The
choice between different types of education can have long-term
consequences on the labour market. Especially at the moment a student
enters the labour market after he has finished school it may have far-
reaching consequences what type of education he has had. Therefore it
would be very relevant for students to know at the moment the
educational choice has to be made, the labour market prospects for
different types of education at the moment they finish school, which is
often four to six years in advance. Empirical evidence in chapter 4
showed that labour market prospects may change rather drastically
within some years, and that students have great difficulties in
anticipating these changes, but at the same time indeed are interested in
better information about the labour market prospects.
Many students regret their educational choice afterwards. This empirical
evidence shows that students are not fully capable of making adequate
labour market forecasts which they need for their educational choice.
Based on this notion the aim of this study is to investigate the
possibilities for the provision of public labour market forecasts which
may assist students in their educational choice.
The investigation of these possibilities requires both theoretical and
practical considerations. An analysis of the standard economic theory
about economic policy shows that this theory does not allow for
influencing people's expectations. The standard economic theory starts
from the assumption that there exists a true model of the economy.
Although it is admitted that it is difficult (or even impossible) to know
the data generating process in practice, all analyses start (implicitly)
from the assumption that the data generating process is known.
Therefore some simplified model is assumed to be the real economic
model. In this framework economic decisions can always, theoretically,
be compared to this real model.
The assumption of such a real economic model makes it difficult to
incorporate the provision of public forecasts into the model. Within this
context students' expectations are, by definition correct or incorrect. If
the expectations are already correct there is no need for public
information, and if they are incorrect the model is unable to explain
why they use these incorrect expectations, and therefore simply has to
assume that they do. The theory can not provide a reason to deviate
from the optimal expectation, and consequently can not predict how
students' expectations will change if public information is provided.
Lucas (1976) introduces an important criterium for economic theories,248
which states that economic models always have to explain why people
behave the way they do: All behaviour of the agents in the model has to
be deduced from optimality criteria. For policy analysis this is a very
important criterium. But, within the context of a theory in which the
true economic model is assumed to be given, this necessarily leads to
rational expectations. In rational expectations students' expectations are
perfect in the sense that all prediction errors they make are not caused
by inadequate analysis made by themselves, but are caused by
exogenous random shocks. In rational expectations the only way
students can be assisted in their choice is by the collection and provision
of new data. Students themselves can draw the right conclusions from
these data.
This conclusion of rational expectations is obviously in contradiction
with the real live observations that students do have difficulties in
forecasting future labour market, that the choice of the right
expectations is not obvious, and that some doubt will always persist.
To make an adequate theory about the effects of the provision of labour
market information it is therefore required that a theory is constructed
which on the one hand holds on to Lucas's criterium that an economic
theory should explain why people behave the way they do, and on the
other hand incorporates the real life notion that students do face
difficulties in predicting the future labour market situation.
Adequateness means above all that the intuitive notions about difficulties
students face are included in the theory. In this study an errors in
forecasts model is developed which makes it possible to incorporate the
provision of public forecasts which has non-trivial consequences. This
model has both theoretical and practical implications, which are
discussed in section 16.1 and 16.2, respectively. Finally, in section 16.3
possibilities for future research are suggested.
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The basic property of existing models about expectations is that they
(implicitly) depart from the assumption that the real model of the
economy is at hand. Expectation formation is modelled within this
context of a knowable data generating process. Departing from such a
model the only expectations which are optimal are rational expectations,
which are perfect expectations besides possible exogenous sources of
uncertainty. For rational expectations, making expectations is therefore
without difficulty and uncertainty. The uncertainty always lies outside
the student and the production of a forecast generates no uncertainty
itself.249
The model developed in this study does not start from the assumption of
a model of reality which is at hand, but starts from the observation that
people do have the capability to make (more or less adequate) forecasts.
A forecast will generally involve a forecast error. Essential for a
forecast is that the person who makes the forecast can not predict
himself what value this forecast error will have. If, as is the case in this
model, there is no background of the real model, it is impossible to
distinguish in a sensible way between ex an/e and ex pas/ forecast
errors, /.e. it is not possible to state that at a certain moment of time,
given the information available at that time, it was not possible to make
a better forecast than has been made. It is always possible that there is a
theory which would have been able to predict the events that actually
happened.
For that reason an equilibrium situation is defined, according to Hayek,
as a situation in which all people have actually taken the same decision
as they would have done in the case they had known the future
developments with certainty. In a situation of equilibrium there is no
need for extra information. If the actual choices people make, differ
from this equilibrium, some people will, once they know the true
developments, regret their choice. Such a deviation of equilibrium is
called mismatch, z.e. a situation which would not have occurred if all
relevant information had been known in time.
A student who has to forecast the future labour market situation
therefore has to make his own model of reality, which of course may
contain errors. If a theory is relatively abstract, the theory itself may be
rather adequate, but many important factors are left out of the model,
leading to additional exogenous random shocks (i.e. stochastic
innovations). In such a case the forecast contains only a small
interpretation error, but has a large information error. On the other
hand if the model used by a student is relatively specific, and more
factors are incorporated in the model, the importance of the exogenous
random shocks diminishes (i.e. the information error diminishes), but
due to the complexity of the forecast more interpretation errors are
included. There exists therefore a trade off between the robustness of
the abstract forecast and the precision of the specific forecast.
From this point of view it is easy to explain cobweb behaviour. People
use the very simple cobweb expectation, that future wages will equal
current wages, not because they really are naive, but because the
interpretation errors which will occur if they make their forecasts more
specific are not compensated by the gains of a more specific forecast. It
is optimal for them only to use simple rules-of-thumb.250 O«V»r 76
In the errors in forecasts model the optimal prediction depends on two
factors. Firstly, the predictability indicates student's capability to make
specific forecasts. Secondly, the variability indicates to what extent the
market is subject to changes, i.e. to what extent it is necessary to use
better models than e.g. the simple cobweb expectation. If the
predictability is low and the variability is low, 'naive' expectations are
optimal, while if predictability is high and variability is high it becomes
optimal to use more complex models of reality.
This relationship is able to explain the fact that in certain circumstances
it is difficult to reject the rational expectations hypothesis, while in other
circumstances it is easy. In a context in which professional forecasters
have to make predictions about a very fluctuative variable, (e.g. at
financial markets) the optimal expectations will be very specific. The
only prediction errors which are made in such a case are unsystematic
deviations. Usually, these independent random deviations are not treated
as evidence against the rational expectations hypothesis. In the reversed
situation, when variability is low and predictability is low (i.£. the
decision of consumers to save) the same model leads to significant
deviations from the rational expectation.
Another important implication of the model is that if some systematic
deviation from optimal expectations is observed, it is only possible to a
limited extent to manipulate these expectations, for example for a
Keynesian policy. The fact that people use such a naive expectation
scheme is caused by circumstances and as soon as these circumstances
change in order to 'misuse' these expectations, the optimal way to form
expectations will adjust to the new situation.
The aim of the study is to investigate the effects of the provision of
public forecasts to students. Within the developed model it is easy to
interpret this provision of information. A public forecast functions as a
way to improve the quality of the specific forecasts of students, and
therefore improves the predictability. An improvement of the
predictability has two effects. Firstly, it will change the optimum
between the abstract and the specific forecast. Students' forecasts will
therefore become less naive. Secondly, the prediction error of this
optimal prediction will diminish. This second effect will however be
larger if the optimal use of forecasts lies nearer to the specific forecast.
If students mainly use the naive, abstract expectation, a small
improvement of the specific expectation will not have much influence
upon the quality of the prediction actually used. Before significant
changes will occur the improved specific expectation, z'.e. the increased
predictability, first has to shift the optimal mix of the abstract and251
specific prediction.
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The errors in forecasts model developed in this study makes it possible
to investigate the effects of providing public forecasts to students. These
effects can be investigated at the individual level, but since changes in
individual behaviour will on aggregate level influence the functioning of
the market as a whole, more importantly, the welfare effects at market
level have to be taken into account. These investigations provide some
insights which may be useful for manpower forecasting and its
evaluation in practice.
At the individual level it is important to notice that the model explains
that the way students will form their expectations, rather naive or not,
depends on both the variability and the predictability of the market. This
implies that the observation of naive anticipating behaviour not
necessarily indicates the need for correction of the forecasts made by
students. It may very well be the case that the naive behaviour is due to
the low variability of the market, and therefore the need for more
appropriate forecasts is very low. A case in which both the variability is
high and the predictability is low, students' predictions may appear to
be more advanced, but this does not imply that the mismatch problem is
less severe. An appropriate measurement for the need for public
forecasts is therefore not the fact whether or not students make
systematic prediction errors (as is the case in the cobweb behaviour).
An adequate indicator measures the size of the prediction error itself.
If, however, students' behaviour is observed to be rather naive it is not
possible to assist their choice only with a small improvement of the
specific forecast. To influence the behaviour, firstly, a shift from the
abstract to the specific expectation is needed. In the case in which
expectations are more specific but nevertheless their error is large, a
small improvement of the forecast will have an immediate favourable
impact on the mismatch.
At the aggregate, market, level two welfare effects have to be
distinguished. Firstly, uncertainty causes changes in supply (i.e.
deviations from the equilibrium supply) and this will cause changes in
the realised wage. These fluctuations in the wage cause welfare effects:
the stabilisation effect. These welfare effects are for a large part only
distributional effects. If the wage is low employers gain and students
loose while if the wage is high students gain and employers loose. The
stability effect has, however, also consequences for the total welfare,252 Oiqpw /<5
because the gains do not fully compensate the losses. If the fluctuations
in the wage are caused by errors in students' predictions, students will
bear a welfare loss while employers gain from this situation. This is
caused by the fact that students' enrolment correlates negatively with the
wage. If many students enter the wage will fall, while if few enter the
wage will rise. This effect will in particular be large for the prediction
errors which relate to the prediction of labour supply. If only students'
welfare is taken into account the improvement of predictions regarding
supply is therefore very important.
Besides the stability effect there is an allocation effect. Wrong
expectations will cause students' to make wrong decisions and therefore
they will get a job which they do not prefer given the wages. This type
of effect only affects students. The welfare loss involved in it may,
however, be rather large.
If students are ignorant regarding the future labour market situation, i.e.
if they use the abstract expectation, the stability effect does not occur.
In such a case students' enrolment can be viewed upon as a constant
and therefore there is no correlation with the wage. The loss in case of
low wages is compensated by the gain in case of high wages. The
provision of public information will reduce the naivety of students'
predictions. There are circumstances in which the provision of
information reduces the total welfare costs, but in which due to the fact
that expectations become less naive, the welfare effect for students are
negative. In general, labour market problems become larger if the ratio
of the elasticities of supply and demand is larger, /.e. if there are
relatively small quantity adjustments at demand side of the market.
If the assumption is dropped that every student has the same prediction
(i.e. if dispersed predictions are introduced) a reduction of the forecast
error not necessarily leads to stabilisation anymore. Although the
provision of information may lead to destabilisation of the market, it
still has, under certain assumptions, positive welfare effects. The
possible negative effect of destabilisation is compensated by positive
allocation effects. The match between supply and demand at aggregate
level may get worse, but more students will be allocated in the job they
actually prefer.
An important assumption for this result is that students correctly
estimate the quality of the public prediction. If students overestimate
this quality the welfare gain becomes lower than possible, and the gain
may even turn into a loss. This indicates that not only public forecasts
themselves, but also an indication about their quality has value.253
The case of dispersed predictions has two important consequences for
manpower forecasting. Firstly, in the evaluation of the effects of public
forecasts not only their effects at aggregate level should be taken into
account, but also their effects upon the individual allocation of students,
which can be measured by the amount of students who regret their
educational choice afterwards. Secondly, public forecasts should always
be accompanied by an indication about the quality of the forecast.
Summarising, if students have a correct perception of the quality of a
public forecast, regardless its quality the provision of public labour
market information theoretically always improves welfare, although it
might lead to a redistribution of welfare between employers and
students.
Every study has its limitations and therefore leaves behind theoretical
questions and possibilities for future research. In this final section some
of these possibilities for future research are sketched in order to provide
insight into the limitations and prospects of the theory developed in this
study.
Economic theory, very often, is split into two approaches. The first
approach focusses on empirical justification. A theory is empirically
adequate if it fits into the economic data, thus if it is sufficiently able to
predict economic events. The other approach focusses on plausibility.
The behaviour of economic agents should be explained, i.e. it has to be
shown that the economic behaviour results from agents' optimising
behaviour.
Unfortunately, it very often seems not possible to bridge the gap
between these two approaches. The existence of this gap often leads to
the rejection of one of both approaches. The right conclusion to draw
is, however, that the theory is still uncomplete. As long as theories
based on agents' optimising behaviour lead to other results than theories
suited to predict economic data, unexplained aspects are left. Such a
situation justifies the existence of both types of theories, but also
requires attempts to overcome the contradiction.
The coexistence of rational expectations and orf Aoc expectation
theories, as the cobweb theory, is an example of a theoretical gap
between empirical justification and plausibility. This study is an attempt
to bridge the gap between both approaches to expectations. It shows the
possibility to overcome this discrepancy between models which explain
expectations from optimising behaviour and models which better fit in254 CtapKr /<S
the experience that human behaviour is far from perfect. It might be
possible to extend this type of analysis to other areas of economic
theory in which similar gaps between optimising behaviour and
observed behaviour seem to exist. An important example of this is the
theory of unemployment, in which on the one hand the real business
cycle theory explains unemployment, based on the optimising behaviour
of agents, but in a way which is clearly in contradiction with empirical
observations, while on the other hand many ad /20c theories on
unemployment are able to provide an empirical satisfactory description
of unemployment by the introduction of assumptions which, however,
contradict the optimising behaviour of agents.
Furthermore, the model developed in this study has several
shortcomings itself. It is based on some rather strong assumptions about
the relationship between education and the labour market. These
assumptions are made to reduce the complexity of the analyses, but of
course the assumptions are made in the conviction that the simplified
model which has been considered reveals some interesting aspects about
expectations formation and the relevance of information which still hold
in a more realistic model.
Two important abstractions have to be mentioned. Firstly, the welfare
analysis of the third part does not incorporate unemployement
situations. Unemployment is of course a very important characteristic of
the labour market nowadays, and many manpower forecasting activities
are directed towards the reduction of unemployment. The theory about
unemployment does, as mentioned above, not provide enough grip to
analyse the relationship between the provision of public information and
the level of unemployment.
Secondly, the model in this study assumes a fixed relationship between
education and occupation. In practice there is, however, substitution
between different types of education. It would be of great interest to
analyse the role of specialised versus more general types of education.
From the point of view of this study it may be possible to explain the
existence of general education as a way to adjust the educational system
to a situation of uncertainty.
More generally, it will be interesting to extend the development of
models in which on the one hand the true economic model is not given
to the agents anymore, but on the other hand people still behave
optimally within the context of the uncertainty they are faced with. This
might further increase the insight in theories in which deviations from
Pareto-optimality are not imposed by restricting assumptions, but can be255
explained by people's optimising behaviour. Such explanations of non-
optimal i ties are important both for welfare analyses and for predictions
about the effects of policy changes.LITERATURE
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232-242,251-255SAMENVATTING
Vanwege het grote economische belang van onderwijs voeren overheden
veelal beleid om de aansluiting van het onderwijs op de arbeidsmarkt tc
verbeteren. Dit gebeurt met behulp van zogenaamde 'manpower
forecasting' of 'educational planning'. Er worden prognoses gemaakt
van de toekomstige vraag naar arbeid met een bepaald type scholing, en
het toekomstig aanbod per opleidingscategorie. De discrepanties tussen
vraag en aanbod geven vervolgens aan waar het beleid in dient te
grijpen. De manpower-forecasting-literatuur geeft echter doorgaans niet
aan hoe er ingegrepen dient te worden. In de meeste vrije-markt-
economieen is het immers de student zelf die zijn opleidingskeuze
bepaalt en kan de overheid deze keuze niet volledig opleggen. In de
context van een vrije-markt-economie ligt het dan ook voor de hand dat
de prognoses met betrekking tot de toekomstige arbeidsmarkt niet direct
gebruikt worden voor overheidsmaatregelen, maar dat deze voor-
spellingen gebruikt worden om studenten voor te lichten over de
mogelijke consequenties van hun studiekeuze. Via het keuzegedrag van
studenten zouden deze arbeidsmarktprognoses dan toch een verbetering
van de aansluiting tussen onderwijs en arbeidsmarkt tot stand kunnen
brengen. Het doel van deze studie is deze relatie tussen het verstrekken
van arbeidsmarktinformatie aan studenten en het functioneren van de
arbeidsmarkt te onderzoeken.
Het proefschrift bestaat uit drie delen. In het eerste deel
wordt een kader geschetst waarop de rest van het onderzoek is
gebaseerd. Verder wordt in dit deel het begrippenkader zowel vanuit de
empirische als vanuit de theoretische hoek nader bekeken. In het tweede
deel /n/omzarion wordt een model (het 'errors in forecasts'-model)
ontwikkeld, waarin de problemen die studenten hebben om in hun
studiekeuze op de arbeidsmarktontwikkelingen te anticiperen, een
centrale plaats innemen. Dit model wordt gerelateerd aan twee in de
literatuur belangrijke theorieen over verwachtingsvorming, de varkens-
cyclustheorie en de theorie van de rationele verwachtingen. Het errors-
in-forecasts-model maakt het mogelijk, in tegenstelling tot deze twee
theorieen, de invloed van publieke voorspellingen op het keuzegedrag
van studenten te verklaren. In het derde deel W?//are wordt, op basis
van het errors-in-forecasts-model, onderzocht welke welvaarts-
consequenties het verstrekken van publieke voorspellingen heeft op
geaggregeerd niveau, voor zowel de studenten/werknemers als de
werkgevers.
Uitgangspunt van het onderzoek zijn de begrippen mismatch en
evenwicht. Deze worden in hoofdstuk 2 geintroduceerd. Studenten
moeten een studie kiezen op een moment waarop ze nog niet alleXXX
consequenties voor het tijdstip waarop ze op de arbeidsmarkt komen
kunnen overzien. Dit kan ertoe leiden dat tegen die tijd de arbeidsmarkt
zich zo ontwikkeld heeft dat zij spijt hebben van hun keuze. Als zij
destijds de arbeidsmarktsituatie precies gekend hadden, dan hadden zij
een andere keuze gemaakt. Deze niet optimale allocatie heet mismatch
en de optimale situatie, waarin niemand een keuze maakt waarvan hij
later spijt heeft, is het evenwicht. In hoofdstuk 3 worden deze begrippen
ondergebracht in een arbeidsmarktmodel dat als uitgangspunt voor de
rest van het onderzoek dient.
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt getoond dat de hierboven geschetste mismatch-
problematiek empirisch relevant is. Ten eerste blijken veel studenten
moeite te hebben met hun onderwijskeuze en heeft een substantieel
gedeelte van hen achteraf spijt van de studiekeuze. Ten tweede blijken
studenten in hun studiekeuze zeer duidelijk geleid te worden door
arbeidsmarktfactoren. Ten derde is er op de arbeidsmarkt sprake van
compartimentalisering, waardoor de gemaakte onderwijskeuze relevant
lijkt te zijn voor de arbeidsmarktmogelijkheden. Tenslotte zijn de
arbeidsmarktomstandigheden dermate veranderlijk dat vooruitlopen op
deze veranderingen van belang is.
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt ingegaan op het verstrekken van publieke
informatie als beleidsinstrument in de economische literatuur. Dit
beleidsinstrument blijkt geen aandacht te krijgen in de literatuur. In de
neo-klassieke theorie worden de verwachtingen van agenten gemodel-
leerd als een mechanische reactie op andere economische grootheden.
Een extreme variant hiervan betreft de rationele verwachtingen. Hier
zijn deze mechanische verwachtingen optimaal, zodat publieke
informatie geen rol meer kan spelen. Het verstrekken van publieke
informatie lijkt het best te passen binnen het neo-liberale gedachtengoed
van de Freiburger school. Hier wordt namelijk veel accent gelegd op
aan de noodzaak voor de overheid om het economische proces te
ondersteunen, zonder het te ontdoen van haar flexibiliteit, bijvoorbeeld
door de markt transparanter te maken.
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt ingegaan op de ontwikkeling van verwachtingen in
de economische theorie. Als gevolg van de formalisering van de
economische theorie, met name sinds Haavelmo, worden economische
ontwikkelingen gezien als een kenbaar stochastisch proces. Uitgaande
van een dergelijk waar model van de economie lijkt de introductie van
rationele verwachtingen onvermijdelijk. Alle andere verwachtingen
hebben namelijk, gezien vanuit dit ware model, een duidelijke
aanwijsbare systematische fout en het is niet aannemelijk dat agenten
zullen volharden in het maken van zulke systematische fouten.In hoofdstuk 7 wordt een alternatief model ontwikkeld, waarin de
aanname van een kenbaar stochastisch proces wordt losgelaten. Bij
rationele verwachtingen wordt alle onzekerheid veroorzaakt door
exogene stochastische invloeden die niet kenbaar zijn op het moment dat
een voorspelling gemaakt moet worden. Naast deze toestand-van-de-
wereld-onzekerheid wordt in het model ook onzekerheid geintroduceerd
die het gevolg is van de beperkte voorspelcapaciteiten van studenten (de
'errors in forecasts'-onzekerheid). Het blijkt dat een combinatie van
deze twee soorten onzekerheid leidt tot een optimale trade-off, waarin
studenten vanwege hun beperkte voorspelcapaciteiten overstappen op
een abstracter model van de werkelijkheid. Dit abstracter model kent
een grotere toestand-van-de-wereld onzekerheid, zodat deze vorm van
onzekerheid niet langer gezien kan worden als een gevolg van nog
onkenbare exogene invloeden. De voorspelfouten die hieruit voorkomen
zijn een gevolg van een optimale, maar niet noodzakelijke versimpeling
van het model van de werkelijkheid dat studenten hanteren.
In hoofdstuk 8 worden zowel de varkenscyclustheorie — waarin
studenten verwachten dat de arbeidsmarktomstandigheden zich niet
zullen wijzigen — en de rationele-verwachtingentheorie toegepast op de
specialisatiekeuze van leerlingen op de LTS. Het blijkt dat het
varkenscyclusmodel betere empirische resultaten geeft dan het rationele-
verwachtingenmodel. Dit duidt erop dat studenten inderdaad syste-
matische fouten maken in hun keuzegedrag.
In hoofdstuk 9 worden de implicaties van het errors-in-forecasts-model
voor de gevolgen van het verstrekken van publieke informatie verder
uitgewerkt. Uitgangspunt hierbij is Lucas' criterium dat het voor-
onderstelde gedrag van agenten altijd verklaarbaar moet zijn vanuit het
model en niet door ad /ioc aannames mag worden opgelegd. Het blijkt
mogelijk om varkenscyclusachtig gedrag van studenten te verklaren op
grond van hun lage capaciteiten goede voorspellingen over de
toekomstige ontwikkelingen te maken. Gezien deze capaciteiten
('predictability') en gezien de veranderlijkheid van de arbeidsmarkt
('variability') is het optimaal voor studenten om af te zien van een
verdergaande anticipatie van de ontwikkelingen. Door het verstrekken
van publieke informatie neemt in feite deze capaciteit om te voorspellen
toe en zullen de keuzen van studenten beter inspelen op toekomstige
veranderingen.
Theil (1958) constateerde dat voorspellingen veranderingen neigen te
onderschatten. Vanuit de theorie van de rationele verwachtingen is dit
fenomeen moeilijk te verklaren. In hoofdstuk 10 wordt deze
'underestimation of changes' verklaard vanuit het errors-in-forecasts-XXXU g
model dat in hoofdstuk 7 en 9 ontwikkeld werd. Het verschil tussen
beide modellen wordt verduidelijkt aan de hand van data van de
instroom van juristen in de Verenigde Staten.
Het klassieke varkenscyclusmodel wordt getypeerd door de golf-
beweging in instroom en lonen die het genereert. In hoofdstuk 11 wordt
dit golfpatroon onderzocht vanuit het errors-in-forecasts-model en
worden de determinanten van de omvang van deze golven afgeleid. Het
blijkt dat bij het errors-in-forecasts-model de voortgebrachte golf niet
kan divergeren.
In hoofdstuk 12 wordt de Nederlandse markt voor leerkrachten onder-
zocht aan de hand van het errors-in-forecasts-model. Het blijkt dat naast
de vervangingsvraag, het overheidsbeleid een belangrijke factor is voor
de onzekerheid en daardoor voor de grote aansluitingsproblemen op
deze markt.
In het laatste deel van het proefschrift wordt ingegaan op de
welvaartsconsequenties van het verstrekken van prognoses over de
toekomstige arbeidsmarkt. In hoofdstuk 13 wordt ingegaan op de
gehanteerde methode om welvaart te meten. Er wordt, in het partiele-
marktmodel, gebruik gemaakt van het werkgevers- en werknemers-
surplus.
In hoofdstuk 14 wordt een vergelijking gemaakt tussen de
welvaartseffecten van prijsstabilisatie en de welvaartseffecten van het
geven van publieke voorspellingen. Het blijkt dat naast de welvaarts-
voordelen door stabilisatie, het verstrekken van publieke voorspellingen
ook een positief effect heeft op de allocatie van studenten over de
beroepen. Verder blijkt de aard van de voorspelfout in sterke mate te
bepalen hoe de welvaartskosten verdeeld zijn over werkgevers en
werknemers. Doordat het verstrekken van publieke voorspellingen een
verschuiving van de aard van de voorspelfouten teweeg kan brengen, is
het in bepaalde gevallen mogelijk dat deze voorlichting voor de
studenten tot een welvaartsnadeel leidt. De studenten/werknemers en de
werkgevers te zamen zullen echter altijd profiteren van publieke
voorspellingen. '
In hoofdstuk 15 wordt ingegaan op het geval waarin studenten onderling
afwijkende prognoses van de arbeidsmarktontwikkelingen hebben.
Doordat de voorspellingen onderling uiteenlopen kan op geaggregeerd
niveau het effect van hun voorspelfouten klein zijn. In dat geval kan een
publieke voorspelling, die immers voor iedereen gelijk is, voor meer
instabiliteit zorgen en daardoor op geaggregeerd niveau de mismatch
vergroten. Uit de analyses blijkt echter dat er toch altijd sprake is vanXXXlll
een welvaartverbetering. De verhoogde instabiliteit leidt op zich wel tot
een welvaartsverlies, maar daar staat tegenover dat op individueel
niveau studenten minder snel een studiekeuze zullen maken waarvan zij
achteraf spijt hebben. Deze verbetering van de allocatie weegt op tegen
de grotere instabiliteit. Een belangrijke voorwaarde voor dit resultaat is
dat studenten op een juiste wijze de kwaliteit van de publieke
voorspelling we ten in te schatten.
Op grond van dit onderzoek naar de arbeidsmarkteffecten van het
verstrekken van publieke voorspellingen kunnen enkele belangrijke
conclusies getrokken worden voor de praktijk van 'manpower
forecasting'. Ten eerste blijken dergelijke voorspellingen een duidelijke
positieve invloed op de totale welvaart te hebben. Hoewel het
welvaartseffect voor studenten meestal positief zal zijn, hoeft dit niet
altijd het geval te zijn. Verder is het van groot belang dat naast de
voorspellingen zelf, ook een indicatie gegeven wordt van de betrouw-
baarheid van deze voorspellingen. Tenslotte moet bij het evalueren van
de efTecten van publieke voorspellingen niet alleen gekeken worden naar
de gevolgen op geaggregeerd (markt-) niveau, maar zijn ook de
gevolgen op individueel niveau van belang.CURRICULUM VITAE
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